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This thesis studies the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in capital markets, and the
effects of two important regulatory decisions that are taken to improve the quality of
information available to the capital markets. In particular, this thesis examines a) the
importance of credit ratings to the debt markets and the level of trust investors place on
CRAs b) whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
improves the quality of accounting information in European Union, and c) whether
implementation of Market Abuse Directive (MAD) has been successful in deterring the
market manipulation activities, improving the quality and flow of information to the
capital markets, and reducing selective disclosure of private information. Chapter 2 of this
thesis shows that the extent of investors’ reliance on the credit ratings depends on
whether or not these ratings correspond to the ratings that are expected based on
publically available information. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the reporting under IFRS is
associated with higher credit ratings and a lower probability and level of rating
disagreements between CRAs. The results in Chapter 4 reveal a decrease in the level of
market manipulation activities and the provision of selective disclosures subsequent to the
implementation of MAD. Chapter 4 also provides evidence of more timely and accurate
information flowing to the security markets after implementation of MAD. Overall the
findings in this thesis show that the participants in the capital markets prefer credit
ratings that have strong association with the publically available information and that
financial regulations introduced during the last decade enhanced the quantity and quality
of information available to the capital markets. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The significance of the capital market to the economic development of a country is well 
documented in both academic and professional literature. Even the success of the Industrial 
Revolution, which had profound effects on the social, economic, and cultural conditions of the 
world, is attributed to these markets.1 Since their inception, the financial markets have developed 
tremendously. They have experienced enormous growth, and have reached previously 
unimagined levels of sophistication. Despite this, however, the capital markets are still far from 
perfect. Capital markets have seen many instances of failure, from the financial hiccups of 1850s 
that culminated in the Great Depression, to the series of financial crises witnessed in last couple 
of decades. The concept of free markets does not allow any governmental intervention; 
nonetheless, the importance of financial markets to the world’s economy and the significance of 
the loss of public wealth at their failure warrants preventive measures. One of the approaches 
meant to deter market failures is to expand the information level of market participants and 
introduce regulations that ensure the smooth functioning of financial markets. Accordingly, 
different information intermediaries (such as credit rating agencies (CRAs)) are allowed to work 
in the capital markets to facilitate market participants whereas policymakers regularly develop 
new or update existing regulations to ensure the smooth functioning of the markets. The purpose 
point of this thesis is to study the role of CRAs (Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P)) in 
reducing the information asymmetry in capital markets and the effects of two regulatory steps - 
the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD) -  that are aimed to improve the quality of information and enhance the 
integrity of capital markets respectively. 
 
 
1.2 Outline 
 
Capital markets work as a bridge between the borrowers and the lenders in order to cater to 
formers’ financing needs. A major barrier in arranging any sort of financing, whether through 
                                                 
1 For instance, the famous English businessman Walter Bagehot argues in his book Lombard Street (1873) that the 
presence of efficient financial markets paved the way for the Industrial Revolution. 
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issuance of equity or debt securities, arises because of the information asymmetry that exists 
between the borrowing companies and the lenders. This information asymmetry makes the 
contracts for financial markets inefficient (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
and Diamond, 1991) and leads investors to demand higher interest rates (e.g., Goyenko at al., 
2011). A number of financial intermediaries, including the CRAs, function in the financial 
markets to facilitate debt contracting between the borrowers and the lenders. The role of CRAs in 
the financial markets is to provide an assessment as to whether the bond issuers would be able to 
meet their contractual and financial obligations when they become due. The significance of the 
assessments provided by CRAs is well documented in the literature (e.g., Allen et al., 1990; Poon 
and Chan, 2008). However, at the same time, several factors such as the lack of competition 
among credit ratings agencies, their compensation structure, and the lack of transparency of the 
rating methodology applied, raise questions about the accuracy and utility of the information 
provided by CRAs. Chapter 2 of this thesis examines whether or not the factors reported above 
affect the investors’ trust on credit ratings. We argue that if investors doubt the accuracy of credit 
ratings and carry out analysis of their own to estimate the credit risk of various debt securities, as 
has been evidenced in several studies, then the investors’ required bond yield should reflect the 
extent to which credit ratings are considered inaccurate by the investors. In other words, we posit 
that the bonds for which the ratings assigned by CRAs are higher than the ratings considered to 
be fair by the investors should have higher yield compared to the yield of the bonds for which the 
actual ratings match the expected ratings and vice versa. The results of our analysis reveals that 
the investors do indeed take into account the difference between the credit ratings assigned by 
credit CRAs and those that appear to be fair. In particular, the investors require higher yield on 
bonds that received higher than expected (fair) ratings compared to the base case bonds for 
which the credit ratings assigned by CRAs are equal to their expected ratings. Next, Chapter 2 
analyzes and explains the higher yield required by investors on split rate bonds. The literature 
(e.g., Morgan, 2002; Livingston et al., 2007) shows that information asymmetry related to certain 
bond issues leads CRAs to issue split ratings which in turn leads such bonds to sell at a higher 
interest rate (e.g., Liu and Moore, 1987; Livingston et al., 2010). We revisit the split rated bonds 
yield and find that part of the extra yield charged on split rated bonds in fact relates to the 
investors’ perception of higher than expected ratings assigned to the split rated bonds. The 
studies related to the split rated bonds further report Moody’s to be a more conservative rater 
than S&P. We examine and compare the relative conservativeness of Moody’s and S&P and find 
that Moody’s is not only more conservative as compared to S&P, but also the ratings assigned by 
Moody’s are generally lower than those predicted based on publically available information. 
Finally, this chapter provides evidence that Moody’s updates the ratings of bonds that receive 
higher than expected ratings much earlier as compared to other bonds when former sell at higher 
than expected yield. We find no such evidence for S&P. 
In Chapter 2 we examine the value relevance of credit ratings for the fixed income securities 
investors. An important building stone of Chapter 2, which is supported by both the literature 
and the CRAs, is that the availability of financial information is imperative for the CRAs to be 
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able to analyze the financial risk of a firm. In fact, financial information is not only important for 
the CRAs but also is vital for all stakeholders of the firm including the equity and debt investors. 
Understanding its importance, regulators around the world constantly strive to introduce and 
incorporate measures that would improve the quality of financial information. The adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by European Union (EU) in 2005 is one of 
the latest examples of such efforts. Since the European Commission’s decision to move to IFRS 
is one of the biggest regulatory changes, it inspired many researchers to investigate if the 
adoption of IFRS achieved the desired objectives. Most of these studies on IFRS, such as Barth 
et al. (2008), Van der Meulen et al. (2007), and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), focused 
on equity markets, whereas evidence from the debt market, a much more important and bigger 
source of finance, remains relatively scarce. In Chapter 3 of this thesis we fill this gap in the 
literature. For this purpose, we compare the credit ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P to the 
bonds issued by European financial firms. Since credit ratings are largely determined based on 
the financial information, we posit that a properly chosen set of proxies based on credit ratings 
should serve as an appropriate criteria to examine the quality of financial information. A review 
of literature suggests that the level of credit ratings assigned by CRAs and the frequency and 
level of rating disagreements between CRAs could form a possible set proxies.  
Chapter 3 provides strong evidence that application of IFRS improves the quality of 
accounting information. In particular, we find that the bonds issued by firms reporting under 
IFRS  receive higher credit ratings, on average, compared to those that are issued by the firms 
that report under other sets of accounting standards. Next, consistent with previous research, we 
find that a high proportion of bonds jointly rated by Moody’s and S&P are split rated. However, 
our results provide strong evidence that the probability of rating disagreements between Moody’s 
and S&P lowers by about 17% after firms start to report under IFRS. Our results also show that 
not only the frequency but also the level of absolute disagreement between CRAs decline for 
IFRS sample firms in instances when a split rating occurs. As an additional source of evidence 
we observe the pattern of lopsided rating disagreements, another proxy of the information 
asymmetry, between Moody’s and S&P. The analysis of lopsided ratings corroborates our main 
findings as our results show a decrease in this phenomenon once firms start to report under IFRS. 
We attribute these results to higher quality and more transparent accounting information being 
produced under IFRS.  
The adoption of IFRS that is intended to improve the quality of information available to the 
security markets shows the level of importance the regulators place on these markets. In fact, the 
regulators consider securities markets that function smoothly and have investors’ confidence as 
one of the most important prerequisites of the economic growth of a country (as stated by 
European Commission Directive 2003/6/EC). Accordingly, regulators always remain watchful of 
the operations of the security markets and, if necessary, bring in new regulations to correct or 
eliminate practices that may be detrimental to the integrity of these markets. In such an effort, 
regulators in Europe enacted a regulation called Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC in 
year 2003. The main objective of this regulation is to deter market abuse activities that put 
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certain investors in an advantageous position and to improve the proper flow as well as the 
quality of information to the security markets. MAD has already been in operation for more than 
7 years; however, there is only limited evidence available regarding its success. In Chapter 4 we 
investigate the effects of MAD on the financial information environment. In particular we focus 
on its provisions that a) aim to reduce the market manipulation, b) require prompt provision of 
inside information to the public, and c) restrict selective disclosures.  
To examine the success of provisions (a) and (b) as stated above, we focus on the stock return 
volatility around earnings announcements and the absolute cumulative abnormal returns during 
the period leading up to the earnings announcements. The market manipulation activities distort 
or lead the prices of a security to an artificial level. Based on Aggarwal and Wu (2006) and Jiang 
et al. (2005), we argue that the absence of or decline in market manipulation activities should 
lower the deviation of stock prices from their fundamental values and lessen their volatility. The 
provision of MAD that require prompt disclosure of inside information should also lead to a 
decrease in the volatility of stock prices at earnings announcements. According to Beaver (1968),  
the  investors’ reactions and the resulting movement in stock prices at the earnings 
announcements depend upon the gap between the information the investors already possess and 
the information content of earnings announcements. A larger information gap results in a higher 
stock price movement or volatility. If, in compliance of provisions of MAD, the inside 
information is released to the market on a more timely basis, then the amount of new information 
contained in the earnings announcement would be lower. This should leads to a lowered stock 
return volatility at the earnings announcements. Further, as a result of the prompt disclosure of 
the inside information the stock prices should remain closer to their fundamental values in all 
time periods, not only just before earnings announcements. To examine whether this is the case, 
we calculate absolute cumulative abnormal returns for each of the 60 days before earnings 
announcements day and until the day following the earnings report day.  
To examine the effect of MAD on the quality of information and whether the implementation 
of MAD has resulted in lowering the provision of selective disclosures, we focus on the accuracy 
and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and level of analysts’ following. The accuracy of analyst 
forecasts has been a well-accepted measure of the quantity and quality of information that is 
available to the financial market (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Barron et al., 1998;). Several 
factors affect the accuracy of the analysts’ forecast. One important factor is the analysts’ 
dependence on the management of the firm for inside information. According to the management 
relation hypotheses (Kothari, 2001), analysts withhold negative views about firms to gain better 
access to management. Since MAD disallows selective disclosures and requires prompt release 
of inside information, its implementation is expected to the reduce analysts’ dependence on firm 
managers for price sensitive, non-public information. As a result, the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts is expected to improve. The practice of selectively disclosing  private information also 
affects the dispersion of the analysts forecast. This is because providing private information to 
selected analysts results in a wider information gap between analysts. In other words, because 
they possess different information to analyze, analysts would have a higher divergence in their 
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forecasts. This notion is also supported by the analysts’ forecast dispersion model presented by 
Barron et al. (1998) and empirical studies such as Botosan et al. (2004). The implementation of 
MAD is also expected to affect the number of analysts following a particular firm. This is 
because analysts prefer to follow those firms that give them access to private information 
(Bushee et al., 2003; Hutton, 2003) which helps them to make more accurate forecasts. A 
restriction on the provision of private information may force the analysts to move away from 
those firms from which they used to receive private information and concentrate on a smaller 
number of firms so as to market themselves based on their ability to make more accurate 
forecasts.  
The results of Chapter 4 provide evidence that the implementation of MAD has a positive 
impact on the financial information environment. Specifically, our results reveal a decrease in 
the level of stock return volatility around the earnings announcement date after implementation 
of MAD. Additionally, we also find that in the post-MAD period stock prices remain closer to 
their post announcement prices compared to the pre-MAD period. Our results also provide 
evidence of an increase in the level of accuracy in analysts’ forecasts while the level of 
dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts appears to have decreased in the post-MAD implementation 
years. Finally, there is strong evidence of decline in the average number analysts following a 
firm which we attribute to a decline in the level of private information available to analysts.
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
The investors’ reaction on the difference between 
actual and expected credit ratings 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The issuance of a debt security is a complex process facilitated by several information 
intermediaries including the credit ratings agencies (CRAs). The role of CRAs in the debt 
issuance process is to provide an assessment as to whether the security issuer would be able to 
meet its contractual and financial obligations when they become due. The significance of rating 
opinions is well documented in literature as both the initial ratings and their subsequent revisions 
are evidenced to influence the bond yields (Allen et al., 1990; Mitchell, 1991; Reiter and Ziebart, 
1991) as well as stock prices (Poon and Chan, 2008; Jorion et al., 2005). In addition to borrowers 
and lenders, financial market regulators also use credit rating information to determine financial 
market regulations.1 
Despite the evidence of utility and the market’s substantial reliance on the information 
provided by CRAs, several issues surrounding them bring into question CRAs’ independence 
and, consequently, the quality and accuracy of information they provide. The purpose of this 
study is to examine if bond investors take these possible inaccuracies in the credit ratings into 
account when making investment decisions based on these ratings.  
Some of the most important of factors that raise doubt about the accuracy of the credit ratings 
relate to the fact that CRAs operate under an oligopoly structure which limits the competition 
among the rating agencies to improve the quality of their services (Becker and Milbourn, 2011), 
and the fact that CRAs rely on the clients they rate for most of their revenues which may lead 
CRAs to issue higher ratings (Smith and Walter, 2002; Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009). 
Furthermore, CRAs are also criticized on the grounds that they update their ratings with a 
significant time lag (Norden and Weber, 2004; Hite and Warga, 1997) and issue unsolicited 
                                                 
1 For instance, the U.S Security and Exchange commission (SEC) relies on credit ratings to monitor risk level of the 
investments held by regulated entities. Similarly, under Based II the minimum capital requirements of the financial 
institutions is determined based on their credit ratings. 
 Chapter 2  
8 
 
ratings that generally do not truly reflect the default risk of an issuer (Poon, 2003).1 The recent 
financial crisis has also opened a new avenue of criticism for CRAs. Some observers believe that 
CRAs are responsible for the occurrence of the current financial crisis while others accuse them 
of breaching the trust of investors who rely on CRAs for their financial decisions.2 The 
seemingly poor performance of CRAs led to a big debate among regulators to take corrective 
actions. Resultantly, several new regulations are proposed that would require CRAs to disclose 
their rating methodology, prohibits compliance officers from working on rating methodologies or 
sales, and would make CRAs liable to investors for their knowing or careless failures. 
We use two sets of studies as a foundation for our study. The first set consists of those studies, 
as discussed in the previous paragraph, that raise concerns about the accuracy of credit ratings 
issued by CRAs. The second set consists of the studies that document that investors distinguish 
among CRAs based on the credibility of the information CRAs provide and that investors carry 
out analyses of their own in order to make a judgment of the creditworthiness of a bond issuer 
(Ellis, 1998; Baker and Mansi, 2002; Livingston et al., 2010). Apart from these two sets of 
studies, we also lend support from the literature that shows that the investors’ reaction to 
information at their disposal depends on the accuracy of both the source and the content of 
information. For instance, Hutton and Stocken (2009) document that the cross-sectional variation 
in the investors’ response to the management predictions depends on the perceived accuracy of 
those predictions. Park and Stice (2000) find that the recent history of forecast accuracy 
influence the price reaction. The findings in Siha et al., (1997) suggest that investors’ reaction to 
the analysts’ forecasts is associated with the accuracy of their forecast revisions. Several other 
papers such as Shivakumar (2000), Abarbnell et al., (1995) also provide evidence that market 
response to the new information depends on the precision of information. Based on these 
findings, we posit that, if the investor indeed consider credit ratings assigned by CRAs to be  
inaccurate then, to the extent to which credit ratings issued by CRAs are considered unjustified 
should be reflected in the investors’ required bond yield spread. In other words, we argue that 
bonds for which the ratings assigned by CRAs (for stylistic convenience, we label these ratings 
as “actual ratings”) are higher than the ratings that are considered to be fair by the investor based 
on their own analysis (for stylistic convenience, we label these ratings as “expected ratings” or 
“predicted ratings”) should have higher yield as compared to the yield of bonds for which the 
actual ratings match the expected ratings and vice versa.  
To test our hypothesis we follow a two-step approach. In the first step we determine the 
expected ratings for each bond based on the available financial information. We do so by 
                                                 
1 See, for example, The Economist (1997, p. 70) on the Asian crisis: “The raters, firms such as Moody’s’ Investors 
Service, Standard and Poor’s’, Duff and Phelps and IBCA, are supposed to be the financial markets’ early warning 
system. Instead, the agencies have spent the past few months belatedly reacting to events.” 
2 The US Government Oversight and Reform Committee gave the remarks that “The credit rating agencies occupy a 
special place in our financial markets. Millions of investors rely on them for independent, objective assessments. 
The rating agencies broke this bond of trust, and federal regulators ignored the warning signs and did nothing to 
protect the public.” More importantly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in their January 2011 report 
commented that "The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown.”  
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
following existing studies such as Blume et al. (1998), Jorion and Zhang (2007), and Pagratis 
and Stringa (2009) that build statistical models to predict (expected) credit ratings.3 We then 
compare these expected ratings with the actual ratings assigned by CRAs. In the second step we 
run a regression with bond yield spread as the dependent variable. The control variables of this 
regression include the variables that are known to influence bond yields. Apart from these 
variables, we also include dummy variables that indicate whether the ratings assigned by CRAs 
are higher or lower than the expected ratings. A positive coefficient, for instance, on the dummy 
variable that indicates that a bond has  higher than expected ratings, would indicate that investors 
accounted for the difference between actual and expected ratings by making an upward 
adjustment in the required yield. We also examine whether the difference between the actual and 
expected ratings damages the information content of credit ratings. We also revisit the premium 
charged on the split rate bonds and examine if the premium charged on these bonds relates 
entirely to the opacity of the information or if part of the premium charged relates to the 
investors’ perception of inflated ratings issued to these bonds. Finally, we examine whether or 
not CRAs respond to the investors’ reaction against the higher or lower than expected ratings and 
update the ratings of such bonds earlier than other bonds. 
Using data on all newly publically issued US domestic, fixed rate, nonfinancial, non-perpetual 
and non-putable bonds issued between years 1983-2008, we report that the investors do indeed 
make an adjustment in the required yield when the actual ratings (assigned by CRAs) differ from 
the expected ratings. That is, on average, the investors require 22 (23) basis points higher (lower) 
yield when a bond receives higher (lower) than expected ratings compared to the yield they 
require for bonds of similar risk profile but for which the actual ratings are equal to expected 
ratings. Further we find that the required yield varies with the magnitude of difference between 
the actual and expected ratings. In particular, a two letter rating difference increases (decreases) 
the bond yield by up to 63 (41) basis points. These findings are apparently stronger for the 
investment grade bonds relative to the non-investment grade bonds. Apart from its impact on the 
yield spread, the difference in the actual and expected ratings also influences the capacity of the 
credit ratings to explain bond yield spread. Specifically, the power of credit ratings to explain 
residual bond yield spread declines by 7.4% when actual ratings are not equal to the expected 
ratings. With respect to the split rated bonds, as consistent with previous studies, we find that 
investors require a premium for such bonds. However, our analysis shows that part of the opacity 
premium fades away when we control for the possibility that the actual ratings assigned to the 
split rated bonds might be higher than the expected ratings. Finally, we find evidence that 
Moody’s updates the ratings of bonds with higher than expected ratings much earlier than bonds 
that sell at a higher than expected yield. We find no such evidence for Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P).  
                                                 
3 Although there is no direct evidence available about the exact statistical models that investors use in their risk 
assessment calculations, Baker and Mansi (2002) document that about 80% of investors rank the financial 
information as the most important factor that helps them make an assessment about the credit risk of a debt security. 
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A number of studies examine whether CRAs assign inflated ratings or lower ratings. Pagano 
and Volpin (2010), Mählmann (2009) and Becker and Milbourn (2011) constitute the group of 
studies that find empirical evidence that CRAs tend to assign inflated ratings to the bond issues 
whereas studies such as Blume et al. (1998) and Poon and Chan (2003, 2005) report that the 
average ratings assigned to US corporate bonds has declined overtime and that the CRAs issue 
lower ratings when these ratings are not paid for. Our study extends this stream of literature by 
documenting the investors’ response to the credit ratings that are higher or lower than the 
expected ratings. Our findings are also relevant to both CRAs and firm managers as these 
findings provide strong evidence of the investors’ preference for ratings that are reconcilable 
with publically available information. For firm managers, our findings provides additional 
evidence of the benefits of higher level of disclosures. For CRAs, our findings indicate a demand 
for higher level of transparency in the rating process. These findings also highlights the need to 
disclose some of the non-public information that is provided to the CRAs during the meetings 
between firm managers and the CRAs’ risk assessment team. Our findings are also relevant for 
regulators who are debating and contemplating bringing new regulations to the operating 
protocols of the CRAs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section, Section 2, describes the data 
selection procedure. Section 3 elaborates the methodology used in this study. The results are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
Two streams of literature are relevant to this paper. The first stream of literature reviews the 
importance of credit ratings and identifies factors that affect their accuracy. The second stream of 
literature consists of studies that discuss the ways in which the accuracy of information 
influences investors’ decisions. 
CRAs began their services in the early twentieth century in the U.S and now represent a 
multi-billion dollar industry that spreads across the big economies of the world. CRAs provide 
individual and institutional investors an independent opinion of the creditworthiness of a firm or 
the debt securities issued by a firm. A large number of debt and equity markets studies provide 
evidence that CRAs bring new and decision relevant information to the capital markets. For 
instance, Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976), Mitchell (1991) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) 
show that credit ratings help investors determine the yield of debt securities, and accordingly, a 
change in credit ratings leads to an adjustment in the prices of the debt securities. The equity 
market based studies, for instance Poon and Chan (2008) and Jorion et al. (2005); also come up 
with the analogous findings for firm stock prices. Credit rating information is also considered to 
improve the marketability and liquidity of debt securities, enhance firms’ ability to borrow funds 
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from external sources (Strahan, 1999), and advance the infrastructure of capital markets (Susan 
and Rechtschaffen, 1998). 
Despite these tested benefits of credit ratings, the literature also indentifies several factors that 
raise questions about the accuracy and efficacy of credit ratings. A main concern regarding 
CRAs is that whether or not they update the credit ratings on timely basis. The answer to this 
question, based on both the anecdotal and academic studies, is that in many instances they do 
not. The major examples that support this belief are those of Enron and Lehman Brothers. Enron 
bonds continued to be rated as investment grade by both Moody’s and S&P less than a week 
before Enron filed for bankruptcy. Lehman Brothers had an “A” grade rating from the major 
CRAs just before its collapse in mid-September 2008. With respect to the scientific evidence, 
Covitz and Harrison (2003) find that investors anticipate the change in rating profile and adjust 
the yield well before an actual rating upgrade is announced by CRAs. Additionally, Weinsstein 
(1977) show that credit ratings reflecting changes in the risk profile of a debt security lag by up 
to 18 months. Pinches and Singleton (1978) also show that the market adjusts stock prices 
several months prior to when a rating revision is actually announced by the CRAs. Zonana and 
Hertzberg (1981) show that a big portion of the outstanding bonds are even not reviewed for a 
possible change in their default risk by CRAs on a yearly basis. Many survey based studies that 
seek opinions of investors on the timeliness of credit rating information document evidence that 
corroborates the findings of archival data based studies. For instance, more than 1/3rd of the 
respondents surveyed in Ellis (1998), Baker and Mansi (2002), and Association of Financial 
Professionals (2002) believe that CRAs react with a significant delay in updating their credit 
ratings in response to a shift in the credit quality of a debt security or its issuer. The lag in 
updating credit ratings is sometimes attributed to the CRAs policy of taking a 3-5 year 
perspective so as to avoid rating updates that are prone to a reversal (Howe, 1997).4 However, 
others attribute the lag to the relatively small number of staff working at CRAs monitoring a 
large number of issuers. Additionally, the fact that CRAs are paid primarily for initial ratings and 
not the subsequent rating updates serves as a good explanation for why ratings are not reviewed 
more frequently.5 Regardless of the underlying reasons, the lag in rating updates is expected to 
harm the utility of credit rating information. 
The current fee structure of CRAs is another source of criticism. Initially, the revenue of 
CRAs consisted of the subscription fee received from investors and the sale of publications. 
After an increase in the demand of ratings due to an increase in regulations in the late 1970s, the 
CRAs switched to an “issuer pays” fee model where bond issuing firms pay CRAs to rate their 
debt securities. Although the “issuer pays” model has several merits,  it creates incentives for the 
CRAs to issue inflated ratings in order to retain and attract clients (Pagano and Volpin, 2010). 
This incentive for CRAs to issue lax ratings together with firms’ to chose any of the CRAs 
                                                 
4 Similarly (Cantor, 2001) also discusses that the credit rating agencies appear to follow an approach where the 
ratings are only updated when the reversal of updated ratings in not likely in the near future.  
5 For example, Mortensen, in a New York Times article (2005), says: “. . . rating agencies typically receive the 
largest fees when they analyze an initial bond issue. After that, a nominal fee is levied, providing something of a 
disincentive to do in-depth, time consuming work.” 
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enable firms to shop for the highest ratings. Mählmann (2009) report that about 1/4th of bonds 
issuers included in their study purchased additional ratings (in addition to the ratings from 
Moody’s and S&P) from Fitch which on average provides higher ratings compared to S&P and 
Moody’s. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) on the basis of 30,499 structured finance tranches find 
that the tranches rated by only one CRA are more likely to be downgraded compared to those 
tranches that are rated by two or more CRAs. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) argue that these 
findings show that firms purchase ratings from those CRAs that are more likely to give higher 
initial ratings. On the basis of a review of previous studies, Walter (2002) believes that a 
convincing amount of evidence exists that indicates the presence of the rating shopping 
especially when the expected rating lies close to the investment and non-investment boarder. 
Importantly, the accusation of rating “shopping” not only comes from a particular section of 
investors or researchers, but also, on certain occasions, even CRAs themselves accuse each other 
of helping issuers “shop” for higher ratings.6 A study 1996 study by Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York  also hinted  at rating “shopping” especially for firms that initially received a non-
investment grade rating from one of the CRAs. 
It is also an interesting fact that, although CRAs earn most of their revenue from the firms 
they rate, CRAs assign ratings to bonds even if their issuers have not asked and paid for the 
ratings. Such ratings are called unsolicited ratings. The unsolicited ratings, on average, are found 
to be lower than solicited ratings (Poon, 2003) and thus are not always welcomed by the security 
issuers. The practice of issuing unsolicited ratings has raised many controversies and questions 
about the CRAs motives behind issuance of these ratings. From the CRAs’ point of view, the 
unsolicited ratings are a service to “meet the needs of the market for broader ratings coverage” 
(Standard & Poor's, 2007). However, from the issuers point of view the unsolicited ratings are on 
average lower than the solicited ratings and are assigned by CRAs to persuade issuers to 
purchase solicited ratings. Parties unrelated to both CRAs and security issuers also appear to 
have a less positive view about the unsolicited ratings. For instance, as reported in Schultz 
(1991) and Harington (1997), a section of the financial market labels unsolicited ratings as 
“extortion” or “financial blackmailing” by the CRAs. Empirical studies also support the issuers 
view, at least to the extent that unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ratings. For instance, 
based on the pooled data of 595 firms in 15 countries rated by S&P during 1998-2000, Poon 
(2003) find that firms that received “solicited” ratings were assigned higher ratings compared to 
the firms that received “unsolicited” ratings. Poon (2003) further report that firms with solicited 
ratings had a better probability of getting investment grade ratings as compared to firms with 
unsolicited ratings. In a later study, Poon and Firth (2005) reported similar findings for 1,060 
banks rated by Fitch. Gan (2004) report that the unsolicited ratings issued by Moody’s and S&P 
are on average 1/2 a notch lower than the solicited ratings and hence result in an 18 basis point 
increase in the borrowing cost. Fulghieri et al. (2010), in addition to the finding that unsolicited 
ratings are lower than solicited ratings, present even more telling evidence that CRAs use these 
                                                 
6 For example, Moody accused Jefferson County of rating “shopping” when it assigned A2 rating and Jefferson 
County received a three notch higher rating of AA for S&P. 
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ratings as a credible threat to issuers and thus as a tool to extract a higher rating fee. Apart from 
the alleged “blackmailing” tool, CRAs are also believed to use unsolicited ratings to deter new 
entrants into the market (Setty and Dodd, 2003).  
CRAs operate in an oligopoly market structure. The biggest barrier to entry is the fact that 
only a limited number of CRAs have been approved as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization NRSROs. The credit rating industry has historically been dominated by two big 
rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P, which, at one point, accounted for above 90% of the market 
share (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). Partnoy (1999) argues that the SEC’s policy to give NRSRO 
status to a limited number of CRAs has eliminated the incentive among CRAs to maintain the 
quality of their ratings. Even more surprising is that the entry of a third rating agency, Fitch, and 
the resulting increased competition in the credit rating market did not improve the quality of 
credit ratings. Becker and Milbourn (2011) report that the entry of Fitch resulted in lower 
quality, more inflated, and less informative ratings from the existing CRAs. The inability of 
CRAs to maintain the quality of their ratings can also be attributed to fact that the CRAs are not 
able to attract or retain sophisticated analysts since the salaries offered CRAs are not competitive 
compared to other financial services companies (Partony, 1999). 
The second stream of literature shows that investors depend on various sources of information 
for their investment decisions. Many studies in this regard show that investors’ trust and their 
resulting decision depends on their judgment about the accuracy and reliability of the source and 
its information. Financial information, especially earnings announcements, serves as an 
important gauge of the performance of a company and helps market participants adjust firm 
stock prices (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Atiase, 1985; Heflin et al., 2003). The extant 
studies, however, show that the market reaction to these announcements depends on the accuracy 
of the financial information. For instance, Zhang (2006) find that new information has a stronger 
impact share prices when such information is issued by firms with lower information asymmetry 
compared to the information issued by firms with higher information asymmetry. Similarly, 
although the literature shows that firms manage earnings prior to seasoned equity offering 
however, as shown by Shivakumar (2000),  investors are able to identify possible management of 
earnings and adjust the share prices accordingly. Foster (1979) find that firms that managed their 
earnings experience a drop in their stock prices in the subsequent period. Dechow et al. (1996) 
document a similar downward adjustment in stock prices when regulators show suspicion over 
financial statement accuracy. The research shows that investors adjust for the possible 
inaccuracy in the information not only emanating directly from the firms but also from other, 
more sophisticated sources such as financial analysts. For instance, Abarbnell et al, (1995) in a 
theoretical framework built on the relationship between the analysts’ forecasts and investors’ 
beliefs, show that investors’ responses to analysts’ forecast revisions positively links with the 
expected accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Empirically, Stickel (1992) find that stock prices 
respond more strongly and predictably to more accurate forecast revisions. Park and Stice 
(2000), based on the analysis of all forecast revisions announced in the years 1990 through 1994, 
show that investors differentiate analysts’ based on analysts’ forecast accuracies and react to 
 Chapter 2  
14 
 

analysts’ forecast revisions based on the perceived accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Similarly, 
Gleason and Lee (2003) show that the price reaction to forecast revisions is more swift and 
complete when the analysis is more accurate.  
Based on the findings that the market response to new information depends on the precision 
of the new information, and the fact that more than 1/3rd of investors do not believe that credit 
ratings reflect true debt security credit risk, a natural question arises of whether or not investors 
adjust for the possible bias in the credit ratings. If so, then such an adjustment should be reflected 
in the investors’ required yield. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
 For purpose of this study, we follow a two-step approach. In the first step we construct a 
credit ratings prediction model using ordered probit regression based bonds issued between 1983 
and 1994 and rated by both Moody’s and S&P. We do not include (notch level) split rated bonds 
in our rating prediction model. The choice of  period 1983-1994 is arbitrary, but, as shown by the 
robustness test analysis, choosing a different time period does not materially change our results. 
On the basis of this model, we predict credit ratings for the remaining set of bonds included in 
our sample of the bonds issued between 1995 to 2008. The dependent variable for this ordered 
probit regression is the actual rating assigned to a bond at its issue. Both Moody’s and S&P 
assign ratings that are represented by various letters. Following existing literature, we convert 
these letter ratings into ordinal numbers. For example, we convert letter rating AAA to numerical 
rating 1, letter rating AA to 2, A to 3, BBB to 4, BB to 5, B to 6 and letter rating CCC to 
numerical rating 7. The specific variables that we use in this ordered probit model are the pre-tax 
interest coverage ratio (Int_Cov), operating income to sales ratio (OperInc_Rev), long term debt 
to assets ratio (Ltd_Assets), total debt to assets ratio (Td_Assets), and firm size (Size). Apart from 
these ratios, we also include a firm beta (Beta) and standard errors from market model (SE) to 
control for the equity risk of a firm. The inclusion of these variables in our rating prediction 
model is based on previous studies such as Blume et al., (1998), Jorion and Zhang (2007) etc. 
Based on the these studies we expect higher pre-tax interest coverage ratio, operating income to 
sales ratio, and firm size to have a positive effect on the ratings assigned to the bonds. Higher 
long term debt to assets ratio and total debt to assets ratio are expected to be associated with 
lower ratings. Similarly, firms with higher beta and standard errors from market model are likely 
to receive lower ratings for their bonds issues. The ordered probit model used in our rating 
prediction analysis is defined as: 
 
S&P_Rating = ȕ0 + ȕ1Int_Covi,t + ȕ2OperInc_Revi,t  
+ ȕ3Ltd_Assets ratioi,t + ȕ4Td_ Assets ratioi,t  
+ ȕ5Sizei,t +ȕ6Betai,t + ȕ7SEi,t  + İ              (1) 
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Panel A and B in Table 2.1 provides a detailed definition and description of variables. In the 
second step we use multivariate regression to examine the yield on bonds issued from 1995 to 
2008. The dependent variable for this analysis is the yield spread (T_Spread) which is calculated 
as the difference between the offer yield to maturity of a bond less yield on comparable treasury 
at offer date. The independent variables are based on existing studies and include the dummy 
variables representing the default risk of a bond, the bond maturity (Mat), the total bond 
proceeds (Proc), and the bonds senior/subordinate status (Sub). We also include dummy 
variables to identify callable bonds (Call), bonds issued under Rule 415 (R415) or under Rule 
144a (R144a), split rated bonds (Splitrated), and bonds issued by utility firms (Utility). 
Following Livingston and Zhou (2010), we control for the influence of general market conditions 
on the yield spread of bonds by including a variable (Riskprem) that is defined as the difference 
between the Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond Index Yields and yield for the 10-year treasury 
securities.7 To examine whether the investors are sensitive to the difference between the ratings 
that are expected (based on the public information) and the rating actually assigned, we compare 
the ratings predicted in the first step with the actual ratings assigned to these bonds by the CRAs 
and construct two dummy variables Higher and Lower. The variable Higher (Lower) is set equal 
to 1 when the actual ratings are higher (lower) than the expected rating and 0 when actual ratings 
are equal to expected ratings. If the investors are sensitive to the difference between actual and 
expected ratings, they are also likely to be sensitive to the magnitude of the difference between 
the actual and expected ratings. To examine this we include four dummy variables Dh1, Dh2, 
Dl1 and Dl2 in the regression equation. The dummy Dh1 equals 1 when the actual rating 
assigned to a bond is higher than the expected rating by one letter rating and 0 otherwis. The 
dummy variable Dh2 equals 1 when the actual rating is higher by two or more letter ratings 
compared to the expected rating and 0 otherwise. Similarly, dummy variables Dl1and Dl2 
identify bonds with ratings that are one and two or more letters respectively lower than the 
ratings predicted by our model. The bonds with ratings that are equal to the ratings expected by 
our model are the reference categories. Therefore, the coefficient on Dh2, for instance, reveals 
the difference in yield on two bonds that have same actual ratings but with one that has an actual 
rating two or more letter ratings higher than expected and the other that has actual ratings equal 
to the expected ratings. The treasury spread regression model is defined as follows: 
 
 
T_Spread = ȕ0 + ȕ1Mati,t + ȕ2Proci,t + ȕ3Subi,t + ȕ4Calli,t 
+ ȕ5Utilityi,t + ȕ6R415i,t + ȕ7R144ai,t + ȕ8Riskpremi,t  
+ ȕ9Default risk dummiesi,t + ȕ10Splitratedi,t 
 +ȕ11Test variablesi,t + ߝ                (2) 
 
                                                 
7 We do not control for any firm specific variables such as firm size, return on equity, liquidity, etc. since the impact 
of these variables is already reflected in the bond ratings. (Bannier et al., 2010). 
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2.4 Data  
 
We collect the required data from three different databases including Thomson Financial SDC 
database, COMPUSTAT, and EVENTUS. We start with Thomson Financial SDC database and 
retrieve issue specific information for all newly issued US domestic, fixed rate, nonfinancial, 
non-perpetual, and non-putable bonds issued between 1983 to 2008. We focus only on the newly 
issued bonds for two reasons. First, as argued by Livingston et al. (2010), the ratings assigned to 
new issues are more likely to be based on the most updated information of the issuer. This is 
especially true given the fact that CRAs lag in updating their rating opinions according to the 
new information available for the issuer (for instance, Ederington and Goh, 1998). Initial ratings 
are also likely to be more accurate than subsequent ratings as CRAs are likely to spend more 
time and effort on credit assessment at the time of bond issuance rather than after issuance. 
Accordingly, we believe that the yield of a bond is likely to have a higher association with the 
assigned ratings at the time of issue than it will in later periods. The issue specific information 
includes the total proceeds of the issue, the time to final maturity, the spread to the bench mark, 
and the ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P. Finally we use EVENTUS to estimate betas and 
standard errors from the market model.  
Our final sample consists of 7,634 bonds issued by 885 distinct firms. Majority of them i.e., 
6,652 bonds (issued by 548 distinct firms), are investment grade bonds while the remaining 982 
bonds (issued by 337 distinct firms) are non-investment grade. Table 2.2 elaborates the sample 
construction steps.8  
 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics of our sample. To facilitate comparison we divide the 
entire sample into three sub-samples and discuss their mean statistics. The first sub-sample 
consists of the observations in which the actual ratings are higher than expected ratings 
(AR>ER). The second sub-sample consists of observations in which actual ratings are equal to 
the expected ratings (AR=ER). Our final sub-sample consists of the bonds where the actual 
ratings are lower than the expected ratings (AR<ER).  
Starting with the variables included in the rating prediction model, the three sub-samples 
appear to be quite similar in terms of long term debt to assets (Ltd_Assets: AR>ER; 0.25 
AR=ER; 0.27, AR<ER; 0.26) and total debt to assets ratios (Td_Assets: 0.32, 0.34, 0.33). Also, 
these sub-samples do not differ from each other with respect to market beta (Beta: 1.01, 0.98, 
0.98) and standard error of residuals (SE: 0.02, 0.02, 0.02). However, AR>ER sample has 
slightly better pre-tax interest coverage (Int_Cov: 9.18, 8.72, 8.59) and operating income to sales 
                                                 
8 Following (John, 2010), we exclude a small number of bonds, precisely 11, with negative treasury spread from our 
analysis. The negative treasury spread might be caused by an error in the database since a close to zero but still 
positive treasury spread is expected even on very highly rated bonds. 
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ratios (OperInc_Rev: 0.21, 0.06, 0.14) compared to the other samples. The AR>ER sample firms 
are also bigger in terms of their average market value than the sample firm in the other two sub-
samples (Size: 16033.6, 12385.1, 15338.2). The important thing to note here is that despite being 
similar to the other two sub-samples, the AR>ER sample firm have significantly better ratings 
compared to the AR<ER and AR=ER sample firms.  On average the AR>ER sub-sample is 2.31 
(or AA+ in terms of S&P rating symbols) against the average rating of 3.25 (AA) for AR<ER 
and 3.40 (AA) for AR=ER sample. In terms of yield spread, AR>ER sample firms have a lower 
yield spread (T_Spread: 0.95, 1.27, 2.22) as compared to firms in other sub-samples. With 
respect to the control variables used in our treasury spread regression, the bonds falling in 
AR>ER category have a longer term of maturity (Mat: 14.18, 13.58, 12.02) but are smaller in 
terms of total proceeds of the bonds (Pro: 198.13, 252.83, 364.84). With regard to the other 
control variables, the AR>ER sample contains a higher percentage of senior (Sub: 0.01, 0.01, 
0.13, with respect to AR<ER only), non-callable (Call: 0.44, 0.46, 0.67), R415 registered (R415: 
0.88, 0.88, 0.79, with respect to AR<ER only), and Rule144a (R144a: 0.06, 0.02, 0.02) bonds but 
a lower percentage of bonds issued by utility (Utility: 0.03, 0.08, 0.07) firms. Finally, all three 
sub-samples have quite similar Riskprem, 1.28, 1.29, 1.28 respectively, which indicates that 
these sub-samples are equally spread over the entire period of our sample. 
 
 
 
2.5 Univariate results 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.3 show that the actual ratings differ from the expected 
ratings for approximately 50% of the bonds included in our sample. About 26.75% of the total 
bonds receive ratings that are lower than their expected ratings while 22.5% bonds received 
ratings that are higher than their expected ratings. Among these bonds, 18.92% bonds have 
actual ratings that are higher than their expected ratings by one rating category (letter level), 
while for 3.63% bonds the actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings by two or more 
rating categories. For 21.89% bonds the actual ratings are lower than the expected rating by one 
category, while for 4.86% bonds this difference is equal to or higher than two rating levels. 
In this section we examine whether the difference between the actual and expected ratings 
assigned to a bond matters to investors and is reflected in their required yield spread. For this 
purpose, we divide the entire sample of our bonds into different categories on the basis of 
whether their actual ratings are higher than (AR>ER), equal to (AR=ER), or lower than 
(AR<ER) the expected ratings. For convenience, we call these categories higher-rated, base case, 
and lower-rated categories respectively. Next, we compare the mean yield for high-rated and 
low-rated categories with the mean yield for the base case. The results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 2.4. The average yield for high-rated bonds is significantly higher than the 
average yield for base case bonds. For instance, as reported in column C to E, the average yield 
for AAA bonds in higher-rated category is 0.233 points higher than the average yield for the base 
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category AAA rated bonds. This trend remains visible in all rating levels (i.e., from AAA till 
CCC). We further divide the higher-rated category into two sub-categories, one-level-higher-
rated and two-or-more-level-higher-rated, on the basis of whether the actual ratings are higher 
than expected ratings by “one” or “two or more” levels. The results of these two sub-categories, 
as reported in column F to H and I to K respectively, show that the yield for one-level-higher-
rated categories is significantly higher than the yield for base case in 4 out of 6 rating levels. 
Similarly, the average yield for two-or-more-level-higher-rated category is higher than the yield 
of base case in 4 out of 5 rating levels. With respect to the lower-rated category, the results are 
less convincing. For example, the average yield is lower than the yield for base case in of 3 out 
of 6 rating levels, but the difference is significant in the expected direction for only one rating 
level. However, the difference is significant in the opposite direction for two rating levels. The 
analysis for sub-categories based on whether the actual ratings are lower by “one” or “two or 
more” rating levels, in contrast to our expectations, also reveals the pattern that the required yield 
for these sub-categories is, in general, higher than the yield on our bases category. 
 
 
2.6 Multivariate results 
 
2.6.1 Determination of expected ratings 
 
As described in the methodology section, we follow a two-step to approach to gather evidence 
that whether the difference between the actual and expected ratings has a bearing on the 
investors’ required bond yield. 
The results of the first step where we predict ratings for newly issued bonds based on the 
publically available information are reported in Table 2.5. The coefficients on all of the 
variables, except for Beta, have predicted signs. The coefficients on variables Int_Cov, 
OperInc_Rev and Size are negative and significant. This is consistent with the previous findings 
that bonds issued by the bigger firms, or by the firms with high interest coverage or stronger 
operating performance receive higher ratings. Also, consistent with the earlier findings, the 
coefficients on the variables depicting the gearing levels of the issuers (Ltd_Assets, Td_Assets) 
are positive (although the coefficient on Td_Assets is not significantly different from zero) 
meaning that the gearing levels increase issuers’ default risk, and hence, the CRAs, holding 
everything else constant, prefer to assign lower ratings to bonds issued by high leveraged firms. 
With respect to the variables used to proxy the equity risk of the issuers, the coefficient on Beta 
is negative and significant which is opposite to the conjecture that bonds issued by risky issuers 
are expected to receive lower ratings. However, after the standard errors are adjusted for the firm 
clusters, the coefficient on Beta no longer remains significantly different from zero. The second 
proxy for the issuer risk (SE) is positive and significant in the expected direction.  
Next, we predict ratings for our sample based on the model developed in Table 2.5. Table 2.6 
tabulates the actual and expected ratings for the sample that is later used to examine whether the 
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difference between the actual and expected rating has a bearing on the average bond yield 
spread. The prediction power of our model, based on the percentage of bond ratings correctly 
predicted, is 40.71%. This is relatively low compared to the prediction power of the models built 
by earlier studies.9 However, in the context of this study, our aim is not to come up with a new 
model with a higher predictability power. If our model does not represent the ratings as might be 
expected by the investors then the variables that we construct based on these predicted ratings 
would not have any significant impact in our treasury spread regression.  
 
2.6.2 Difference between actual and expected ratings and required yield 
 
Having determined the expected ratings for the sample bonds, in this section we analyze 
whether the differences between expected and actual ratings have any impact on the average 
yield spread of the newly issued bonds. For this purpose, we modify the regression equation (2) 
by including indicator variables Higher and Lower. The variable Higher is equal to 1 when 
actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise, while variable Lower is set 
equal to 1 when the actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise. By this 
construction, all instances of bonds issues with the same actual and expected ratings become our 
base case. Model 1 in Table 2.7 reports the results of this analysis. In terms of our test variables, 
the coefficient on Higher is positive (0.222) and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient 
on Lower is negative (-0.235) and significant. The estimated effects of both variables are also 
economically significant. For instance, the coefficient of 0.222 on Higher suggests that investors 
on average require approximately a 22 basis point higher yield spread on the bonds with higher 
than expected ratings compared to the bonds for which the actual and expected ratings are the 
same. Likewise, the coefficient of -0.235 on Lower means that investors require 23 basis points 
lower yield spread when the actual ratings assigned to the bonds are lower than the expected 
ratings. With respect to the control variables, most of the issue and issuer specific variables are 
significant and have expected coefficient signs. These results show that the yield spread of a 
bond is positively associated with the length of its maturity (Mat), whether the bond is callable 
(Call) or split rated (Splitrated), and the market default risk premium prevalent at the issue date. 
The results also reveal that bonds issued under rule R415 (R415) and R144a (R144a) or by utility 
firms (Utility) have a lower yield spread compared to the other bonds. The positive coefficient 
sign on Proc is consistent with the notion that bonds with large proceeds are likely to have a 
negative impact on the leverage of a company and thus lead to higher yield spread. The 
coefficient on Sub is different than expected but is not significantly different from zero. The 
bond specific risk premium dummies (i.e., the dummies created based on the ratings assigned to 
the bonds) reveal a very instinctive pattern. The investors’ required yield monotonically 
                                                 
9 The percentage of out of sample bond ratings correctly predicted by our model is 40.71%. The prediction power of 
models used in previous studies remains about 55% (for example, Blume et al. (1998). One possible explanation for 
the lower predictability power of our model is that previous studies mainly limit their sample to investment grade 
bonds only while the sample used in this study contains both investment and non-investment grade bonds. 
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increases with the increase in the default risk of bonds. Importantly, there is a sudden rise (from -
4.157 for BBB bonds to -2.884 for BB bonds) in the demanded yield spread for the bonds that 
are rated at below investment grade.  
Next, we examine whether these findings are applicable for both investment and non-
investment grade bonds. For this purpose, we break the full sample into two sub-samples, 
investment grade bonds sample and non-investment grade bonds sample, and perform our 
analysis for each of these two samples separately. The results for the investment grade sample, 
reported in Model 2, are very similar to those of the full sample. That is, the indicator variables 
Higher (0.162) and Lower (-0.232) have expected coefficient signs and are highly significant. In 
the non-investment sample, Model 3, the indicator variable Higher is also positive (0.565) and 
significant, whereas the indicator variable Lower has an expected negative sign but is not 
significant. In sum, these results provide evidence that, in general, the difference between actual 
and expected ratings matters to the investors for both investment and non-investment grade 
bonds, though the evidence is much stronger for the investment grade bonds compared to that of 
obtained for the non-investment grade bond. 
Up to this point, we have only considered the effect of higher or lower than expected ratings 
but have not considered the magnitude of the difference between the actual and expected ratings 
on investors’ required yield. The notion here is that if the expected ratings influence the 
investors’ demanded yield, then the required yield should increase/decrease as the difference 
between the actual and expected ratings widens. Thus, accordingly, we include dummy variables 
Dh2, Dh1, Dl1, and Dl2 to reflect the level of difference between the actual and expected ratings 
on both the higher and lower side.10 The results of this analysis are reported in Model 4 in Table 
2.7. The coefficient on Dh1 and Dh2 are 0.148 and 0.635 respectively. These coefficient values 
reveal that investors require about 15 basis points higher yield for the bonds that receive one 
letter level better than expected ratings compared to the base case bonds. The required yield 
raises by 64 basis points in the case of the bonds that receive two letter levels better than the 
expected ratings relative to the yield on base case bonds. These results indicate that investors 
demand a higher yield on bonds for which the actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings, 
and that the magnitude of demanded yield increases with the increase in the difference between 
the actual and expected ratings. The negative coefficients on Dl1 (-0.185) and Dl2 (-0.414), in 
line with expectations, reveal that investors adjust and require a lower yield for bonds with lower 
than expected ratings compared to the base case bonds.  
 
2.6.3 Difference between actual and expected ratings and the information 
content of ratings 
 
                                                 
10 Since there are only a few bonds for which the actual and expected ratings differ by more than two letter level 
ratings, we combine all such bonds together with the bonds for which the difference between actual and expected 
ratings is equal to two letter levels. 
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In this section we examine whether the association between the yield spread and credit ratings 
varies depending on whether or not the actual bond ratings correspond to the expected ratings. 
For this purpose we follow a two step approach as used in Becker and Milbourn (2011) and 
examine the contribution of credit ratings in R2 for the yield spread regressions. Specifically, in 
the first step we run regress T_Spread on variables, except S&P_Rating, that are known to 
influence bond yields. In the second step, for each of the two sub-samples that we create on the 
basis that whether or not the actual ratings are equal to the expected ratings (called AR <> ER 
and AR = ER respectively), we regress the residuals from the first stage regression on 
S&P_Rating. The results of this analysis are reported in Model 1-3 in Table 2.8. For the AR = 
ER sample the R2 is 32.87% which is higher than the R2 , 25.41%, for AR <> ER model. For 
both AR = ER and AR <> ER samples the coefficient on S&P_Rating is significantly different 
from zero and is comparatively higher for AR = ER sample. Collectively, this analysis provides 
evidence that information content of credit ratings is rises when credit ratings are equal to the 
expected ratings and declines when the actual ratings do not correspond to the expected ratings. 
 
2.6.4 Difference between actual and expected ratings and the information 
asymmetry premium 
 
Split rated bonds are bonds for which CRAs do not agree on a default risk and hence assign 
divergent ratings. A number of studies identify information asymmetry as the main factor behind 
the occurrence of split ratings. Morgan (2002), for instance, report that bonds issued by firms 
operating in highly opaque industries (e.g., the financial industry) are more likely to receive split 
ratings compared to bonds issued by firms operating in other industries. Similarly, Livingston et 
al. (2007) based on a sample of non-financial firms, document that the instances of split ratings 
are more pronounced among firms that have a higher level of information asymmetry. Finally, 
the research on split rated bonds also shows that investors require an opacity premium on split 
rated bonds (e.g., Liu and Pu, 1987; Livingston and Zhou, 2010).. 
Since split rated bonds receive two distinct ratings, a natural question arises of which of the 
two ratings determines the yield for such bonds. A number of previous studies try to provide 
answer for this question and come up with varied findings. Billingsley et al. (1985), Liu and Pu 
(1987) and Perry et al. (1988) find that the lower of the two split ratings determine the yield of 
bonds. In contrast, Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) and Ziebart and Reiter (1992) indicate that bond 
yield is associated more with the higher rather than the lower of the two ratings. Evidence also 
shows that the bond yield corresponds to the average of two ratings (e.g., Livingston et al., 
2007). Recently, (e.g., Livingston et al., 2010) show that the yield on split rated bonds is 
associated with the ratings from Moody’s which is generally considered to be a more 
conservative rater.  
In the previous section we find that bonds with higher than expected ratings have higher yield 
compared to similar risk bonds for which the actual ratings are equal to the expected ratings. In 
this section we revisit the question of why investors require a higher premium on split rated 
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bonds. Based on our findings in the previous section, we examine whether the extra yield 
charged on the split rated bonds consists only of the opacity premium only, as reported in various 
studies, or if it also includes an adjustment for the difference between the actual and expected 
ratings. To do so, we examine and compare the yield required for the split rating bonds over 
three different models. The first model is the traditional yield regression model that examines 
whether, after controlling for the relevant factors, the investors require a higher yield on split 
rated bonds. The second model includes variables Higher and Lower to indicate whether the 
rating assigned to a bond is higher or lower than the expected rating. The third model extends the 
second model by including an interaction term, Splitrated*Higher, between Splitrated dummy 
and indicator variable Higher. This interaction term essentially separates any extra yield required 
by investors for higher than expected ratings from the opacity premium charged on split rated 
bonds. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.9. In Model 1, which is our base 
model, the coefficient on Splitrated is positive (0.164) and significant at a 1% level implying 
that, on average, investors require 16 basis points higher yield on split rate bonds. The results of 
the Model 2 reveal that the investors’ required yield on split rated bonds decreases slightly to 14 
basis points after controlling for the difference between the actual and expected ratings. In Model 
3, the coefficient on interaction term Splitrated*Higher is positive (0.229) and significant 
(p=0.06), while the coefficient on the Splitrated dummy falls to 0.109 and its significance lowers 
from 1% level to 5% level. These results provide some indication that the premium charged by 
investors on split rated bonds is not solely based on the opacity of information but partly on the 
investors’ perception of prevision of higher than expected ratings assigned to these bonds. 
 
2.6.5 The relative conservativeness of Moody’s and S&P 
 
There exists quite a consensus among researchers that Moody’s is a relatively conservative 
rater when compared to S&P. That is, in the case of jointly rated split rated bonds, Moody’s is 
found to assign slightly lower ratings than does S&P. In this section we examine whether 
Moody’s is a conservative rater relative to S&P only or if Moody’s conservativism may be 
generalized. In Table 2.10, we compare the ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P with each 
other and with the ratings predicted based on publically available information. Results show that 
30% (40%) of the split rated bonds rated by Moody’s (S&P) received ratings that are equal to the 
expected ratings. About 51% of the split rated bonds received lower than excepted ratings from 
Moody’s whereas about 40% of the bonds received lower than expected ratings from S&P. 
Along the same lines, only 15% percent bonds apparently received higher than expected ratings 
from Moody’s while 20% of the sample bonds received higher than expected ratings from S&P. 
These results suggest that the ratings issued by Moody’s are not only lower than the ratings 
assigned by S&P but also lower than those that are predicted based on public information. 
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2.6.6 Difference between actual and expected ratings and rating revisions 
 
Our analyses in the preceding sections show that bond investors take into account the 
difference between actual and expected ratings and adjust the required yield accordingly. An 
important point to examine here is whether CRAs respond to the investors’ reaction and revisit 
the default risk of the bonds for which the actual ratings do not correspond to the expected 
ratings. At least one previous study i.e., Livingston et al. (2008) indirectly support the idea that 
the difference between the actual and expected ratings might be a factor for an earlier rating 
revision. In their study Livingston et al. (2008) compare the probability of rating migration 
between split and non-split rated bonds and document that the split rated bonds are more likely to 
receive a revised rating in the future compared to non-split rated bonds. The authors further find 
that the CRA that assigns higher (lower) initial ratings to a split rated bond is more likely to 
make a downward (upward) revision of the rating in a subsequent period. 
To examine if the difference between actual and expected ratings also leads to an earlier 
rating revision, we divide the entire set of bonds, with all the necessary information available, in 
two groups based on whether the actual rating assigned to a bond is equal to the expected rating 
(AR=ER) or not (AR<>ER). We then compare the average number of days before which a rating 
revision occurs for each of these groups of bonds. The results of the univariate analysis are 
reported in Table 2.11. Results show that Moody’s revises much earlier the ratings of  AR<>ER  
group than they do for  AR=ER group. Specifically, for AR<>ER group, the first rating revision 
on average takes place 854 days after the initial ratings as compared to 1,032 days for AR=ER. 
However, when a distinction is made between the bonds with higher than expected ratings and 
those with lower than expected ratings, Moody’s appears to bring in early rating revisions only 
for bonds that have lower than expected ratings. There is no significant difference between the 
average time before Moody’s revises a bond rating with higher than expected ratings and 
AR=ER group bonds. Specifically, the results show that Moody’s, on average, updates the credit 
rating of bonds with lower than expected ratings 814 days after the initial ratings whereas it 
updates bond ratings with higher than expected ratings on average, after 1,108 days. The 
subsample analysis further reveals that the magnitude of difference between the actual and 
expected rating also has a bearing on the timing of rating revisions. For instance, the bonds with 
one level lower than expected ratings receive their first rating revision 851 days after their initial 
rating while bonds with two levels lower than expected ratings receive their first rating revision 
after 738 days. The sub-sample analysis does not reveal a consistent and significant evidence for 
bonds with higher than expected ratings. In terms of analysis based on S&P data, contrary to the 
expectations, S&P appears to maintain the ratings of AR<>ER bonds  for a slightly longer period 
of time compared to AR=ER bonds (779 vs. 726 days). The sub-sample analysis reveals that this 
trend is more visible and significant for bonds that receive higher than expected ratings (1,151 
vs. 726). The bonds that receive lower than expected ratings appear to receive a rating revision 
sooner than the base case bonds (684 vs. 726 in case of Lower by 1+ notch category) but these 
results are not statistically significant. 
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Next, we apply a multivariate analysis to analyze the impact of difference in actual and 
expected ratings on rating revision. The dependent variable of our regression analysis is the 
difference in number of days between the initial and first subsequent rating change for each bond 
issue. The test variable consists of variables Higher and Lower that indicate, for each bond, 
whether the bond received a higher or lower than expected ratings. A dummy variable, 
Yield_High, designates whether a bond’s initial yield is higher or lower than the predicted 
yield.11 We also include the interaction between Yield_High and the test variables Higher and 
Lower. Our motivation to include yield indicator variable (Yield_High) is based on the notion 
that the CRAs would not, for instance, find it necessary to revise the ratings on the bonds with 
higher than expected ratings if these bonds trade at a yield which corresponds to their actual 
ratings. The set of control variables are based on Livingston et al. (2008) . These control 
variables include the dummy variables that correspond to each bond’s credit rating, dummy 
variables indicating the state of economy, (i.e., peak, normal and trough at the time of issue of a 
bond). Following Livingston et al. (2008)  we define the year of a bond issue as a “peak year” if 
the real economic growth of that year remained higher than 4%, and a “trough year” if the real 
growth during the year remained below 3%. The remainder of the years which become the base 
case are defined as “normal”. Previous studies show that the split rated bonds are more likely to 
receive a rating revision sooner compared to other bonds. Accordingly, we include variable 
Splitrated to identify these bonds. Finally we also include a list of year dummy variables.  
The results of our multivariate analysis based on Moody’s rating are reported in Model 1 of 
Table 2.12. The coefficient on variable Higher is positive (335.052) and significant while that 
coefficient on Lower is negative (-164.868) but not significant. The coefficient on variables 
High_yield is 220.803 which is significant at the 10% level. With respect to interaction terms 
Higher*High_Yield is negative (-540.629) and significant (p=0.022) whereas the 
Lower*High_Yield is negative (-153.578) but not significant (p=0.266). These results indicate 
that, on average, Moody’s maintains the initial ratings of the bonds that receive higher than 
expected ratings for a much longer time than other bonds. However, the rating revision occurs 
considerably earlier for such bonds if they trade at higher than estimated yield. In terms of 
control variables, most have expected signs. Namely, the coefficients on Splitrated, Trough, and 
credit risk dummy variables are negative. This reveals that the credit ratings of the split rated 
bonds  and of those issued during years with lower economic growth are updated earlier than 
bonds issued in years of normal or high economic growth (note that the coefficient on Peak is 
positive and significant). Furthermore, the coefficients on the rating dummies show that low risk 
bonds are expected to have more stable ratings compared to high risk bonds.  
We repeat the analysis with the dependent variable based on the number of days after which 
S&P introduces the rating update after the initial rating. The results of this analysis are presented 
as Model 2 in Table 2.12. Once again, the coefficient on Higher is positive and significant 
                                                 
11 To predict the yield for each bond we ran a bond yield regression for the entire sample of bonds. We then predict 
the yield for each bond based on this model. Next we compare the actual and estimated yield to determine whether a 
bond is traded at higher or lower than the predicted yield.  
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suggesting that S&P also maintain the ratings of the bonds that receive higher than expected 
ratings for a longer period of time compared to other bonds. However, none of the other test 
variables are significant suggesting that our findings based on the analysis of ratings from 
Moody’s do not hold for S&P. 
 
 
2.7 Robustness 
 
We perform additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we use robust 
standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and year. The result of this analysis is 
reported in Model 1 in Table 2.13. According to these results, all the test variables have the 
expected coefficient signs and are highly significant. The resulting p-values are, in general, very 
similar to the ones reported for our main analysis. 
Next, we replicate our main analysis based on random samples taken from the full sample. 
That is, we draw a random sample of approximately 1/4th of the bonds included in our sample to 
build a rating prediction model. Based on this model, we predict expected ratings for the 
remaining bonds. Next, on the basis of these expected ratings, we construct several test variables 
such as Higher, Lower etc., following the procedure explained in methodology section. We then 
re-run regression equations (1) and (2) for 1,121 times. The average results of these replications 
are reported in Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 2.13. Similar to our main findings, the coefficient 
on all test variables have anticipated signs and, with one exception of Dh2, are highly significant. 
For instance, in line with the main results, the estimated average coefficient on Higher and Dh1 
are positive and significant at better than 0.05 levels while Dh2 narrowly misses the 0.10 
significance level with the average two-sided p-value of 0.155. Likewise, the estimated average 
coefficient on Lower, Dl2, and Dl1 are negative and significant. The detailed replication results, 
presented in Table 2.14, further reveal that in the overwhelming majority of replications (well 
above 80%, except of Dh2) the coefficients on test variables are significant at better than 0.05 
levels. Finally, in only 1 out of 1,121 replications a test variable has an unanticipated coefficient 
sign.  
As an additional robustness check, we test whether our findings are applicable at all credit 
rating levels or if a particular rating category is driving our results. For this purpose, we include 
Higher, Lower, Dh2, Dh1, Dl1, and Dl2 dummies for each rating categories in the yield spread 
regression. The results shown in Table 2.15 reveal that our previous findings almost consistently 
apply to all the rating categories. In particular, these results show that out of 22 dummies 
variables 15 have the significant expected signs.12 Only 3 dummy variables with unexpected 
signs are significant at conventional level. These results indicate that investors nearly 
                                                 
12 The reason that we have 22 rating dummies instead of 28 rating dummies is as follows: The expected ratings 
cannot be higher than AAA so for AAA ratings category the creation of dummies variables Dl2 and Dl1 is not 
possible. Similarly, for AA rating category Dl2 will have zero observations. The same reasoning applies to the two 
lowest rating categories C and B. 
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consistently require higher (lower) yield when the actual ratings are higher (lower) than expected 
ratings.  
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Several factors raise questions about the objectivity and quality of the information provided 
by CRAs. These factors relate to a number of issues including the market and fee structure of the 
credit rating industry, the allegations to allow rating shopping, the lag in rating updates, and the 
issuance of punitive unsolicited ratings. All together, these factors raise questions about the 
utility of credit ratings and whether these ratings truly reflect the credit risk of an issuer.  
In this paper we examine whether these factors effect investors’ reliance on credit ratings 
issued by CRAs. Based on a large set of bonds jointly rated by Moody’s and S&P, our analysis 
reveals following results. First, we find that the investors do indeed take into account the 
difference between the credit ratings assigned by credit CRAs and those considered fair. In 
particular, the investors require a higher (lower) yield on bonds that received higher (lower) than 
expected ratings compared to the base case bonds for which the credit ratings assigned by CRAs 
are equal to their expected ratings. These findings hold for both investment and non-investment 
grade bonds but the results are stronger for the investment grade bonds. Second, we find that the 
information content of credit ratings declines when these ratings are different than the expected 
ratings. Third, consistent with the prior literature, we find that that investors do require a higher 
yield for split rated bonds. However, we find evidence that this extra yield does not entirely 
relate to the information opacity. Rather, part of this yield is explained by the difference between 
the actual and expected ratings. Finally our results show that the difference between the actual 
and expected ratings forces Moody’s to bring in a rating change earlier if such bonds sell at a 
yield that is higher than the expected yield. We do not find such evidence in the case of S&P. 
Our study is also relevant to the stream of literature that examines whether the CRAs make a 
fair risk assessment of the debt securities. Our study contributes to this literature by documenting 
investors’ response when the outcome of the CRAs’ risk assessment of a bond issue differs from 
the outcome that is expected based on public information. Our findings are also relevant for firm 
managers as well as CRAs as they suggest that investors prefer those ratings that are reconcilable 
with the publically available information. For firm managers, our findings provide additional 
evidence of the benefits of a higher disclosure level. In other words, a higher disclosure level 
would help investors understand the basis of the ratings assigned to a firm’s debt securities and 
would lead to lower interest costs. From the point of view of CRAs, the findings of this paper 
show that, although the credit ratings are one of  the most important determinant of the yield of a 
bond,  investors do not appear to trust these ratings unquestionably. A possible suggestion could 
be that CRAs should become more transparent about their rating criteria and, if practical, provide 
a brief description of the basis of the ratings assigned to a security. This would help CRAs keep 
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investors believing in the CRA ratings especially in cases where the ratings assigned are not 
easily reconcilable with the publically available information.  
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Table 2.2: Sample construction 
This table describes the sample construction and number of observations dropped at each step. The sample consists 
of all newly publically issued US domestic, fixed rate, nonfinancial, non-perpetual and non-putable bonds issued 
between years 1983-2008. 
Initial sample (total domestic bonds issued by public US firms between (1983-2008))  132,109 
Less:   
 Non-fixed interest rate bonds (26,478)  
 Privately placed bonds (12,128)  
 Bonds with Perpetual maturity (2,168)  
 Bonds with credit enhancement (12)  
 Bonds issued by firms from financial sector, SIC(6011-6799) (73,569) (114,355) 
Total sample of bonds retrieved from SDC  17,754 
Less:   
 Bonds with missing credit ratings (2,952)  
 Bonds with missing information required for rating prediction model.  (7,168)  
Sample of bonds used in credit rating model (885 unique firms)  7,634 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in this study. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for 
the dependent and control variables used in rating prediction model. This model is based on all newly publically 
issued US domestic, fixed rate, nonfinancial, non-perpetual and non-putable bonds issued between years 1983-1994. 
Panel B contains descriptive statistics for the dependent and control variables used in the bond yield regression 
model. The sample for this model consists of all newly publically issued US domestic, fixed rate, nonfinancial, non-
perpetual and non-putable bonds issued between years 1995-2008. To facilitate comparison, we divide the entire 
sample into three sub-samples. The first sub-sample, denoted as AR>ER, consists of the observations for which the 
ratings assigned by CRAs (for stylistic convenience, we label these ratings as ‘actual ratings’) are higher than those 
predicted based on publically available financial information (for stylistic convenience, we label these ratings as 
‘expected ratings’). The second sub-sample consists of observations where actual ratings are equal to the expected 
ratings (AR=ER). The final sub-sample consists of the bonds where the actual ratings are lower than the expected 
ratings (AR<ER). The variable definitions are provided in Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.1. 
Variables N Mean P25 P50 P75 Std. Dev 
Panel A. Rating prediction model 
Ratings-Actual 2098 3.162 3.000 3.000 4.000 1.105 
Ratings-Expected 2098 3.125 3.000 3.000 3.000 0.848 
Int_Cov 2098 6.090 3.413 4.419 6.440 6.827 
OperInc_Rev 2098 0.196 0.117 0.164 0.265 0.118 
Ltd_Assets 2098 0.264 0.170 0.251 0.347 0.138 
Td_Assets 2098 0.349 0.256 0.338 0.420 0.153 
Size (billion) 2098 6.531 0.948 3.059 6.519 10.341 
Beta 2098 1.171 0.820 1.213 1.477 0.481 
SE 2098 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.006 
Panel B. Treasury spread model. Actual ratings lower than the expected ratings (AR<ER) 
 N Mean P25 P50 P75 Std. 
Ratings-Actual 1799 3.868 3.000 4.000 4.000 0.916 
Ratings-Expected 1799 2.506 2.000 3.000 3.000 0.943 
Int_Cov 1799 13.477 3.729 6.289 11.511 34.366 
OperInc_Rev 1799 0.228 0.131 0.208 0.278 0.237 
Ltd_Assets 1799 0.243 0.153 0.227 0.323 0.122 
Td_Assets 1799 0.301 0.215 0.294 0.383 0.129 
Size (billion) 1799 25.87 2.40 8.33 27.77 41.37 
Beta 1799 0.928 0.617 0.900 1.170 0.452 
SE 1799 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.018 0.005 
T_Spread 1799 1.731 0.880 1.430 2.150 1.310 
Mat 1799 12.370 5.110 10.140 10.360 11.547 
Proc 1799 0.433 0.150 0.300 0.520 0.442 
Sub 1799 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 
Call 1799 0.636 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
Utility 1799 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.316 
R415 1799 0.895 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.307 
R144a 1799 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.171 
Riksprem 1799 1.328 0.900 1.270 1.660 0.483 
Splitrated 1799 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.328 
       
Panel C. Treasury spread model. Actual ratings equal to the expected ratings (AR=ER) 
 N Mean P25 P50 P75 Std. 
Ratings-Actual 1452 3.154 3.000 3.000 4.000 1.016 
Ratings-Expected 1452 3.154 3.000 3.000 4.000 1.016 
Int_Cov 1452 8.587 4.194 6.417 9.550 8.200 
OperInc_Rev 1452 0.121 0.130 0.178 0.244 2.744 
Ltd_Assets 1452 0.258 0.166 0.251 0.327 0.133 
Td_Assets 1452 0.324 0.232 0.312 0.401 0.141 
Size (billion) 1452 15.89 2.26 6.06 16.24 29.03 
Beta 1452 0.837 0.583 0.773 1.050 0.421 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
SE 1452 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.007 
T_Spread 1452 1.268 0.640 0.950 1.530 1.063 
Mat 1452 12.718 5.090 10.140 12.190 11.285 
Proc 1452 0.220 0.025 0.150 0.299 0.294 
Sub 1452 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133 
Call 1452 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
Utility 1452 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 
R415 1452 0.899 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.301 
R144a 1452 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.191 
Riksprem 1452 1.425 1.020 1.380 1.750 0.474 
Splitrated 1452 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.337 
Panel D. Treasury spread model. Actual ratings higher than the expected ratings (AR>ER) 
 N Mean P25 P50 P75 Std. 
Ratings-Actual 316 3.016 2.000 3.000 4.000 1.199 
Ratings-Expected 316 4.212 3.000 4.000 6.000 1.276 
Int_Cov 316 5.612 3.844 4.802 6.729 3.554 
OperInc_Rev 316 0.154 0.099 0.159 0.224 0.298 
Ltd_Assets 316 0.319 0.235 0.290 0.364 0.154 
Td_Assets 316 0.394 0.299 0.371 0.429 0.145 
Size (billion) 316 7.07 0.88 2.50 11.34 9.34 
Beta 316 0.830 0.477 0.747 1.022 0.534 
SE 316 0.024 0.015 0.022 0.028 0.015 
T_Spread 316 1.617 0.725 1.115 2.260 1.341 
Mat 316 12.707 7.100 10.140 10.185 12.011 
Proc 316 0.178 0.040 0.150 0.250 0.167 
Sub 316 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 
Call 316 0.516 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.501 
Utility 316 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.184 
R415 316 0.911 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.285 
R144a 316 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.147 
Riksprem 316 1.518 1.060 1.520 1.920 0.490 
Splitrated 316 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.434 
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Table 2.5: Ordered Probit Regression 
This table reports the results of the ordered probit regression model based on a 2098 non split-rated Moody’s and 
S&P jointly rated bonds issued between years 1983-1994. The p-values in Model 1 are based on the standard errors 
while p-values in Model 2 are based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted for potential clustering 
problem caused by issuance of multiple bonds by the same firm. The dependent variable for both probit regression 
models is S&P_Rating. S&P_Rating presents letter level ratings assigned by S&P to a bond issue. S&P_Rating is an 
ordinal variable while S&P assigns letter ratings to bond issues. We convert these letter ratings into numerical 
ratings following existing literature. Namely, we convert letter rating AAA to numerical rating 1, letter rating AA to 
2, letter rating A to 3 and so on. The control variables, except for Int_Cov, are based on Blume et al. (1998). With 
respect to Int_Cov, Blume et al. (1998) divide the interest coverage ratio of an issuer into four categories based on 
whether the interest coverage ratio is less than 5, between 5 and 10, between 10 and 20 and 20 and 100. We do not 
use such categories. The variable definitions are provided in Panel A of Table 2.1.  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
P>|z| Robust Standard 
Errors 
P>|z| 
Int_Cov -0.020 0.004 0.000 0.012 0.098 
OperInc_Rev -2.608 0.263 0.000 0.660 0.000 
Ltd_Assets 4.058 0.329 0.000 0.917 0.000 
Td_Assets 0.131 0.276 0.636 0.621 0.833 
Size -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Beta -0.235 0.069 0.001 0.158 0.136 
SE 124.451 6.374 0.000 20.847 0.000 
N 2098     
Rating boundaries 
AAA <-0.641   0.398  
AA -0.641<>0.921   0.363  
A 0.921<>2.675   0.391  
BBB 2.675<>4.044   0.448  
BB 4.044<>4.479   0.471  
B 4.479<>9.886   1.931  
CCC >9.886   1.931  
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Table 2.6: Actual versus Expected ratings 
This table tabulates the actual ratings against the expected ratings for the bonds issued  between years 1995-2008. 
The actual ratings are the initial ratings assigned to these bonds by S&P. The expected ratings present the ratings 
that are predicted for these bonds on the ordered probit model in Table 2.5. The tabulated ratings serve as a 
measure of the goodness of fit of model presented in Table 2.5. This table, for instance, shows that 117 bonds are 
jointly rated as AAA by S&P and Moody. The model in Table 2.5 correctly predicts AAA ratings for 103 of those 
bonds whereas 3 of these bonds are expected as AA, 7 as A, 2 as BBB and another 2 as B rated bonds. 
 Actual ratings  
Expected ratings AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Total expected 
AAA 103 119 208 58 1 1 0 490 
AA 3 122 229 149 2 3 0 508 
A 7 109 841 765 115 22 2 1861 
BBB 2 1 60 299 89 47 1 499 
BB 0 2 1 22 19 10 0 54 
B 2 0 5 23 39 66 11 146 
CCC 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 9 
Total Actual 117 353 1344 1316 266 155 16 3567 
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Table 2.7: Treasury Spread Regression controlling for the difference between actual and expected ratings 
This table presents the results of the treasury spread regression that examines whether the difference between the 
ratings assigned by CRAs (actual ratings) and those that are predicted based on publically available financial 
information (the expected ratings) effects the bond yield. The dependent variable, for all the models reported in this 
table, is the T_Spread. T_Spread is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ (Y) of a bond less 
‘yield on comparable treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). The control variables are based on Livingstone and Zhou 
(2010). Model 1 examines whether the difference between the actual ratings and expected ratings affects the 
required bond yield. In Model 1, apart from the control variables used in Livingstone and Zhou (2010), we also 
include indicator variables Higher and Lower in the treasury spread regression. The variable Higher equals 1 when 
the actual ratings are higher than the expected rating and 0 otherwise. The variable Lower is set equal to 1 when 
actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise. Model 2 and Model 3 are similar to Model 1 and 
presents the results for investment and non- investment grade bonds separately. Model 3 examines the effect of the 
magnitude of the difference between the actual and expected ratings on bond yield. For this purpose, apart from the 
control variables used in Livingstone and Zhou (2010), we include indicators variables Dh2, Dh1, Dl2 and Dl1 in 
the treasury spread regression. The variable Dh2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher than the expected 
ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dh1 equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher 
than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are 
lower than the expected ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl1 equals 1 when the 
actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 otherwise. Model 3 examines the trend in 
use of in house credit risk analysis by investors. The variable definitions are provided in Panel B of Table 2.1. The 
p-values in are based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted for potential clustering problem caused by 
issuance of multiple bonds by the same firm. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 4 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Mat 0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0630) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
Proc 0.000** 
(0.024) 
0.000** 
(0.026) 
0.000 
(0.119) 
0.000*** 
(0.008) 
Sub -0.033 
(0.842) 
0.167 
(0.112) 
0.019 
(0.920) 
-0.020 
(0.901) 
Call 0.111*** 
(0.005) 
0.098** 
(0.021) 
0.437*** 
(0.004) 
0.107*** 
(0.009) 
Utility -0.013 
(0.832) 
-0.032 
(0.535) 
-0.051 
(0.885) 
0.012 
(0.846) 
R415 -0.350*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040 
(0.508) 
-0.817*** 
(0.000) 
-0.334*** 
(0.000) 
R144a -0.433*** 
(0.000) 
-0.211*** 
(0.007) 
0.631 
(0.269) 
-0.420*** 
(0.000) 
Riksprem 0.998*** 
(0.000) 
0.920 
(0.000)*** 
1.977*** 
(0.002) 
1.003*** 
(0.000) 
AAA -5.467*** 
(0.000) 
-1.273*** 
(0.000) 
 -5.497*** 
(0.000) 
AA -5.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.853*** 
(0.000) 
 -5.014*** 
(0.000) 
A -4.731*** 
(0.000) 
-0.569*** 
(0.000) 
 -4.716*** 
(0.000) 
BBB -4.157*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 -4.171*** 
(0.000) 
BB -2.884*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-2.464*** 
(0.000) 
-2.809*** 
(0.000) 
B -1.725*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.502*** 
(0.002) 
-1.641*** 
(0.000) 
Splitrated 0.142*** 
(0.004) 
0.180*** 
(0.001) 
-0.103 
(0.545) 
0.137*** 
(0.006) 
 Chapter 2  
37 
 

     
Table 2.7 (continued) 
Higher 0.222*** 
(0.001) 
0.162** 
(0.010) 
0.565** 
(0.022) 
 
Lower -0.235*** 
(0.000) 
-0.232*** 
(0.000) 
-0.196 
(0.317) 
 
Dh2    0.635*** 
(0.000) 
Dh1    0.148** 
(0.027) 
Dl1    -0.185*** 
(0.000) 
Dl2    -0.414*** 
(0.000) 
constant 4.735*** 
(0.000) 
4.721*** 
(0.000) 
4.701*** 
(0.000) 
4.695*** 
(0.000) 
N 3567 3130 437 3567 
Adj. R2 62.37% 63.48% 64.52% 64.97% 
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Table 2.8: The difference between actual and expected ratings and information content of ratings 
This table presents the results of the analysis that examines whether the difference between the actual and expecting 
ratings has a bearing on the information content of credit ratings. The dependent variable in Model 1, Model 2 and 
Model 3 is the T_Spread which is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ (Y) of a bond less 
‘yield on comparable treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). The control variables in Model 1 are based on Livingstone 
and Zhou (2010) expect that we use the ordinal variable S&P_Rating instead of a dummy variable for each rating 
category. In Model 2, we indicator variable Equal which takes a value 0 when actual ratings are equal to expected 
ratings and 0 otherwise. In this model we also include an interaction term, S&P_Rating*Unequal, between 
S&P_Rating and Equal. Model 3 regresses T_Spread on all control variables used in Model 1 except for 
S&P_Rating. Model 4 and Models regresses the residuals from Model 3 on credit ratings. Model 4 is based on 
bonds for which actual ratings differ from the expected ratings while Model 5 uses the sample bonds for which 
actual ratings are equal to the expected ratings. The variable definitions are provided in Panel B of Table 2.1. The p-
values in are based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted for potential clustering problem caused by 
issuance of multiple bonds by the same firm. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Mat 0.000144 
(0.906) 
  
Proc -0.000118 
(0.227) 
  
Sub 1.782*** 
(0.000) 
  
Call 0.378*** 
(0.000) 
  
Utility -0.0668 
(0.621) 
  
R415 -1.142*** 
(0.000) 
  
R144a -1.432*** 
(0.000) 
  
Riksprem 0.873*** 
(0.000) 
  
S&P_Rating  0.499*** 
(0.000) 
0.495*** 
(0.000) 
Splitrated 0.122* 
(0.076) 
  
Constant 1.188*** 
(0.000) 
-1.689*** 
(0.000) 
-1.773*** 
(0.000) 
N 3,567 1,452 2,115 
R-squared 40.53% 32.87% 25.41% 
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Table 2.9: Split rated bond analysis 
This table presents the results of the analysis that examines the difference between the ratings assigned by CRAs 
(actual ratings) and those that are predicted based on publically available financial information (the expected ratings) 
on the split rated bonds yield. The dependent variable for these treasury spread regressions is the T_Spread. 
T_Spread is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ (Y) of a bond less ‘yield on comparable 
treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). Model 1 is the base model that examines the effect of several control variables, 
including the split rating identifier, Splitrated on bond yield. Model 2 presents the results of the analysis where, 
apart from the variables included in the Model 1, we also control for the difference between actual and expected 
ratings on bond yield. Model 3 is an extension of Model 2 with the inclusion of the interaction term, 
Higher*Splitrated between Splitrated and Higher. Splitrated is a dummy variable that identifies bonds for which 
Moody’s and S&P differ in their ratings by at least one letter rating. Higher in a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
the actual ratings are higher than the expected rating and 0 otherwise. The rest of the control variables are based on 
Livingstone and Zhou (2010). The variable definitions are provided in Panel B of Table 2.1. The p-values in are 
based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted for potential clustering problem caused by issuance of 
multiple bonds by the same firm. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Mat 0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
Proc 0.000 
(0.437) 
0.000** 
(0.024) 
0.000** 
(0.020) 
Sub -0.081 
(0.632) 
-0.033 
(0.842) 
-0.039 
(0.815) 
Call 0.121*** 
(0.004) 
0.111*** 
(0.005) 
0.112*** 
(0.005) 
Utility -0.053 
(0.513) 
-0.013 
(0.832) 
-0.017 
(0.792) 
R415 -0.379*** 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.000) 
-0.346*** 
(0.000) 
R144a -0.487*** 
(0.000) 
-0.433*** 
(0.000) 
-0.437*** 
(0.000) 
Riksprem 1.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
AAA -5.274*** 
(0.000) 
-5.467*** 
(0.000) 
-5.481*** 
(0.000) 
AA -4.814*** 
(0.000) 
-5.019*** 
(0.000) 
-5.035*** 
(0.000) 
A -4.591*** 
(0.000) 
-4.731*** 
(0.000) 
-4.743*** 
(0.000) 
BBB -4.114*** 
(0.000) 
-4.157*** 
(0.000) 
-4.167*** 
(0.000) 
BB -2.837*** 
(0.000) 
-2.884*** 
(0.000) 
-2.886*** 
(0.000) 
B -1.628*** 
(0.000) 
-1.725*** 
(0.000) 
-1.731*** 
(0.000) 
Splitrated 0.164*** 
(0.003) 
0.142*** 
(0.004) 
0.109** 
(0.040) 
Higher  0.222*** 
(0.001) 
0.169** 
(0.023) 
Lower  -0.235*** 
(0.000) 
-0.236*** 
(0.000) 
Higher*Splitrated   0.229* 
(0.069) 
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Table 2.9 (continued) 
Constant 4.551*** 
(0.000) 
4.658*** 
(0.000) 
4.744*** 
(0.000) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 3567 3567 3567 
Adj. R2 64.17% 64.62% 64.76% 
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Table 2.10: Conservativeness of Moody’s and S&P 
This table presents the results of the analysis where we compare ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P (actual 
ratings) with the ratings predicted based on publically available information (expected ratings) information. The 
sample for this analysis consists of 791 split rated bonds. This table, for instance, reveals that 157 of the split rated 
bonds received higher than expected ratings and 315 bonds received lower than expected ratings from S&P. For 319 
bonds, the ratings assigned by S&P are equal to the expected ratings. 
 S&P Moody’s 
Actual ratings > Expected ratings 157 (19.85%) 120 (15.17%) 
Actual ratings = Expected ratings 319 (40.33%) 266 (33.63%) 
Actual ratings < Expected ratings 315 (39.82%) 405 (51.20%) 
Total 791 791 
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Table 2.12: Rating revision regression controlling for the difference between actual and expected ratings 
This table presents the results of the analysis that examines whether the difference between the ratings assigned by 
CRAs (actual ratings) and those that are predicted based on publically available financial information (the expected 
ratings) leads to an early rating revision by CRAs. The dependent variable of the regression analysis is ‘Days’ which 
is defined as the difference,  in number of days, between the date of initial bond ratings and the date of first 
subsequent rating change. The independent variables are based on Livingston et al. (2008). In Model 1 the 
dependent variable ‘Days’ is calculated based on the initial and first subsequent bond rating changes by Moody’s. In 
Model 2 the dependent variable ‘Days’ is calculated based on the initial and first subsequent rating change by S&P. 
The analysis consists of a subsample of all bonds including in our main analysis for which the credit rating history is 
available through Bloomberg Finance. The p-values in are based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted 
for potential clustering problem caused by issuance of multiple bonds by the same firm. The variable definitions are 
provided in Panel C of Table 2.1. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
Variables  Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Higher 335.051** 
(0.042) 
342.364* 
(0.070) 
Lower -164.868 
(0.183) 
127.266 
(0.214) 
High_Yield -220.803* 
(0.077) 
-98.0369 
(0.261) 
Higher* Yield_High -540.629** 
(0.022) 
-55.411 
(0.748) 
Lower* Yield_Low 153.578 
(0.266) 
91.702 
(0.398) 
Splitrated -81.246 
(0.290) 
-108.073 
(0.102) 
Peak 725.995*** 
(0.000) 
301.947* 
(0.052) 
Trough -160.653* 
(0.089) 
-138.149 
(0.143) 
AA -967.964*** 
(0.000) 
-510.274 
(0.214) 
A -813.945*** 
(0.001) 
-795.909** 
(0.014) 
BBB -725.953*** 
(0.002) 
-643.074** 
(0.043) 
BB -1122.562*** 
(0.000) 
-964.025*** 
(0.003) 
B -1078.579*** 
(0.000) 
-832.758*** 
(0.010) 
CCC -1088.659*** 
(0.000) 
-956.482*** 
(0.007) 
Constant -1826.868*** 
(0.000) 
1329.726*** 
(0.000) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
N 1110 1178 
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Table 2.13: Robustness test based on random samples 
This table presents the results of the robustness tests of the main findings. The dependent variable, for all the models 
reported in this table, is the T_Spread. T_Spread is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ 
(Y) of a bond less ‘yield on comparable treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). The control variables are based on 
Livingston and Zhou (2010). In Model 1, apart from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou (2010), we 
also include indicator variables Higher and Lower in the treasury spread regression. The variable Higher equals 1 
when the actual ratings are higher than the expected rating and 0 otherwise. The variable Lower is set equal to 1 
when actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise. In Model 1, the p-values are based on two-
way clustering based on the year and the issuer of the bond. Model 2 presents the average coefficients values of 
control variables that result from 1121 bond yield regressions that are carried on 1121 random sample taken out of 
the main sample to examine whether the difference between the ratings assigned by CRAs (actual ratings) and those 
predicted based on the publically available information (expected ratings) affects the required bond yield. Model 3 
examines the effect of the magnitude of the difference between the actual and expected ratings on bond yield. For 
this purpose, apart from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou (2010), we include indicators variables 
Dh2, Dh1, Dl2 and Dl1in the treasury spread regression. The variable Dh2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are 
higher than the expected ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dh1 equals 1 when the 
actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl2 equals 1 
when the actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The 
variable Dl1 equals 1 when the actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 
otherwise. For Model 2 and Model 3, the p-values are based on robust standard errors that have been adjusted for 
potential clustering problem caused by issuance of multiple bonds by the same firm. The variable definitions are 
provided in Panel B of Table 2.1. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
Variables  Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Mat 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Proc 0.000* 
(0.083) 
0.000** 
(0.024) 
0.000 
(0.116) 
Sub -0.132 
(0.321) 
-0.033 
(0.842) 
-0.150 
(0.266) 
Call 0.069 
(0.103) 
0.111*** 
(0.005) 
0.074* 
(0.083) 
Utility -.0388 
(0.538) 
-0.013 
(0.832) 
-0.043 
(0.513) 
R415 -0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.000) 
-0.266*** 
(0.000) 
R144a -0.396*** 
(0.000) 
-0.433*** 
(0.000) 
-0.408*** 
(0.000) 
Riksprem 0.867*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
0.866*** 
(0.000) 
AAA -5.183*** 
(0.000) 
-5.467*** 
(0.000) 
-4.937*** 
(0.000) 
AA -4.912*** 
(0.000) 
-5.019*** 
(0.000) 
-4.716*** 
(0.000) 
A -4.619*** 
(0.000) 
-4.731*** 
(0.000) 
-4.446*** 
(0.000) 
BBB -4.070*** 
(0.000) 
-4.157*** 
(0.000) 
-3.902*** 
(0.000) 
BB -2.614*** 
(0.000) 
-2.884*** 
(0.000) 
-2.496*** 
(0.000) 
B -1.334*** 
(0.000) 
-1.725*** 
(0.000) 
-1.446*** 
(0.000) 
Splitrated 0.0904*** 
(0.008) 
0.142*** 
(0.004) 
0.086** 
(0.013) 
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Table 2.13 (continued) 
Higher  0.222*** 
(0.001) 
0.125** 
(0.011) 
Lower  -0.235*** 
(0.000) 
-0.119** 
(0.019) 
Dh2 0.217 
(0.155) 
 
 
 
Dh1 0.141*** 
(0.003) 
  
Dl1 -0.128*** 
(0.008) 
  
Dl2 -0.392** 
(0.013) 
  
Constant 4.424*** 
(0.000) 
4.735*** 
(0.000) 
4.312*** 
(0.000) 
N 3567 3567 3567 
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Table 2.14: Detailed results of robustness tests 
This table provides the detailed results of the robustness test where we run the bond yield regression for 1121 times 
based on the random sub-samples taken out of the main sample. The results in this table, for instance, reveal that in 
1064 of these regressions the coefficient on variable Higher is positive and significant at p=0.05 level and in 1112 of 
these regression the coefficient on Higher is positive and significant at p=0.100. Further, the results also reveal that 
in 1 out of 1121 regressions, the coefficient on variable Higher is negative. The dependent variable in all treasury 
regression is the T_Spread. T_Spread is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ (Y) of a bond 
less ‘yield on comparable treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). The control variables that are based on Livingston and 
Zhou (2010). In the treasury spread regression that examines whether the difference between the actual ratings and 
expected ratings affects the required bond yield, apart from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou 
(2010), we also include indicator variables Higher and Lower in the treasury spread regression. The variable Higher 
equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher than the expected rating and 0 otherwise. The variable Lower is set equal 
to 1 when actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise. In the treasury spread regression that 
examines the effect of the magnitude of the difference between the actual and expected ratings on bond yield, apart 
from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou (2010), we include indicators variables Dh2, Dh1, Dl2 and 
Dl1 in the treasury spread regression. The variable Dh2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher than the expected 
ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dh1 equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher 
than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are 
lower than the expected ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl1 equals 1 when the 
actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 otherwise.  
Variables No. of simulations P-values <0.05 P-values <0.100 Unexpected sign 
Higher 1,121 1,064 (94.92%) 1,112 (99.20%) 1 
Lower 1,121 950 (84.74%) 1,098 (97.95%) 0 
Dh2 1,121 90 (8.04%) 338 (30.10%) 0 
Dh1 1,121 1,059 (94.47%) 1,105 (98.56%) 0 
Dl1 1,121 971 (86.57%) 1,067 (95.12%) 0 
Dl2 1,121 934 (83.26%) 1,047 (93.32%) 0 
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Table 2.15: Robustness test. The treasury spread regression for each rating category 
This table presents the results of the treasury spread regression that, for each credit rating category, examines 
whether the difference between the ratings assigned by CRAs (actual ratings) and those that are predicted based on 
publically available financial information (the expected ratings) effects the bond yield. For this purpose we estimate 
a separate treasury spread regression for each rating category. The dependent variable for these treasury spread 
regressions is the T_Spread. T_Spread is defined as the difference between the ‘offer yield to maturity’ (Y) of a 
bond less ‘yield on comparable treasury at offer date’ (COMPTY). The control variables are based on Livingston 
and Zhou (2010). We examine whether the difference between the actual ratings and expected ratings affects the 
required bond yield by, apart from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou (2010), including indicator 
variables Higher and Lower in the treasury spread regression. The variable Higher equals 1 when the actual ratings 
are higher than the expected rating and 0 otherwise. The variable Lower is set equal to 1 when actual ratings are 
lower than the expected ratings and 0 otherwise. To examine the effect of the magnitude of the difference between 
the actual and expected ratings on bond yield, apart from the control variables used in Livingston and Zhou (2010), 
we include indicators variables Dh2, Dh1, Dl2 and Dl1 in the treasury spread regression. The variable Dh2 equals 1 
when the actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings by two or more ratings level and 0 otherwise. The 
variable Dh1 equals 1 when the actual ratings are higher than the expected ratings by one rating level and 0 
otherwise. The variable Dl2 equals 1 when the actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings by two or more 
ratings level and 0 otherwise. The variable Dl1 equals 1 when the actual ratings are lower than the expected ratings 
by one rating level and 0 otherwise. We do not report control variables for brevity. The p-values in are based on 
robust standard errors that have been adjusted for potential clustering problem caused by issuance of multiple bonds 
by the same firm. ***,**,* show the significance of difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Rating category Dh2 Dh1 Higher Dl2 Dl1 Lower 
1 0.596*** 
(0.000) 
0.376*** 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.478) 
   
2 0.384*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.002) 
0.171** 
(0.017) 
 -0.100 
(0.240) 
-0.032 
(0.611) 
3 0858** 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.994) 
0.0406 
(0.507) 
0.309*** 
(0.000) 
-0.110* 
(0.078) 
-0.301*** 
(0.001) 
4 0.653** 
(0.030) 
-0.282*** 
(0.008) 
0.494* 
(0.078) 
-0.332*** 
(0.003) 
-0.289*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040 
(0.471) 
5 -1.352*** 
(0.000) 
0.497** 
(0.036) 
0.134 
(0.709) 
-0.522* 
(0.064) 
0.120 
(0.594) 
-0.619*** 
(0.005) 
6  1.632** 
(0.029) 
1.972*** 
(0.003) 
-0.445** 
(0.045) 
0.289 
(0.680) 
0.0511 
(0.826) 
7    0.830** 
(0.014) 
0.611 
(0.335) 
0.737 
(0.174) 
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The quality of financial reporting under IFRS: 
evidence from credit ratings 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
n this study we examine whether or not firms that report under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) receive higher credit ratings than firms who do not report under 
IFRS, and whether or not the application of IFRS is associated in those firms with lower 
instances and levels of rating disagreements among the credit rating agencies (CRAs).1 IFRS are 
issued by The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) who aims to develop a single set 
of high quality, understandable, and internationally comparable financial reporting standards for 
general purpose financial statements.2 Currently, more than 100 countries across the world 
require or allow firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS (Ball, 2006). 
From 2005 onwards, firms in EU member states are mandatorily required to prepare their 
financial statements by following IFRS. The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is also 
currently deliberating on whether or not to allow firms to report under IFRS in the US. The 
adoption of IFRS is expected to enhance transparency, comparability and quality of financial 
statements presented by European firms. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to a more 
efficient functioning of the capital and internal markets (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). 
The worldwide adoption of IFRS in the recent years has motivated many researchers to 
investigate quality differentials between IFRS and the set of standards they replace. These 
studies focus on a range of accounting quality attributes such as value relevance (e.g., Barth et al. 
2008), timeliness of loss recognition (e.g., Barth et al. 2008; Van der Muelen 2007), accrual 
quality, predictability (e.g., Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005)  
and more. While most of the studies concentrate on the equity market effects of IFRS, a 
relatively small number of studies examine the change in accounting quality from the perspective 
of the debt market. The debt market is a much bigger and important source of finance for public 
firms compared to the equity market (Henderson et al. 2006) as about 2/3rd of the assets of an 
                                                 
1 We use the term IFRS and IAS interchangeably throughout our paper. 
2 http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm 
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average firm in big economies (e.g. the US, UK, Japan etc.) are financed through debt 
instruments (see for example Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Firms typically approach the debt market by issuing fixed-income securities such as bonds. 
The issuance of a new bond is a complex process that is facilitated by different financial 
intermediaries including CRAs. The role of CRAs in a bond issuance process is to assess if the 
bond issuer will be able to meet its contractual and financial obligations when they become due. 
These risk assessments provided by CRAs are of immense importance as they decrease the 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and thus enhance firms’ access to new 
funding sources and new markets (Strahan, 1999; Susan and Rechtschaffen, 1998). 
Fundamentally, credit ratings are based on the analysis of current and historical information so as 
to draw opinion about the events and developments that are likely to happen in future. Since the 
occurrence of future events is hard to predict with conviction, a degree of uncertainty is always 
associated with the credit rating process. Morgan (2002) argues that the uncertainty in the credit 
rating process relates directly to the information asymmetry that exists between a firm and the 
outside world, and the difficulty involved in the valuation of a firm’s assets. The uncertainty and 
information asymmetry in the credit rating process might have two important consequences on 
rating decisions. Firstly, as argued by Pagratis and Stringa (2009), if CRAs act conservatively 
and err on the side of safety, then information asymmetry and uncertainty about the firm’s true 
risk might lead CRAs to assign lower ratings compared to what might have been assigned 
otherwise. Secondly, depending on the level of uncertainty, if a bond is rated by two (or more) 
CRAs and one rater acts more conservatively than the other, then the two raters might assign 
different ratings to same bond, Hence, the bond might be split rated.   
The discussion above shows that information asymmetry and uncertainty are associated with 
levels of assigned ratings and the occurrence of split ratings. In other words, rating levels and 
split ratings reveal the presence of information asymmetry and uncertainty in the rating process 
and thus can be reasonably used as a proxy for  information asymmetry and uncertainty. From 
the point of view of a firm, both lower ratings and split ratings are costly. Prior research shows 
that bond yields exhibit an inverse relation with credit ratings, for example bonds with lower 
credit ratings have higher yield spreads (Allen et al. 1990; Mitchell 1991). Similarly, bonds that 
are split rated have bigger yield spreads (Billingsley et al. 1985; Ziebart, 1991; Jewell and 
Livingston, 1998) and carry higher issuing costs measured in terms of underwriters’ spread 
(Jewell and Livingston, 1998). 
Academic literature provides consistent evidence that credit ratings are largely based on the 
debt issuer’s accounting information. For example, Horrigan (1966) reports that about 2/3rd of 
the credit ratings assigned by CRAs can be correctly predicted on the basis of an issuer’s 
accounting ratios. Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) find that up to 80% of the variation in credit 
ratings can be explained using accounting information based models. Other studies that report 
accounting information as an important input of the credit rating process include Blume et al. 
(1998), Chan and Jegadeesh (2001), Kamstra, Kennedy, and Suan (2001). Most importantly, 
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CRAs such as S&P also acknowledge that the financial risk of debts issuers is largely determined 
based on the accounting information extracted through an entity’s financial statements.  
Since accounting information plays a vital role in the determination of financial risk, 
accounting information that is transparent, comparable, and provides more disclosures is likely to 
decrease the information asymmetry and the ambiguity about the financial health of a firm. As 
discussed earlier, the rise in information asymmetry might lead to lower ratings and greater 
rating disagreements and vice versa. If this is true, then firms that provide higher quality 
information are, on average, more likely to receive higher credit ratings and experience lower 
instances of rating disagreements. At least one empirical study supports this hypothesis: Jorion et 
al. (2007) document that CRAs tend to issue lower ratings to firms that have lower accounting 
quality and the other way round. Mansi et al. (2004) provide indirect evidence of the influence of 
quality of accounting information on the ratings assigned by CRAs by showing that firms audited 
by a Big 4 auditor (usually taken as a proxy for quality of information) on average receive higher 
ratings compared to those audited by smaller audit firms. 
In this study we investigate whether the application of IFRS reduces information asymmetry 
and uncertainty about the financial risk of a firm. We do so by examining that whether bonds 
issued by European financial firms (banks and insurance companies) that report under IFRS 
receive higher credit ratings compared to those issued by firms reporting under other sets of 
accounting standards. Further, we examine whether CRAs (specifically Moody’s and S&P, two 
of the most prominent CRAs), disagree less frequently when assigning ratings to the bonds 
issued by firms that report under IFRS as compared with those who do not report under IFRS. 
We also examine whether reporting under IFRS influences the magnitude of rating 
disagreements between Moody’s and S&P when split ratings occur. As an additional source of 
evidence, we observe the pattern of lopsidedness of rating disagreements for bonds issued by 
IFRS and non-IFRS sample firms. Lopsidedness is a term used in the literature to refer to the 
situation where one CRA consistently issues lower ratings to bonds as compared with other 
CRAs’ ratings. The level of lopsided ratings is also argued to be associated with information 
asymmetry and uncertainty involved in the assessment of the financial risk of a firm (see 
Livingston et al., 2007; Morgan, 2002). 
We limit our analysis to a sample of European financial firms for a number of reasons. First, 
the financial reporting changes brought by IFRS have had a bigger impact on financial firms than 
on non-financial firms (Ammer et al., 2004).1 Further, the assets of financial firms are more 
difficult to value compared to those of non-financial firms (e.g., Morgan, 2002; Innotta 2006). 
Therefore, the effects of IFRS are expected to be more pronounced for financial firms. Second, 
most of the bonds issued by European non-financial firms are rated by only one CRA, which 
means that they will not have split ratings. Third, financial firms issue more bonds than do non-
                                                 
1 For example, the differences in reporting assets and liabilities at fair value and the treatment of financial 
derivatives and hedges as required under IFRS are argued to be larger for financial firms compared to non-financial 
firms (see Moody‘s Investor Service ʊExpected Impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on 
European Banks February, 2004). 
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financial firms (e.g., about 85% of the bonds included in Innotta (2006) are issued by financial 
firms); hence, focusing on financial firms gives more power to our tests due to a larger sample 
size. Finally, while firms in many other countries report under IFRS, we focus on European firms 
to avoid the heterogeneity issues that may exist in different financial markets. 
Based on the results of the univariate and multivariate tests that we performed on a sample of 
788 bonds issued by European financial firms during the period 1996-2008, we find that bonds 
issued by firms reporting under IFRS, on average, receive higher credit ratings by about 0.38 of a 
notch compared to those issued by firms that report under other sets of accounting standards. 
Next, consistent with previous research, we find that a high proportion (68.53% in aggregate 
terms) of bonds jointly rated by Moody‘s and S&P are split rated. However, our results provide 
strong evidence that the probability of getting a split rating lowers by about 17% after firms start 
to report under IFRS. Monetarily, this lower probability of split rating for firms reporting under 
IFRS saves about $91,000 dollars in terms of lower yield spread.2 Further, we document that the 
level of absolute disagreement between raters also declines (by approximately 0.42 of a notch) 
for IFRS sample firms in instances when a split rating occurs. With respect to the lopsidedness of 
ratings, we document the existence of this pattern for both pre and post IFRS sample firms. 
Nonetheless, our results show that there is at least a slight decrease in this phenomenon once 
firms start to report under IFRS. We attribute these results to higher quality and more transparent 
accounting information under IFRS. Our results do not materially change when we use a 
constant sample, a matched sample, or a constant sample of mandatory adopters of IFRS only. 
Our study contributes to literature that examines the potential benefits of IFRS adoption by 
focusing on debt market perspective. While the number of studies that examine the impact of 
IFRS on equity markets has grown considerably, the evidence from the perspective of the debt 
market is relatively scarce. Evidence from debt markets in the presence of evidence from equity 
markets is still important since the debt market is a much bigger source of finance for listed firms 
and because the results obtained from the analysis of equity markets might not hold for the debt 
market (Ball et al., 2009). Another reason evidence from the debt market is relevant is that the 
results of equity market based studies, such as those focusing on value relevance, might have 
reliability issues because of the imprecision of the stock pricing models used (e.g. Mansi et al., 
2003). These studies are also criticized on the grounds of econometrics (Lambert, 1996; Lys, 
1996; and Skinner, 1996, 1999) as well as on the basis of the validity of the proxies used to 
measure the quality of financial reporting (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
Focusing on an important information intermediary of the debt market, CRAs, to gather 
evidence of any change in the quality of accounting information associated with IFRS) also gives 
our study several advantages over other studies. For instance, CRAs form their rating opinions 
based on a detailed analysis of individual components of accounting information rather than 
simply relying on bottom line figures such as net income or book values.3 Consequently, credit 
                                                 
2 See footnote 21 for detailed calculations. 
3 This is evident from the S&P document “Corporate Credit Ratings 2008” which states “…we believe it is critical 
to analyze each type of business and asset class in its own right.” 
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ratings may capture and reflect changes in accounting quality also occurring at the individual 
accounts level. Additionally, CRAs are expected to gather sufficient support before they assign a 
particular risk level to a bond issue since any incorrect rating could be costly for the debt issuers, 
investors, and for the rating agencies themselves. This is mainly due to the fact that investors and 
regulators heavily rely on these ratings and in many cases these ratings are integrated into the 
regulations. In such cases, a change in credit rating necessitates inventors adjust their portfolio of 
investments or requires supervisory bodies to initiate regulatory actions.4 Based on these factors 
we assume that the ratings opinions given by CRAs are less likely to be affected by noise in the 
information environment. We also contribute to the literature by using a much cleaner and more 
directly observable set of proxies for the information asymmetry, such as credit rating levels and 
split ratings, compared to other proxies that are often hard to quantify and difficult to measure,  
such as firm size, intangible assets, or analyst forecast dispersion (Livingston and Zhou, 2010). 
Apart from our contribution to the literature of IFRS, we also contribute to literature that 
examines the effect of the quality of accounting information on credit ratings decisions by 
showing that high quality accounting information may lead to better ratings and lower instances 
of rating disagreements. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 builds and explains our 
hypothesis, Section 3 discusses the existing literature on IFRS and credit ratings, Section 4 and 5 
describe the dataset and the methodology used respectively, Section 6 presents the results of our 
analysis,  Section 7 performs robustness tests and Section 8 discusses the findings and 
conclusions.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
 
The credit rating of a bond is a function of the business and the financial risk. Whereas 
information about business risk comes from a consideration of general economic and industry 
specific conditions, the information about the financial risks is largely based on the accounting 
information periodically released by the firm in the form of financial statements. S&P 
acknowledges the utility of accounting information in a credit rating process by stating “financial 
statements and related disclosures serve as our primary source of information regarding financial 
condition and financial performance…,” and that “financial risk is portrayed largely through 
quantitative means, particularly by using financial ratios”. 5  
Existing literature also provides evidence of usage and significance of accounting information 
in bond ratings process. For example, the rating prediction model proposed by Horrigan (1966), 
which consists of five financial ratios, could correctly explain 65% of the variation in bond 
                                                 
4 For example, according to the “International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards a revised 
framework” of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the capital charge on the debt issued by banks 
depends on the ratings assigned to the bonds. A decline in ratings requires banks to issue extra capital or limit their 
borrowings. 
5 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 2008, page.23. 
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ratings issued during 1961-1964. The model could also correctly predict up to 58% of new 
ratings and 57% of the rating changes. With a slightly different combination of accounting 
variables Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) are able to predict 80% of the ratings assigned by CRAs. 
Many other studies including Blume et al. (1998), Chan and Jegadeesh (2001), Kamstra et al. 
(2001), and Jorion and Zhang (2007) either use accounting information to predict credit ratings 
or provide evidence of usage of accounting information in the credit rating process. Importantly, 
not only academia, but also regulators and firms trust and utilize the results of these studies. For 
instance, the findings of Blume et al. (1998), which shows that the CRAs have tightened their 
rating standards over time, have been cited in well over 100 scientific articles. Notably, the same 
paper is also referred to by the Federal Reserve Board in its comment letter on the proposal of 
Draft Standard and Basis Conclusions-Financial Instruments and Similar Items issued by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee and in its research report on the U.S. banking 
sector issued in 2003. Highlighting the importance of these studies, some researchers (for 
example, Kamstra et al., 2001) believe that companies use the results of these studies to predict 
initial bond ratings or subsequent changes to them. 
The estimation of credit risk, however, is not an exact science and requires subjective 
judgments.6 The subjective nature of the rating process makes it difficult for CRAs to precisely 
determine the credit risk of a bond. Instead, under such circumstances, CRAs are more likely to 
determine a range within which the credit risk for a bond may fall. The more uncertain the CRAs 
are about the risk of a firm, the broader the range of possible risk. The width of a credit risk 
range might have two consequences. First, if CRAs prefer to err on the lower rather than upper 
side and i.e., act conservatively, then they are likely to assign ratings that correspond to the 
higher side of the possible credit risk range while the level of actual credit risk might lie on the 
lower end of the credit risk range. This means that when CRAs are less confident about the true 
value of the assets of a firm, they might prefer to issue lower credit ratings and vice versa 
(Morgan, 2002). Consistent with this notion, Jorion and Zhang (2007) finds that the decline in 
the quality of accounting information overtime has, in fact, led CRAs to issue lower ratings to 
US corporate bonds. CRAs also admit that they consider the quality of accounting information 
during the credit rating process. For example, S&P states that: 
 
Ratings rely on audited data, and the rating process does not entail auditing a company’s 
financial records. Analysis of the audited financials begins with a review of accounting 
quality. The purpose is to determine whether ratios and statistics derived from financial 
statements can be used accurately to measure a company’s performance and position 
relative to both its peer group and the largest universe of industry or utility companies.7 
 
Among the factors that influence the quality of accounting information are the accounting 
standards since they provide a collection of rules, procedures, and conventions that determine the 
                                                 
6 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 2008, page.20. 
7 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 2003, page 22. 
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treatment of various transactions that make up the financial statements of a firm. S&P describes 
the importance of accounting standards in their rating process in the following words: 
“Understanding the implications of the accounting basis used—e.g., International Financial 
Reporting Standards, U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or other local or statutory 
GAAP basis—is highly germane to our corporate rating methodology.”8 IFRS are issued by 
IASB that has an objective to issue high quality accounting standards that result in transparent 
and comparable financial statements. The salient features that are attributed to IFRS are that they 
are forward looking, focus on fair value reporting of assets and liabilities, require higher levels of 
disclosures (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006), and limit allowed alternate accounting treatments 
(Barth et al. 2008). The IFRS are also considered to be more comprehensive than most of the 
local GAAP (Bae et al. 2008). Regulators also expect IFRS to enhance comparability of 
accounting information and make accounting information more transparent (EC Regulation No. 
1606/2002). Incidentally, these features are closely relevant to the credit rating process. For 
example, as credit ratings essentially provide forward looking information, it would be more 
helpful if they were determined using forward looking information (as presumably provided by 
IFRS). Similarly, IFRS puts more emphasis on fair values, thus IFRS reported figures are likely 
to be closer to the true economic values of assets and liabilities and hence be more decision 
relevant compared to the historical costs that become increasingly irrelevant with the passage of 
time. IFRS based figures of income and loss are also believed to be more informative compared 
to those reported under the local GAAP.9 The amount of information disclosed through financial 
statements also has important implications on a firm’s credit risk. This is because higher 
disclosure levels tend to reduce estimation risks (Verrecchia, 2001) whereas lower disclosure 
levels could, as suggested by S&P, lead to lower ratings.10 Limiting managerial discretion is 
important as it enhances the transparency and quality of accounting information by restricting 
managers’ opportunistic discretions (Ashbuagh and Pincus, 2001). Finally, reporting under the 
same set of standards facilitates the credit rating process by making it easier to compare financial 
performance of a bond issuing firm with the performance of its peers. The comparability of 
financial statements is important in the credit rating process as S&P admits that “the rating 
process is, in part, one of comparisons, so it is important to have a common frame of 
reference.”11 As the features discussed above are closely relevant to the credit rating process and 
are perceived to be associated with reporting under IFRS, their realization is expected to lower 
uncertainty in the rating process and lessen the need to issue conservatively lower ratings. This 
leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bonds issued by firms reporting in accordance with IFRS receive higher 
credit ratings compared to bonds issued by firms reporting under non-IFRS. 
                                                 
8 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 2008, page 37. 
9 Bank of England, Financial Stability Review, December 2005, page 42. 
10 S&P define the benefits of disclosure by stating that “to the extent we believe information risk exists, it can 
influence our decision to maintain a rating, assign a rating in the first place, or the level of the rating assigned.” 
11 Standard and Poor’s Corporate Ratings Criteria 2008, page.23. 
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Another implication of the inability of CRAs to determine credit risk with precision arises 
when a bond is rated by two (or more) CRAs. In such a case, if the range of possible credit risk 
determined by CRAs remains within the boundaries of a particular credit rating, then both CRAs 
would assign similar ratings to the bond. However, if the range of credit risk determined by 
CRAs is so wide that it crosses the boarders of two or more adjacent credit ratings, then the bond 
may get a split rating. High quality accounting information is expected to help CRAs to 
determine the possible financial risk of a firm within a narrow range. High quality accounting 
information is also likely to lead CRAs to place more reliance on and come up with a similar 
interpretation of accounting information. These factors are expected lower the frequency of 
rating disagreements between CRAs. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bonds issued by firms reporting under IFRS are less likely to be split rated 
compared to bond issued by firms reporting under non-IFRS. 
 
In many cases the determination of credit risk is so difficult that the credit rating issued by 
CRAs differs by more than one notch. For example, more than 18% of the bonds in the sample 
used in Morgan (2002) are split rated by two or more notches. Although the implementation of 
IFRS is expected to help CRAs to determine credit risk more accurately,  IFRS are not expected 
to completely eliminate the uncertainty and information asymmetry from the rating process. 
Therefore, a good proportion of bonds might still be split rated even after firms start to report 
under IFRS. Nevertheless, we expect that improved accounting quality would reduce the 
absolute magnitude of rating disagreements when a split rating occurs. Our third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of rating disagreement between CRAs is lower for bonds 
issued by firms reporting under IFRS compared to bonds issued by firms reporting under 
non-IFRS. 
 
Based on both the perceived and empirically tested characteristics of IFRS, we expect to find 
empirical support for our hypothesis. Nonetheless, our results may indicate no, or even negative 
effects of IFRS on our chosen proxies. This can happen on the following grounds: First, although 
the fair values of assets and liabilities provide superior information to the user of financial 
statements, the management discretion and assumption applied in determination of the fair 
values make them questionable (Nissim, 2003). Second, despite several associated benefits, 
limiting managerial discretions in accounting reporting could hinder managements’ ability to 
reflect the true performance and financial position of a firm in its financial statements (Barth et 
al. 2008). Third, although reporting under the same set of accounting standards increases the 
harmonization of accounting information, provision of options in some accounting standards and 
the room for varied interpretations, especially in the case of IAS32 and IAS 39, may still reduce 
 Chapter 3  
57 
 
the comparability of accounting information.12 Finally, the possible increase in the volatility of 
financial results resulting from application of IFRS as suggested by Ball (2006) could also lead 
to the issuance of lower ratings and higher rating disagreements. 
 
 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
Two streams of literature are relevant to this study, one examines the difference between the 
quality of accounting information produced under IFRS and other GAAPs, and the other 
investigates the role of accounting information in the credit rating process. 
 
3.3.1 IFRS and the quality of accounting information 
 
Studies examining the effect of adoption of IFRS largely focus on value relevance, earnings 
management, and the cost of capital. The papers comparing IFRS and GAAP based on value 
relevance or earnings management provide mixed evidence. For example, Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) and Goncharov (2005) do not find any conclusive evidence as to whether 
firms reporting under IFRS engage in lower earnings management. Similarly, Hung and 
Subrananyam (2007) do not find a significant difference between the value relevance of 
accounting numbers such as book value and net income prepared under IFRS and the German 
GAAP. Bartov et al. (2005), however, find evidence of higher quality reporting under IFRS as 
compared to the German GAAP in terms of earnings association with a 12 month stock return. 
Consistent with Bartove et al. (2005), findings in Barth et al. (2008) also suggest that voluntary 
adopters of IFRS produce high quality earnings information in terms of their value relevance, 
level of earnings management, and timely recognition of losses in comparison to a matched 
sample of firms following the local GAAP. The evidence of high quality reporting is also 
provided by Gassen (2006) and Daske and Gebhardt (2006). The results of studies investigating 
the effect of adoption of IFRS on the cost of equity are also not consistent. Whereas Cuijpers and 
Buijink (2005) and Daske (2006) do not find evidence of a decrease in the cost of capital for 
IFRS adopting firms, Daske el al. (2007a), Vogler (2008), and Kim and Shi (2007) find evidence 
of a reduction in the cost of capital after firms switch to IFRS. A final set of studies gathers 
evidence of expected benefits of IFRS by looking at the market reaction to the news of an 
increase or decrease in the likelihood of IFRS adoption in Europe. The results of these studies 
also point in both directions. Comprix et al. (2003) report a weak but negative reaction of the 
                                                 
12 Banque De France document “The impact of the transition to IFRS for French banking groups”. Pp. 1. Available 
at http://bdfbs-ws01.heb3.fr.colt.net/gb/supervi/telechar/arcb2005-the-impact-of-the-transition-to-ifrs-for-french-
banking-groups.pdf 
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market to the news of IFRS adoption in Europe, while Armstrong et al. (2007) report a positive 
market reaction to events indicative of IFRS adoption in Europe.  
 
 
3.3.2 The role of accounting information in credit rating process 
 
Researchers over a long period of time have been interested in exploring whether accounting 
information can be used to predict ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P. In one of the pioneer 
studies, Horrigan (1966) examines whether accounting data, especially when transformed into 
accounting ratios, can be used to explain the credit ratings issued by S&P. He finds that a 
regression model built almost entirely on accounting information such as liquidity, solvency, and 
capital turnover ratio can correctly predict over half the ratings assigned by S&P to US corporate 
bonds. Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) also examine role of publically available information in the 
credit rating process. They find financial information such long-term debt to total assets, the 
coefficient of variation of earnings, and total assets to be highly relevant in the credit rating 
process. With the addition of a few other accounting variables, their model was able to correctly 
predict credit ratings for 80% of the bonds included in the sample. Many other studies such as 
Altman and Katz (1976), Ang and Patel (1975), Bhandari et al. (1979), and Martin et al., (1984) 
build accounting information based statistical models to predict bond ratings. Jegadeesh and 
Chan (2001) compare the relative strength of different statistical models and conclude that the 
prediction power of these models reaches up to 85%. Belkaoui (1980) consider that the rating 
prediction models are a significant help to firm managers. These rating models facilitate 
managers to get an approximation of the risk premium of a bond before its issue, and therefore 
help managers in financial decisions. A few recent studies use these accounting information 
based statistical models to try to answer the concerns raised about the accuracy of the credit 
ratings issued by CRAs. Blume et al. (1998) is one of the most important studies in this respect. 
In the study, researchers, in order to explain the visible downward trend in the credit ratings 
assigned to the US corporate debt, compare the actual bond ratings with ratings predicted based 
on accounting information. On the basis of this comparison they conclude that CRAs have, over 
the time, become more stringent in their risk assessment approach. Findings in Jorion and Zhang 
(2007) provide more direct evidence of the importance of accounting information in the credit 
rating process. They show that the apparent stringent standards of CRAs, as reported by Blume 
et al. (1998), are in fact largely caused by the decline in the quality of accounting information 
over time. Poon (2003) analyze a set of accounting based ratios to conclude that the unsolicited 
ratings issued by CRAs are lower than the ratings issued at the request of the issuers. 
The next set of studies relevant to our work is directed towards the causes and consequences 
of rating disagreements. Ederington (1986) is one of the first studies that investigate the causes 
of the occurrence of split ratings. In his study Ederington examines whether split ratings occur 
due to a) a difference between the respective rating categories used by different CRAs, b) 
different CRAs giving asymmetric importance to various determinants of credit ratings, or c) 
 Chapter 3  
59 
 
whether or not the subjectivity involved in evaluation of credit worthiness of various firms 
becomes the basis for split ratings. Based on the analysis of 493 industrial bonds jointly rated by 
Moody’s and S&P issued between January 1975 and December 1980, his study largely rules out 
the possibility of any systematic difference between rating criteria used by Moody’s and S&P 
and concludes that split ratings are mainly caused by the random difference of opinion between 
CRAs. A few studies, however, argue that split ratings do not occur from random errors by 
CRAs; rather, they occur due to the opaqueness of assets held by bond issuing firms. Morgan 
(2002), for example, finds that bonds issued by banking firms (possessing more opaque assets) 
are more likely to be split rated compared to bonds issued by industrial firms. Iannotta (2006) 
also reports similar results for a study carried out on European markets. The asset opaqueness 
hypothesis is also supported by Livingston et al. (2007).  
Finally, a number of studies closely associated with the split ratings literature also investigate 
whether split ratings matter to the market. On the one hand, Bilingsley (1985), Liu and Moore 
(1987), and Perry et al. (1988) examine the consequences of split ratings on bonds yields and 
report that the yield on split rated bonds lies close to the yield on the lower of the two ratings 
making a split. On the other hand,  Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) find that split rated bonds trade as 
a separate rating category different from the upper and lower rating, and that the split rated bonds 
experience a lower issuing cost compared to a similar single rated bond. Reiter and Ziebart 
(1991) investigate the effect of split ratings on bond yields by taking into account various factors 
known to affect the bond yield. The results of their study led them to conclude that the market 
gives more value to the higher of two ratings in the pricing of split rated bonds. Jewell and 
Livingston (1998) take a larger sample compared to most of the previous studies and find that the 
bond yield on split rated bonds is approximately equal to the average yield generally associated 
with upper and lower ratings. They further report a higher underwriters spread for high yield split 
rated bonds.  
 
 
3.4 Data  
 
We use three different databases to construct our sample, the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, and Thomson One Banker 
database. We use SDC to gather the issue specific (face value, maturity date, issue type, 
Moody’s and S&P ratings, etc.) and issuer specific (nationality, industry, ultimate parent, etc.) 
information for newly issued bonds. The accounting information required for our analysis is 
retrieved from Thomson One Banker, whereas the information about the number of analyst 
followings and the standard deviation of their forecast is taken from I/B/E/S database.  
We start by retrieving bond specific information from SDC. Together with bond specific 
information, we also retrieve the ticker and issuer name for each bond. We use tickers to match 
our dataset to Thomas One Banker and I/E/B/S. Our data set includes publically issued bonds by 
European financial institutions from 1996-2008. Our sample period starts in 1996, which when a 
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set of revised International Accounting Standards (IAS) became effective. The IAS before this 
revision were mostly descriptive and were criticized for allowing a number of alternative 
accounting treatments (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005). Therefore, including bonds issued 
by firms reporting under IASs of potentially questionable quality might bias our results against 
finding any results that support IFRS quality. Our sample period ends in 2008 due to the 
availability of required data at the time of our analysis. Following Iannotta (2006) we only 
include fixed rate, non-convertible, non-perpetual, and non-callable bonds in our analysis. We 
also exclude bonds issued by central banks, supranational institutions, central governments, or 
government owned firms. We start with 2330 newly issued bonds and delete bonds that are not 
jointly rated by Moody’s and S&P and bonds with missing information (most bonds were deleted 
from our sample because they were not jointly rated by Moody’s and S&P). Our final sample 
consists of 788 bonds issued by 58 distinct financial firms. For the purpose of analysis, we only 
take into account the initial bond ratings issued by Moody’s and S&P. The inclusion of ratings 
subsequent to initial ratings may bias results because of the possibility of asynchronous ratings 
revision by Moody’s and S&P (Livingston et al., 2007).  
 
 
3.5 Methodology 
 
3.5.1 IFRS and the credit rating levels 
 
To test our first hypothesis, we use an ordered probit model and regress the dependent 
variable S&P_Rating on a set of variables that are associated with the credit risk of a firm. The 
dependent variable S&P_Rating presents the S&P ratings assigned to a bond. S&P_Rating is an 
ordinal variable and since S&P assign letter ratings to bonds, we convert these letter ratings into 
numerical ratings.  Namely, we convert letter rating AAA to numerical rating 1, letter rating AA 
to 2, letter rating A to 3, and so on. Defining our dependent variable in this way means that a 
lower value of S&P_Rating corresponds to a better rating. The independent variables of our 
ordered probit regression include the pre-tax interest coverage ratio (Int_Cov), operating income 
to revenue ratio (OperInc_Rev), long term debt to assets ratio (Ltd_Assets), and total debt to 
assets ratio (Td_Assets). Apart from these accounting information based ratios, we also include 
total assets (TA) as a proxy for firm size, the firm beta (Beta), and standard errors from market 
model (SE) in order to control for the equity risk of a firm. Finally, we include an IFRS (IFRS) 
dummy in our regression analysis to capture the effect of IFRS on the credit rating decisions. 
Table 3.1 contain the detailed description and definitions of these variables. 
The expected impact of variables described above on the level of credit ratings assigned to a 
bond is as follows: the pre-tax interest coverage, which is ratio of a firms operating income 
before interest and tax to the interest expenses, is a measure of a firm’s ability to pay the interest 
on its outstanding debt. A firm with a high pre-tax interest coverage ratio is expected to service 
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its debts with more ease and is likely to have less chance of defaulting. Therefore, the pre-tax 
interest coverage ratio is expected to have a positive relation with the assigned ratings. The 
operating income to revenue is a ratio that indicates the strength of a firm’s operating activities. 
In essence, this ratio indicates the percentage of sales revenue that is left (after payment of the 
direct costs of a company) to pay its fixed costs including the interest and capital repayment of 
outstanding debt. Therefore, higher operating income to sales ratio is a sign of good financial 
health of a company and should lead to higher credit ratings. The next two ratios, long term debt 
to assets ratio and total debt to assets ratio, relate to the gearing of a firm. Gearing reveals the 
extent to which a firm is financed by external sources that require a fixed return. Therefore 
gearing is an important measure of risk of a firm. A higher gearing may be used to increase 
returns to equity owners, however, it also increases the financial burden of a firm and thus the 
likelihood of default. Therefore, we expect an inverse relation between gearing ratios and the 
assigned credit ratings. The firm size is expected to be positively related to the level of credit 
ratings since larger firms tend to be more diversified and competitive. Also, larger firms in 
general reveal more information to the market, have greater analyst following, and are more 
visible to the market. Both the equity beta and standard error of residuals represent a firm risk 
with respect to the market. Prior studies (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979 and Blume, et al., 1998) 
document a negative relation between credit rating level and firm risk with respect to the market. 
Finally, as argued in previous sections, we expect IFRS to have a positive influence on the level 
of ratings assigned by CRAs. In all the models (i.e., equation (1) and equation (2 & 3) below), 
we also include regional dummies in our analysis to control for any differences in the accounting 
information environment due to variation in the legal and political system, law enforcement, 
investors’ protections, and ownership structure. These regional dummies are based on La Porta et 
al. (1998). The ordered probit model to test our first hypothesis is defined as: 
 
 
S&P_Rating = ȕ0 + ȕ1IFRSi,t + ȕ2Int_Covi,t + ȕ3OperInc_Revi,t  
+ ȕ4Ltd_Assetsi,t + ȕ5Td_ Assetsi,t + ȕ6TAi,t  
+ȕ7Betai,t + ȕ8SEi,t + ȕ9Region_ dummies            (1) 
 
The detailed description and definitions of control variables used in model 1 is presented in 
Table 3.1. 
 
 
3.5.2 IFRS and the split ratings 
 
We test our second and third hypothesis by using a set of probit and ordered probit models. In 
these models we regress dependent variables Split and Abs_Split on IFRS dummy and various 
control variables as suggested by prior literature. The dependent variable Split is a binary 
variable which is equal to 0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign the same notch level rating to a 
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new bond and 1 when they (Moody’s and S&P) assign different ratings. Abs_Split is an ordinal 
variable which is equal to 0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign the same rating to a new bond; 
Abs_Split is equal to 1 when Moody’s and S&P rating differ by one notch; Abs_Split is equal to 2 
when Moody’s and S&P rating differ by two notches and so on. The control variables used in 
this analysis include both bond and firm specific characteristics.13 Starting with the bond specific 
characteristics, the first control variable is the bond maturity (Mat) which represents the number 
of months from issue date of bond till date of final maturity. Intuitively, it is easier to predict the 
outcome of events likely to occur in the near future as compared to those in the distant future. 
Accordingly, CRAs are likely to determine the credit risk of shorter maturity bonds with more 
certainty compared to bonds with longer maturity. Previous studies such as Flanner (1996) also 
find a positive association between uncertainty and bond maturity. Therefore, as the probability 
of split rating increases with uncertainty, the bonds with longer maturity are more likely to be 
split rated than bonds with shorter maturity. The level of default risk of a bond is another 
indicator of uncertainty. We use the S&P rating (S&P_Rating ) assigned to a bond as a proxy for 
its default risk. Since uncertainty increases with risk, bonds with lower ratings are more likely to 
be split rated than bonds with higher ratings. Face value (FV) represents the total value of a bond 
measured in millions of dollars. High face value bonds are normally issued by bigger firms; since 
bigger firms have lower information asymmetry problem, high face value bonds are less likely to 
be split rated. Moving towards the accounting variables used in our analysis, loan and leases 
(Loans&Leases) represents the ratio of the total amount of money loaned to customers (net of the 
reserves for loan losses) and loans made by the banks in order to finance leases to the firm’s total 
assets. The amount of outstanding loans and leases raises the opaqueness of banks assets because 
of the problems associated with their valuation (Guthman, 1953). Loans and leases also give rise 
to the agency problem especially when they are extended to a large number of small borrowers 
(Diamond, 1984). Consequently, bonds issued by firms with a higher proportion of loans and 
leases are more likely to be split rated. Cash and Deposits (Cash&Deposits) represents the ratio 
of the total amount of money available for use in normal operations and the value of money held 
by the bank or financial company on behalf of its customers to the firm’s total assets. The cash 
and deposits rank among the most certain assets held by a firm. Thereby, their presence is 
expected to lower the overall opaqueness of the firm’s assets. Conversely, the cash and deposits 
could make it difficult to assess the credit risk of a firm because of the uncertainty about their 
expected disposal by the manager (Jensen, 1986). Fixed assets (FA) are defined as the ratio of the 
total value of the property, plant, and equipment (net of depreciation) to the firm’s total assets. 
Fixed assets are the least uncertain assets held by any bank thus their presence is likely to reduce 
the overall opaqueness of a bank’s assets. Therefore, bonds issued by banks with a bigger portion 
of fixed assets are less likely to be split rated. The valuation problems associated with intangible 
assets (Int) make such assets hard to value, and thus presence of intangible assets is expected to 
contribute to the overall opaqueness of a firm’s assets. Other assets (OA) represents the ratio of 
                                                 
13 The variable definition and explanation of their possible impact of split ratings are based on Morgan (2002) and 
Livingston et al. (2007). 
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assets other than those included in the different asset definition of our study to the fixed assets of 
a firm. CapTA is defined as the capital to total asset ratio. Banks with a high capital level tend to 
have good asset quality;14 hence, a higher capital to asset ratio should lead to lower rating 
disagreements. Firm size, measured as the total assets (TA) of a firm, is expected to enter 
negatively in our equation. This is because big firms have more media and analyst following and 
thus are more visible to the market. As a result bigger firms are likely to have lower information 
asymmetry and asset opaqueness problems. As a robustness check, we include additional 
variables in our analysis that have been used in other studies as proxies for information 
asymmetry. These variables are based on Livingston et al. (2007) and include the number of 
analyst following a firm (N_Analysts), standard deviations of analyst forecast (Std_Forecast), 
and market to book ratio (MB). Analyst following reduces the asset opaqueness (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1995); hence, bonds issued by firms with higher analyst following are less 
likely to be split rated. Standard deviation of analyst forecast is a measure of the level of 
consensus among analysts. Since consensus among analysts is likely to decline with the level of 
opaqueness of a firm’s assets, the bonds issued by firms with higher deviation of analyst forecast 
are more likely to be split rated than the bonds issued by other firms. Market to book value has 
been used in previous studies, for example McLaughlin et al. (1998), as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. Consequently, bonds issued by firms with a higher market to book ratio are more 
likely to be split rated as compared to bonds issued by firms with a lower market to book ratio. 
Finally, IFRS is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for firms reporting under IFRS and 0 
otherwise. A negative sign on IFRS means would mean that reporting under IFRS reduces the 
instances of rating disagreements between raters while a positive sign on IFRS provides evidence 
to the contrary. The probit model that investigates whether there is a quality difference between 
IFRS and other standards measured in terms of the frequency of split ratings is defined as: 
 
 
Split  = ȕ0 + ȕ1IFRSi,t + ȕ2Mati,t + ȕ3S&P_Ratingi,t + ȕ4FVi,t 
 + ȕ5Laons&Leasesi,t+ ȕ6Cash&Depositsi,t +ȕ7FAi,t  
+ ȕ8Inti,t + ȕ9OAi,t + ȕ10CapTAi,t + ȕ11TAi,t + ȕ12TA2i,t 
+ ȕ13Region_dummies+İ                    (2) 
Our ordered probit model takes the following form: 
 
 
Abs_Split  = ȕ0 + ȕ1IFRSi,t + ȕ2Mati,t + ȕ3S&P_Ratingi,t + ȕ4FVi,t 
 + ȕ5Laons&Leasesi,t+ ȕ6 Cash&Depositsi,t +ȕ7FAi,t  
+ ȕ8Inti,t + ȕ9OAi,t + ȕ10CapTAi,t + ȕ11TAi,t + ȕ12TA2i,t 
+ ȕ13 Region_dummies +İ                 (3) 
 
                                                 
14 Moody’s special comment, 1993, p.5. 
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The detailed description and definitions of control variables used in model 2 and model 3 are 
presented in B of Table 3.1. 
 
 
3.5.3 Kappa Statistics 
 
We also compare the probability and level of split ratings for IFRS and non-IFRS samples 
using kappa statistics. Kappa is a statistical tool that is often used in scientific studies and in 
daily situations where one needs to assess the level of consensus between two raters. Although 
kappa statistics do not entail complex calculations, the important feature of kappa statistics that it 
takes into account the probability that the consensus between raters may occur simply by chance 
makes it superior to the other univariate tests. Kappa statistics are defined as: 
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Pr(a) is the percentage of bonds with consensus Moody’s and S&P ratings. Pr(e) is the 
probability of occurrence of the rating consensus by chance. Since kappa statistics do not give 
weight to the level of rating disagreements, it can only be used to test whether reporting under 
IFRS lowers the probability of rating disagreements between CRAs. To test whether reporting 
under IFRS also lowers the level of rating disagreements between CRAs, we use a more 
advanced form of kappa statistics called weighted kappa. Kappa statistics determine the level of 
agreement between raters on a -1 to +1 scale (-1 refers to the least agreement while +1 means 
perfect agreement). 
 
 
3.6 Results 
 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.2 provides comparative statistics of the dataset that is used to test the three hypotheses 
of this study. The dependent variables, Panel A in Table 3.2, show that the bonds issued by IFRS 
sample firms, on average, received about 1/3rd of a notch higher ratings than did the bonds issued 
by non-IFRS sample firms. This difference is significant at p=0.01 level. With regard to the 
rating disagreements, Panel B reveals that about 60.99% of the IFRS sample bonds are split rated 
whereas the percentage of split rated bonds stands at a much higher level of 76.5% for the non-
IFRS sample. The statistics in Panel C further reveal that not only the instances but also the 
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average level of rating disagreements between CRAs are lower in the case of the IFRS sample 
(0.87 of a notch) as compared to the non-IFRS sample (1.10 of a notch).  
With respect to the control variables used in the model to test the first hypothesis, the 
descriptive statistics reveal that both IFRS and non-IFRS sample have quite similar interest 
coverage ratios (Int_Cov: 1.545 vs. 1.586), whereas the IFRS sample has a slightly better 
operating income to revenue ratio (OperInc_Rev: 0.105 vs. 0.199). In terms of the gearing ratios, 
the IFRS sample has a significantly lower long term debt to the total assets ratio (Ltd_Assets: 
0.216 vs. 0.137) as compared to the non-IFRS sample. However,  The IFRS and non-IFRS 
samples do not differ in terms of total debt to total asset ratio (Td_Assets: 0.468 vs. 0.423). 
Finally, the equity beta (Beta: 0.959 vs. 0.915) of both the IFRS and non-IFRS sample is close to 
1 which shows that the  none of the sample’s stocks are more volatile than the market as a whole. 
The standard errors calculated from the market model (SE: 0.000 vs. 0.000) for both samples are 
also similar and are not significantly different from 0.  
The descriptive statistics for the control variables used to test the second and third hypothesis 
are reported in Panel D of Table 3.2. According to these statistics, the bonds issued by IFRS 
sample firms on average have shorter maturity (Mat: 50.40 vs. 46.08) but higher face value (FV: 
328.07 vs. 532.19) compared to the bonds issued by non-IFRS sample firms. The issuer specific 
information shows higher analyst following (N_Analysts: 22.15 vs. 27.07), smaller standard 
deviation of forecast (Std_Forecast: 1.27 vs. 0.54), and a much higher average market to book 
ratio (MB: 8.72 vs. 26.75) for the IFRS sample. Descriptive statistics of the accounting variables 
show that the IFRS sample has a smaller percentages of loans and leases (Loans&Leases: 61.36 
vs. 59.28) and cash and deposits (Cash&Deposits: 34.65 vs. 33.01) as compared to the non-IFRS 
sample. These statistics further reveal that the IFRS sample firms have a slightly lower 
percentage of fixed assets (FA: 1.42 vs. 1.17) but a significantly higher proportion of intangible 
assets (Int: 0.43 vs. 0.91) and other assets (OA: 2.14 vs. 5.63) in their assets mix as compared to 
that of the non-IFRS sample firms. Finally, the IFRS sample firms are bigger in terms of total 
assets (TA) and have a better capital to assets ratio (CapTa: 20.57 vs. 26.09) than the non-IFRS 
sample firms’ ratio.  
Taken together, the descriptive statistics reveal that the IFRS and the non-IFRS sample firms 
differ significantly in terms of the characteristics that influence the level and likelihood of split 
ratings and thus suggest the need to control for the differences in these firm characteristics. 
 
3.6.2 Reporting under IFRS and the credit ratings levels 
 
In this section we use the multivariate analysis to examine whether firms reporting under 
IFRS receive a better credit rating than firms reporting under other accounting standards. Our 
dependent variable (S&P_Rating ) in this analysis is the S&P rating assigned to a bond. As 
explained in methodology section, S&P_Rating  is constructed in such a way that a lower value 
on this variable actually reveals a better rating. For example, a bond with the S&P_Rating  value 
of 5 has a better rating compared to a bond with the S&P_Rating  value equal to 6. Accordingly, 
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a negative sign on the coefficient of any independent variable indicates that that particular 
variable is positively associated with better credit ratings. 
As discussed in the methodology section, we use an ordered probit model similar to the one 
used in Blume et al. (1998) and extend this model by including an IFRS dummy. The results, as 
reported in Table 3.3, show that the IFRS dummy enters with a negative sign in the ordered 
probit analysis and is significant at close to 0.01level. The magnitude of the coefficient for the 
IFRS dummy (-0.201), interpreted with the cut points of the ordered probit model as reported in 
the lower half of the Table 3.3, indicates that after controlling for other relevant variables, firms 
reporting under IFRS on average receive ratings of about 0.38 of a notch better than the firms 
reporting under other accounting standards. This result supports our first hypothesis that 
reporting under IFRS improves the ability of CRAs to measure the credit risk more accurately. 
Consequently, CRAs tend to act less conservatively in the rating process which results in firms 
getting better credit ratings for their debt on average. 
With respect to control variables, the operating income scaled by the total revenue 
(OperInc_Rev) has the expected negative sign, although it is not significant at the conventional 
level. The variable representing the long term debt to assets ratio (Ltd_Assets) is positive and 
significant. This indicates that firms with larger long term debts tend be more risky and thus 
receive lower ratings. The coefficient on TA, used as a proxy for firm size, is negative and 
significant. This is consistent with the argument that larger firms reveal more information, have 
greater analyst following, and are generally more visible to the market. These factors lower the 
level of uncertainty for these firms and thus make them less risky. Also consistent with previous 
research, the firm beta (Beta), used as a proxy for the firm equity risk, is positive and significant. 
Variables representing interest coverage ratio (Int_Cov), total debt to assets ratio (Td_Assets), 
and standard errors from market model (SE) take unexpected signs on their coefficients. Blume 
et al. (1998) also report a positive (though insignificant) sign on interest coverage ratio when it 
becomes extremely large (i.e., higher than 20 times). Similarly, Blume et al. (1998) also find a 
negative sign on the coefficient for the total debt to asset ratio (Td_Assets) and argue that 
apparently, after having controlled for the long term debt to asset ratio, firms with a higher 
proportion of short term debts are considered to be less risky by CRAs. Although the coefficient 
on SE is negative, it is not significantly different from zero. 
 
 
3.6.3 Reporting under IFRS and the split ratings (univariate analysis) 
 
Table 3.4 provides the results of various measures of disagreements between bond raters. The 
first of these measures is the kappa statistics. The kappa statistics for IFRS sample firms is 0.249 
compared to 0.086 for non-IFRS sample firms. These figures indicate a comparatively higher 
level of rating agreements between CRAs for the IFRS sample. In absolute terms, however, these 
kappa values show a “fair” level of rating consensus between CRAs for IFRS sample firms 
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where the level of agreement between CRAs for non-IFRS sample stands at only “slight” level.15 
The weighted kappa statistics, where the level of rating disagreements is also taken into account, 
also show greater agreement level between raters for the IFRS sample as compared to the non-
IFRS sample. The weighted kappa statistics are 0.516 (moderate level of agreement) for IFRS 
sample and 0.363 (fair level of agreement) for non-IFRS sample. The supplementary kappa 
statistics reveal a significantly higher observed level of agreement for IFRS sample firms as 
opposed to non-IFRS sample firms (39.01 vs. 23.50), while the results do not show a significant 
difference between the IFRS and non-IFRS sample in terms of the possibility of chance rating 
agreement(18.76 vs. 16.31).  
In terms of other agreement measures, the IFRS sample shows a higher level of correlation 
between the credit ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P as compared to the correlation for the 
non-IFRS sample (0.81 versus 0.66). The absolute average gap between the credit ratings 
assigned by Moody’s and S&P is 0.87 for the IFRS sample and 1.10 for the non-IFRS sample. 
The difference between these two numbers is significant at 1% level. Finally, the IFRS sample 
has a lower percentage of bonds falling in each of the rating gap categories, i.e. an absolute 
rating gap ranging from 1 to 3+. Taken together, the preceding results show a higher level of 
rating agreement between rating agencies for IFRS sample firms as compared to the non-IFRS 
sample firms. 
 
3.6.4 Reporting under IFRS and probability and level of rating 
disagreements (multivariate analysis) 
 
We use a pair of closely related models to obtain formal evidence of whether or not reporting 
under IFRS is negatively associated with the frequency and level of disagreement between 
CRAs. We start with our base model (Model 1) where we regress Split on IFRS dummy and the 
variables identified in Morgan (2002) as associated with the occurrence of split ratings. 
According to the results of this model as reported in Table 3.5, the IFRS dummy is negative with 
a coefficient value of -0.468 and significant at 1% level. This indicates that reporting under IFRS 
is negatively associated with the occurrence of the split rating. The results for control variables 
are, in general, consistent with those reported in previous studies. For example, in line with 
Morgan (2002), we find that factors such as capital to total assets ratio (CapTA), percentage of 
fixed assets (FA), percentage of other assets (OA), face value (FV) of the bonds, and proportion 
of cash and deposits (Cash&Deposits, though not significant) have a significantly negative 
association with split ratings. On the other hand, the credit risk measured in terms of S&P ratings 
(S&P_Rating ) and the loans and leases (Loans&Leases, though not significant) have a positive 
association with the probability of split rating occurrence. Further, whereas Morgan (2002) does 
not report a significant relation between split ratings and percentage of intangible assets (Int), we 
                                                 
15 Based on the kappa statistics categories defined by Landis and Koch (1977). For a reference, these categories have 
been reproduced below in Table 3.4. 
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find that bonds issued by firms with a higher percentage of intangible assets are more likely to be 
split rated compared to bonds issued by firms with a lower percentage of intangible assets. This 
makes sense since, by their very nature, intangible assets are harder to value and therefore their 
presence increases the overall opaqueness of a firm’s assets (Livingston et al. 2007). The size of 
a firm and its squared value have unexpected signs, but their coefficients are only marginally 
significant.  
Model 2 includes three additional variables, the number of analysts (N_Analysts), the standard 
deviation of analyst forecast (Std_Forecast), and the market to book value (MB) of the issuer.16 
Livingston et al. (2007) report that these variables have a significant relation with split ratings. In 
Model 2, however, only the number of analysts (N_Analysts) is significant and that too has a 
coefficient sign opposite to what is expected. Standard deviation of analyst forecast 
(Std_Forecast) has an unexpected negative sign but is not significant as is the case with market 
to book ratio (MB). Nonetheless, the IFRS dummy is still negative and significant at 1% and has 
a bigger coefficient compared to that in the previous model. Generally, the absolute value of the 
IFRS dummy remains close to 0.50 in both models. Based on the calculations (as presented in 
Table 3.5 column 4), this means that bonds issued by firms reporting under IFRS have 
approximately 17% lower probability of being split rated as compared to bonds issued by firms 
reporting under non-IFRS standards.  
Next, we examine whether reporting under IFRS also affects the level of absolute rating 
disagreements between CRAs. To test this hypothesis, we replace the dependent variable Split 
with the variable Abs_Split and redo the analysis using ordered probit regression. In the results of 
this specification (Model 3) the IFRS dummy is again negative with a coefficient value of -0.410 
and is significant at a level of 1%. The IFRS dummy still remains significant after the inclusion 
of additional control variables such as the number of analysts (N_Analysts), the standard 
deviation of analyst forecast (Std_Forecast), and market to book value (MB). Based on the 
magnitude of the IFRS in Model 3 and the rating disagreement boundaries  (see the bottom of the 
Table 3.5), these results indicate that the level of rating disagreement between CRAs is, on 
average, 0.42 of a notch lower for IFRS sample firms as compared to non-IFRS sample firms.  
Taken together, our results suggest that firms reporting under IFRS receive higher credit 
ratings compared to firms reporting under non-IFRS. Further, reporting under IFRS not only 
reduces the probability of occurrence of split rating but also decreases the magnitude of split 
rating when it happens. We attribute these findings to the fact that the use of IFRS leads to more 
transparent and reliable accounting information which, in turn, sheds some of the information 
asymmetry and uncertainty involved in the credit rating process.  
 
 
3.6.5 Lopsidedness of Rating Disagreements 
 
                                                 
16 The smaller number of observations in this model aisre due to the fact that I/B/E/S has relatively low coverage for 
European firms as compared to its coverage for US firms. 
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Previous studies that examine the causes of the split ratings find a pattern of lopsided rating 
disagreements between CRAs. That is, these studies find that a particular rating agency (for 
instance, S&P in the case of US market based studies) consistently provides lower ratings 
compared to other raters when a split rating occurs. Researchers in previous studies such as 
Morgan (2002) and Livingston et al. (2007) believe that the pattern of lopsided ratings is also 
caused by asset opaqueness and uncertainty involved in the rating process. These studies argue 
that if CRAs differ with respect to their level of conservativeness then the uncertainty and asset 
opaqueness will lead a more conservative rater to issue lower ratings even more frequently.  
We argue that if IFRS improve the quality of accounting information then their application 
should lessen the uncertainty and asset opaqueness and, consequently, the rating conservatism of 
the CRAs. The decline in rating conservativeness is expected to be larger in the case of a more 
conservative rater because a more conservative rater has more room to decrease its level of 
conservativeness. Consequently, the difference in the level of rating conservatism maintained by 
the more conservative rater and the less conservative rater is expected to be lower in the case of 
firms reporting under IFRS compared to that of firms reporting under other accounting standards. 
To determine whether this actually happens, we calculate the level of lopsided ratings for both 
IFRS and non-IFRS samples. The procedure is as follows: first, for each sample we determine 
the percentage of bonds rated higher by each of the raters (i.e., by Moody’s and S&P). Then we 
calculate the difference between these percentages. This difference between percentages presents 
the level of lopsidedness. The outcome of these calculations is presented in Table 3.6 which 
reveals that the level of lopsided ratings is 53% for non-IFRS sample firms (65% bonds with 
better Moody’s ratings and 12% bonds with better S&P ratings) and at 49% for IFRS sample 
firms (55% bonds with better Moody’s ratings and 6% bonds with better S&P ratings). Hence, 
the IFRS sample shows a 4% lower pattern of lopsided ratings compared to the non-IFRS 
sample. Thus, this reduced level of rating lopsidedness provide us with further evidence of better 
quality accounting information under IFRS as compared to other accounting standards.  
 
 
3.7 Robustness tests 
 
In this section we test the robustness of our previous findings. Our robustness tests are largely 
based on the variation of the composition of our sample. The construction procedure of various 
samples are described below. 
 
3.7.1 Reporting under IFRS and credit ratings levels 
 
The results in the previous section provide evidence of better credit ratings and a lower 
frequency and level of split ratings for IFRS sample firms. However, these results might have 
been driven by the possibility that the bonds included in the non-IFRS sample are issued by more 
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opaque firms compared to those included in IFRS sample. To overcome this problem we 
construct a constant sample, one that consists of only those firms that have issued bonds under 
both set of standards. Model 1 in Table 3.7 presents the results for this sample for the first 
hypothesis. The variable of interest IFRS is negative and significant with a coefficient bigger in 
absolute terms than the one reported in the main analysis in Table 3.3 (-0.398 vs. -0.201). The 
coefficient signs on most of the control variables are similar to the signs reported for the main 
analysis.  
Constructing a sample in this way, however, has a potential problem since the number of 
bonds issued by each firm under non-IFRS and IFRS standards are not equal. For instance, it 
might be the case that firms that are more opaque have issued higher numbers of bonds when 
reporting under non-IFRS than when reporting under IFRS. In order to navigate this issue we 
construct a matched sample. In this matched sample, for each firm we include equal numbers of 
bonds issued under non-IFRS and IFRS reporting standards. The construction procedure of this 
sample is as follows: first, we count the number of bonds issued by each firm under each set of 
accounting standards. Then, if the number of bonds issued by a firm under non-IFRS is greater 
than the number of bonds issued by the same firm under IFRS, we delete the additional bonds 
issued under non-IFRS starting with the bonds with the shortest maturity at the issue date. We 
follow the same procedure when a firm has issued more bonds while reporting under IFRS. This 
process reduces our sample size to 300 bonds with an equal number of bonds included for each 
firm in the IFRS and non-IFRS sample. The results of this sample, reported in Model 2, are still 
in line with those of the main analysis. Once again, the variable of interest is negative and 
significant with a coefficient of -0.497 and a p-value <0.01 which is similar to the results 
reported for the constant sample and greater than the results for the main analysis. 
About 1/4th of the bonds included in the main analysis belong to voluntary adopters of IFRS. 
Prior literature suggests that firms voluntarily reporting under IFRS have specific characteristics 
that distinguish them from average firms. For example, voluntary adopters of IFRS are less 
capital intensive, are much bigger (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998), have a higher percentage 
of foreign sales (Murphy, 1999), maintain a lower debt to equity ratio, and have higher 
profitability compared to other firms (El-Gazzar et al. 1999). Factors such as the need to raise 
additional equity (El-Gazzar et al. 1999), the political cost, and outside market pressure 
(Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998) also motivate firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS. Mandatory 
adopters of IFRS do not have any particular incentives and do not have characteristics 
distinguishing them from other firms. Since voluntary adopters of IFRS are different in certain 
aspects from average firms, our previously reported results might be biased (both for or against) 
due to these distinguishing features of voluntary adopters.17 Therefore, we exclude, from the 
constant sample used in Model 1 Table 3.7, all bonds issued by firms when they voluntarily 
reported under IFRS. The results as reported in Model 3 of Table 3.7 show that the IFRS dummy 
                                                 
17 The lack of comparability of accounting information could be one reason that could potentially lessen the benefits 
of adoption of IFRS for voluntary adopters. This is especially true if only a limited number of firms in a particular 
industry voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
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is negative (-1.131) and significant at better than p=0.01 level whereas the coefficients on the 
other variables are largely similar to those reported in other models. These results show that our 
previously reported findings also hold in the case of constant samples of mandatory IFRS 
adopters.  
 
3.7.2 Reporting under IFRS and probability and level of rating 
disagreements 
 
We also perform a similar analysis to test the robustness of our results for the probability and 
level of rating disagreements. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 3.8. Model 1 to 
Model 3 show the influence of IFRS on the probability of rating disagreements for the constant, 
matched and constant set of mandatory adopters of IFRS respectively. For constant and matched 
samples, the coefficients on IFRS dummies are negative (-0.747 and -0.681) and highly 
significant at the p<0.01 level while for constant samples of mandatory adopters, the coefficient 
on IFRS dummy (-0.135) is significant at the p<0.05 level. Similarly, Model 4 to Model 6 
presents the results of the ordered probit regressions to find additional evidence of whether 
reporting under IFRS reduces the level of rating disagreements between Moody’s and S&P. 
Again, the IFRS dummy is negative for all three models though it is marginally insignificant for 
the constant sample IFRS mandatory adopters.  
Taken together, the results of our robustness test are consistent with those of our main 
findings, that bonds issued by firms that report under IFRS receive better credit ratings and are 
less likely to be split rated. Further, these results support our findings that the absolute level of 
rating disagreements between CRAs is also smaller for the IFRS sample. 
 
 
3.8 Economic significance of switching to IFRS 
 
For firms that adopt them, IFRS brings potential economic benefits and better implementation 
costs. The implementation costs of IFRS include, for example, the deployment of new IT sources 
and the overhauling of existing IT infrastructure (Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). 
Firms might also need to spend a significant amount of time and money to make their accounting 
staff familiar with IFRS. A PwC survey of FTSE 350 firms reveals that most of these firms 
actually had to hire extra staff during the implementation stage of IFRS.18  
Our results could also be used to measure the approximate costs firms can potentially save by 
reporting under IFRS. For example, the non-IFRS firms in our sample have a median face value 
debt of $92.42 million. Assuming that IFRS lowers the probability of split rating by 
approximately 17% (see Table 3.6), this translates into  savings of $91,000 in terms of a lower 
                                                 
18 Price WaterhouseCoopers (2006a). IFRS: Embracing Change, July, London, PWC, page, 27. 
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yield spread for a bond with a maturity of 3.89 years.19 Similarly, as documented in this study, 
firms reporting under IFRS also benefit from the lower yield spread because such firms, on 
average, receive higher bond ratings, compared to firms reporting under other standards. This 
cost saving can be compared to the various costs of switching to IFRS as identified in prior 
literature. These cost saving figures are important for firms in the process of deciding whether to 
switch to IFRS voluntarily in countries that have not yet adopted IFRS. 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
The move toward IFRS is a global trend. The recent adoption of IFRS in various countries 
and regions including the EU motivated many researchers to compare the difference in 
accounting quality before and after the adoption of IFRS. Most of these studies focus on the 
capital market effects of adoption of IFRS and only a few studies gather evidence of the 
accounting quality differential from the debt market. Although studies based on the equity 
market consequence of IFRS provide valuable information about the changes in accounting 
quality brought by IFRS adoption, evidence from the debt market is also important since the 
results obtained from the analysis of equity market might not hold for the debt market because of 
the fundamental differences between these markets (Ball et al., 2009). Furthermore, compared to 
the equity market, the debt market is a much bigger source of finance for firms (Henderson et al., 
2006). Therefore, regulators around the world should be interested in looking at the evidence of 
reporting under IFRS from the perspective of the debt market. 
In this study we examine and compare the accounting information quality prepared under 
IFRS and other local GAAP used in the EU from the perspective of an important information 
intermediary of the debt markets, CRAs. CRAs play a vital role in the debt market as they 
provide an independent opinion about the credit worthiness of new and existing debt securities in 
the form of credit ratings. Credit ratings are opinions about the future, therefore an element of 
uncertainty is always expected in the rating process. Literature suggests that the information 
asymmetry and the vagueness of firm assets (such as those of banks) further heighten the 
uncertainty in the credit rating process. This uncertainty leads to two important consequences. 
First, since CRAs remain conservative in their rating decisions, they are more likely to assign 
lower ratings when faced with high information asymmetry and uncertainty about the true credit 
risk of a debt issue. Similarly, if CRAs differ with respect to the level of respective conservatism, 
the information asymmetry and uncertainty about the true financial risk might lead them to issue 
dissimilar ratings for the same bond. Therefore, we argue that if IFRS improved the quality of 
accounting information then their application should lower the uncertainty and information 
                                                 
19 We calculate the $91,000 amount as follows: 92.42*3.89*0.17*0.15 where 92.42 and 3.89 is the median face 
value and median maturity in years of bonds for non-IFRS sample, 0.17 is the decrease in probability of getting a 
split rating for IFRS sample firms, and 0.15 is the extra yield spread for split rated bond based on Mansi et al, 
(2003). 
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asymmetry faced by CRAs. Accordingly, then, the firms that report under IFRS should, on 
average, receive higher ratings and experience lower probability of rating disagreements.  
We find support in favour of this hypothesis. In particular, we find that bonds issued by firms 
that report under IFRS receive about 0.38 of a notch better ratings compared to the bonds issued 
by firms that do not report under IFRS. Next, in line with the previous research, we also find that 
a large proportion, around 68%, of bonds included in our full sample are split rated. However, 
our results show a significant decrease in the probability and level of rating disagreements 
between Moody’s and S&P for the bonds issued by firms that report under IFRS. We also report 
a lower level of lopsided ratings for our IFRS sample. We take these results as evidence that 
IFRS is superior to local GAAP. To control for the possibility that improvement in accounting 
quality may not be attributable to accounting standards but rather to the specific environment of 
a firm or a change in sample composition, we construct various sub-samples. The results of the 
sub-sample analysis are consistent with our findings for the full sample.  
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Table 3.3: Ordered Probit Regression explaining Effect of IFRS on credit ratings 
This table presents the results of the ordered probit regressions models that are used to determine whether bonds 
issued by firms reporting under IFRS receive higher credit ratings compared to bonds issued by firms reporting 
under other accounting standards. The dependent variable for the probit regression models is S&P_Rating . 
S&P_Rating  presents letter level ratings assigned by S&P to a bond. S&P_Rating  is an ordinal variable while S&P 
assigns letter ratings to bonds. We convert these letter ratings into numerical ratings following existing literature. 
Namely, we convert letter rating AAA to numerical rating 1, letter rating AA to 2, letter rating A to 3 and so on. The 
control variables, except for Int_Cov, are based on Blume et al. (1998). With respect to Int_Cov, Blume et al. (1998) 
divide the interest coverage ratio of an issuer into four categories based on whether the interest coverage ratio is less 
than 5, between 5 and 10, between 10 and 20 and 20 and 100. We do not use such categories. Our variable of 
interest is IFRS dummy which is set to 1 for bonds issued by firms reporting under IFRS and 0 otherwise. In all 
models we include region dummies to control for any difference in the legal and political system, enforcement of 
law, investors’ protections and ownership structure across regions. Variable definitions are provided in Panel A of 
Table 3.1. The p-values appear in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
Variables Coefficients 
(p-values) 
IFRS -0.201** 
(-0.038) 
Int_Cov 0.018** 
(0.032) 
OperInc_Rev -0.200 
(0.763) 
Ltd_Assets 0.930* 
(0.077) 
Td_Assets -0.385 
(0.398) 
Beta 0.610*** 
(0.000) 
SE -310.905 
(0.173) 
TA -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Region dummies Yes 
N 735 
Rating boundaries 
AAA <-0.579 
AA -0.579<>-0.458 
A -0.458 <>-0.158 
BBB -0.158<>0.703 
BB 0.703<>1.836 
B 1.836<>2.395 
CCC 2.395<>3.095 
CC >3.095 
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Table 3.5: Probit Regression explaining probability of split rating 
This table presents the results of the probit and ordered probit regressions that are used to determine whether 
reporting under IFRS leads to lower probability and level of rating disagreements between CRAs. The dependent 
variable for the probit regression models (Model 1 and Model 2) is Split. Split is a binary variable which is equal to 
0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign the same rating (at notch level) to a new bond and 1 when Moody’s and S&P 
assign different ratings. Our variable of interest IFRS is binary variable which is set equal to 1 if the bonds issuing 
firm for bonds that are issued by firms that report under IFRS and 0 otherwise. The control variables are Morgan 
(2002). In Model 2 we add three other variables identified by Livingston et al. (2007), the existence of which also 
influences the occurrence of split ratings. Model 3 and Model 4 respectively are similar to Model 1 and Model 2 
except that they are based on ordered probit regression model. The dependent variable for these models is Abs_Split. 
Abs_Split is an ordinal variable which is equal to 0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign same rating to a new bond, 
Abs_Split is equal to 1 when Moody’s and S&P rating differ by one notch, Abs_Split is equal to 2 when Moody’s 
and S&P rating differ by two notches and so on. In all models we include region dummies to control for any 
difference in the legal and political system, enforcement of law, investors’ protections and ownership structure 
across regions. Column 4 presents the expected change in probability of occurrence of split rating when a variable 
increases from its 25th percentile value to 75th percentile value while others remain at their median value. For IFRS 
dummy the percentage change represents the difference in probability of occurrence of split rating between firms 
that report under IFRS and those which do not. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Panel B of Table 
3.1. The p-values appear in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model  2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Changes in prob. 
of split rating 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model  4 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
IFRS -0.468*** 
(0.001) 
-0.614* 
(0.017) 
-17.22% -0.410*** 
(0.000) 
-0.709*** 
(0.001) 
Loans&Leases 0.006* 
(0.076) 
0.008 
(0.159) 
1.75% 0.002 
(0.368) 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
Cash&Deposits -0.002 
(0.754) 
-0.009 
(0.305) 
-1.48% 0.000 
(0.913) 
-0.016** 
(0.027) 
FA -0.048* 
(0.071) 
-0.125** 
(0.014) 
-1.71% -0.053** 
(0.023) 
-0.120*** 
(0.006) 
Int 0.199*** 
(0.000) 
0.164* 
(0.052) 
3.75% 0.203*** 
(0.000) 
0.117 
(0.107) 
OA -0.020* 
(0.067) 
-0.012 
(0.363) 
-6.04% -0.028*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012 
(0.298) 
CapTA -0.015** 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.160) 
-4.78% -0.006 
(0.197) 
-0.017* 
(0.052) 
TA 0.000* 
(0.084) 
0.000** 
(0.021) 
-7.92% 0.000 
(0.146) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
TA2 -0.000 
(0.184) 
-0.000 
(0.148) 
9.71% -0.000 
(0.598) 
-0.000*** 
(0.004) 
S&P_Rating 0.378*** 
(0.000) 
0.325*** 
(0.000) 
10.72% 0.363*** 
(0.000) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
Mat -0.025 
(0.706) 
-0.039 
(0.623) 
-2.93% -0.049 
(0.332) 
0.035 
(0.632) 
FV -0.000* 
(0.095) 
0.000 
(0.605) 
-2.36% -0.000 
(0.192) 
0.000 
(0.407) 
N_Analysts  1529.5** 
(0.018) 
  2829.0*** 
(0.000) 
Std_Forecast  -0.027 
(0.589) 
  -0.038 
(0.356) 
MB  -0.001 
(0.761) 
  -0.007 
(0.205) 
Region Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 788 788  788 788 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Rating disagreements boundaries  
No disagreement <-0.623 
Disagreement at 1 notch level -0.623<>0.811 
Disagreement at 2 notch levels 0.811<>2.266 
Disagreement at 3 notch levels 2.266<>2.699 
Disagreement at 4 or more notch levels 2.699<>3.272 
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Table 3.6: Pattern of Lopsided Rating Disagreements 
The table presents the result of independent sample t-test that is used to compares the pattern of lopsided ratings for 
IFRS and non-IFRS sample. The pattern of lopsided ratings for each sample is determined by calculating the 
percentage of bonds with better Moody’s ratings (notch level) and percentage of bonds with better S&P ratings 
(notch level). The difference between these percentages is defined as pattern of lopsided ratings. To calculate the 
percentage of bonds with better ratings by either rating agency, we first convert letter rating issued by Moody’s and 
S&P into numerical ratings in line with the existing literature. For example, we convert letter rating AAA to 
numerical rating 1, letter rating AA+ to 2, letter rating AA to 3 and so on. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
 Non-IFRS Sample IFRS Sample 
Average Moody’s Rating 3.57 3.27 
Average S&P Rating 4.30 4.00 
Difference in average Ratings 0.73*** 0.73*** 
Percentage of bonds with better Moody’s Rating 65% 55% 
Percentage of bonds with better S&P Rating 12% 6% 
Level of lopsided Rating 53%*** 49%*** 
No. of observations 383 405 
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Table 3.7: Robustness for level of ratings 
This table presents the of results of sub-samples (i.e., constant sample, matched sample and constant sample of 
mandatory adaptors of IFRS) used in this study to test the robustness of the findings of the main analysis. The 
dependent variable for the probit regression models is S&P_Rating. S&P_Rating presents S&P letter level ratings 
assigned to a bond. S&P_Rating  is an ordinal variable while S&P assigns letter ratings to bonds. We convert these 
letter ratings into numerical ratings following existing literature. Namely, we convert letter rating AAA to numerical 
rating 1, letter rating AA to 2, letter rating A to 3 and so on. Model 1 presents the results of ordered probit model for 
the constant sample. We define our constant sample as the one consisting of bonds issued by only those firms that 
issued bonds under both non-IFRS and IFRS reporting standards over the sample period. Model 2 is based on the 
matched sample. The matched sample is constructed in such a way that, for each firm, it contains equal number of 
bonds issued under IFRS and non-IFRS sample. That is to say, that if a firm has issued, say, 8 bonds reporting under 
non-IFRS standards and 10 bonds under IFRS then the 2 bonds (with the shortest maturity) issued under IFRS are 
excluded from the IFRS sample. Model 3 presents the probit regression results for the constant sample of mandatory 
adopters of IFRS. The constant sample of mandatory adopters is similar to the constant sample but does not include 
the bonds issued by the voluntary adopters of IFRS in pre-IFRS period. The control variables, except for Int_Cov, 
are based on Blume  et al. (1998). With respect to Int_Cov, Blume et al. (1998) divide the interest coverage ratio of 
an issuer into four categories based on whether the interest coverage ratio is less than 5, between 5 and 10, between 
10 and 20 and 20 and 100. We do not use such categories. In all models we include region dummies to control for 
any difference in the legal and political system, enforcement of law, investors’ protections and ownership structure 
across regions. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Panel B of Table 3.1. The p-values appear in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. 
Variables Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
IFRS -0.398*** 
(0.003) 
-0.497*** 
(0.001) 
-1.313*** 
(0.000) 
Int_Cov 0.004 
(0.709) 
0.004 
(0.653) 
0.015 
(0.273) 
OperInc_Rev 0.853 
(0.294) 
1.063 
(0.329) 
-1.135 
(0.280) 
Ltd_Assets 3.568*** 
(0.000) 
3.757*** 
(0.000) 
8.666*** 
(0.000) 
Td_Assets -1.110* 
(0.077) 
-1.418* 
(0.079) 
-2.325*** 
(0.002) 
TA -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.688) 
Beta 0.188 
(0.464) 
0.316 
(0.324) 
0.104 
(0.740) 
SE -873.384** 
(0.020) 
-798.418* 
(0.060) 
-1088.79*** 
(0.002) 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 430 300 294 
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Table 3.8: Probit and Ordered Probit Regression explaining probability and level of split rating 
This table presents the results of sub-samples (i.e., constant sample, matched sample and constant sample of 
mandatory adaptors of IFRS) used in this study to test the robustness of the findings of the main analysis. Model 1 to 
Model 3 test the influence of IFRS on probability of rating disagreements between CRAs for the constant, matched 
and the constant sample of mandatory adopters of IFRS respectively. The dependent variables in these three models 
is Split. Split is a binary variable which is equal to 0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign a same rating (at notch 
level) to a new bond and 1 when Moody’s and S&P assign different ratings. Model 4 to Model 6 test the influence 
of IFRS on the level of rating disagreements between CRAs for the constant, matched and constant sample of 
mandatory adopters of IFRS respectively. The dependent variable for these models is Abs_Split. Abs_Split is an 
ordinal variable which is equal to 0 when both Moody’s and S&P assign same rating to a new bond, Abs_Split is 
equal to 1 when Moody’s and S&P rating differ by one notch, Abs_Split is equal to 2 when Moody’s and S&P rating 
differ by two notches and so on. We define our constant sample as consisting of bond issued by only those firms that 
have issued bonds under both non-IFRS and IFRS reporting standards. The matched sample is constructed in such a 
way that, for each firm, it contains equal number of bonds issued under IFRS and non-IFRS sample. That is, if a 
firm has issued, say, 8 bonds reporting under non-IFRS standards and 10 bonds under IFRS then the 2 bonds (with 
the shortest maturity) issued under IFRS are excluded from IFRS sample. The constant sample of mandatory 
adopters is similar to the constant sample but does not include the bonds issued by the voluntary adopters of IFRS in 
pre-IFRS period. The control variables are based on Morgan (2002). In all models we include region dummies to 
control for any difference in the legal and political system, enforcement of law, investors’ protections and ownership 
structure across regions. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. The p-values appear in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively.  
 Model 1 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 3 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 4 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 5 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Model 6 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
IFRS -0.747*** 
(0.000) 
-0.681*** 
(0.002) 
-0.971** 
(0.021) 
0.533*** 
(0.000) 
-0.387** 
(0.022) 
-0.315 
(0.192) 
Loans&Leases -0.007 
(0.198) 
-0.003 
(0.670) 
0.018** 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.348) 
0.004 
(0.487) 
0.009* 
(0.075) 
Cash&Deposits 0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.541) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.286) 
FA -0.066** 
(0.046) 
-0.041 
(0.311) 
-0.140** 
(0.021) 
-0.054* 
(0.051) 
-0.085** 
(0.029) 
-0.077** 
(0.015) 
Int 0.173** 
(0.012) 
0.136* 
(0.081) 
0.072 
(0.521) 
0.153*** 
(0.009) 
0.203*** 
(0.003) 
0.064 
(0.333) 
OA -0.008 
(0.691) 
0.009 
(0.693) 
-0.045* 
(0.057) 
0.003 
(0.847) 
0.020 
(0.249) 
-0.027 
(0.130) 
CapTA 0.019** 
(0.040) 
0.018* 
(0.096) 
0.059*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.051*** 
(0.000) 
TA 0.000*** 
(0.003) 
0.000* 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.006) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
TA2 -0.000* 
(0.051) 
0.000 
(0.356) 
-0.000*** 
(0.008) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.399) 
-0.000*** 
(0.004) 
S&P_Rating 0.405*** 
(0.000) 
0.361*** 
(0.000) 
0.371*** 
(0.000) 
0.374*** 
(0.000) 
0.357*** 
(0.000) 
0.360*** 
(0.000) 
Mat -0.168* 
(0.072) 
-0.194* 
(0.088) 
-0.062 
(0.638) 
-0.136* 
(0.050) 
-0.074 
(0.373) 
0.017 
(0.836) 
FV -0.000 
(0.304) 
-0.000* 
(0.088) 
-0.000 
(0.110) 
-0.000 
(0.440) 
-0.000* 
(0.069) 
-0.000 
(0.157) 
N 463 316 310 463 316 310 
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Empirical analysis of the effectiveness of Market 
Abuse Directive 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Financial markets play an important role in the economic development of a country. This is 
particularly true when these markets operate with integrity, provide a level playing field to all 
investors, and enjoy investors’ confidence. Given the importance of financial markets to the 
prosperity of a country, regulators always remain watchful of the operations of financial markets 
and, if necessary, bring in new regulations to correct or eliminate practices that may be 
detrimental to the integrity of these markets. The introduction of Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 
2003/6/EC in 2003 in Europe is one of the latest examples of such efforts. The purpose of this 
study is to examine whether the implementation of this directive has been effective and whether 
its implementation is associated with any adverse consequences.  
The EC introduced MAD with the aim to improve the integrity of financial markets and 
enhance investors’ confidence on them.  In this respect, the EC indentifies various market abuse 
activities that harm the integrity of financial markets. These activities include the insider dealing 
and market manipulation activities that give misleading signals regarding the demand or supply 
of the financial instruments, or that cause the prices of financial instruments to an artificially 
higher or lower level. The EC considers deterrence of such activities essential to enhance the 
integrity of financial markets and investors’ confidence on them. Apart from that, the 
commission also considers timely and fair dissemination of information to the investors essential 
for smooth functioning of financial markets. Accordingly, MAD contains provisions that are 
directed to deter market abuse activities and that ensure prompt and fair disclosure of 
information to the public. For instance, this directive requires issuers of financial instruments to 
inform the public about any price sensitive inside information promptly after such information 
comes to their knowledge (Article 6(1)). Further, this directive prohibits the practice of releasing 
information regarding the operations and results of a firm to a selected group of players 
(investors as well as analysts). The directive also requires member states to take the necessary 
steps to prohibit market manipulation activities. 
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Even though the provisions in MAD are quite comprehensive and are further augmented by 
requiring member states to take other steps that could be necessary to deter market manipulation 
activities, however, there are a number of reasons why the goals of this directive might not be 
achieved. First, even though issuers are required to immediately disclose all insider information 
to the public, the directive does allow issuers to withhold such information under the 
circumstance that the non-disclosure of such information would not mislead investors in their 
financial decisions. The lack of an objective criterion for disclosure raises concerns that issuers 
might use this provision to withhold inside information in order to avoid uncertainty and 
volatility of their stock price. Second, there are concerns about the definition of “inside 
information” used by the directive in the provision that aims to prohibit inside trading and the 
provision that calls for the immediate release of all inside information to the public. The 
European Security Market Expert Group (ESME) report points to the inconsistent interpretation 
and application of the definition of “inside information”. According to this report, managers are 
employing different strategies to avoid immediate disclosure of inside information, which they 
prefer to not be public knowledge.1 Additionally, there are no guidelines that specify at what 
point a certain event should be regarded as mature enough to be considered price sensitive 
information.2 This could lead to inconsistent disclosure behavior among firms. Third, although 
the prohibition on the disclosure of information to selective individuals is aimed to enhance the 
integrity of the financial markets, this restriction may cause a decline in the level and quality of 
information available to investors. For example, prior literature identifies analysts’ reports and 
opinions as one of the crucial source of new information for the investors (Griffen, 1976; Imhoff 
and Lobo, 1984; Asquith et al., 2005). Analysts’ opinions are generally based both on 
information that is publically available and as well as on the insider information (Moizer and 
Arnold, 1984; Chugh and Meador, 1984). MAD prohibits the private disclosure of price sensitive 
information to all parties including the analysts. Thus, the implementation of MAD is expected 
to lower the level of information available to the analysts. This, in turn, might lower the accuracy 
of their forecasts. The implementation of MAD might also fail to achieve its objectives simply 
because mangers may still continue to provide classified information to select groups of 
investors instead of making the information fully public. Therefore, whether MAD is effective 
and influences the financial information environment is an empirical question that has not yet 
been answered in the available literature, thus, we set out to answer that question. 
To investigate whether MAD is achieving its stated goals and to observe whether its 
introduction has brought any change in the quality and quantity of financial information, we 
conduct an empirical analysis on a sample of firms that are listed on the Frankfurt stock 
exchange during 2001 to 2006. Since all firms listed on Frankfurt stock exchange were required 
to follow MAD at the same point in time, we ran into the problem of the non-existence of a 
sample of firms against which the results of our treatment sample firms could be compared. To 
                                                 
1 ESME (2007) report. “Market abuse EU legal framework and its implementation by member states: a first 
evaluation.” Pp. 5. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/mad_070706_en.pdf 
2 ESME (2007) report. “Market abuse EU legal framework and its implementation by member states: a first 
evaluation.” Pp. 5. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/mad_070706_en.pdf 
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counter this issue, following other studies that faced the same problem (e.g. Landsman et al., 
2012; Daske et al., 2008), we include a sample of firms listed on NYSE to serve as the 
benchmark since these firms are not subject to MAD during the same time period. Based on our 
univariate and multivariate tests, we find evidence of the effectiveness of MAD. Specifically we 
find that, in comparison with pre-MAD years, the stock return volatility declines in post-MAD 
years. We interpret this result as a decrease in market manipulation activities. This interpretation 
is based on studies, for instance Agarwal and Wu (2004) and Jiang et al. (2005), that report a 
positive association between market manipulation activities and the level of stock return 
volatility. Further, based on Beaver (1968), we also interpret a decline in the level of stock return 
volatility as evidence that MAD lowers the gap between investors’ existing information and the 
information contained in earnings announcements. We also find that the stock prices in the post-
MAD period remain closer to their real prices (prices subsequent to the earnings announcements) 
during the specified time period (up to 60 days prior to the earnings announcement date). We 
interpret this as evidence that, pursuant to MAD, on average, managers convey information to 
the market on a timelier basis. We also find evidence of higher accuracy and lower dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts associated with MAD. While both accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts are indicative of improved information quality, we interpret the decline in forecast 
dispersion as a signal of the uniformity of information available to all analysts. Finally, we report 
a decline in the average number of analysts following a firm, which, as argued by Hutton (2003) 
and Bushee et al. (2003), might be a signal of the decline in selective disclosures of private 
information to analysts. Our results are statistically significant after controlling for various firm 
specific characteristics. We test the robustness of our findings in several ways. First, we moved 
the implementation date of MAD to various artificial dates and redid all the analysis. This 
approach has been used in Christensen et al. (2011). The notion behind this approach is that if a 
particular event, in our case introduction of MAD, causes a change in the chosen proxies, then 
the results of the analysis that is based on the actual date of occurrence of the event should be 
stronger than the results of the analysis that are based on the artificial date of occurrence of the 
event under consideration. Second, we apply the full set of multivariate analysis on various sub-
samples. These sub-samples include German firms only, the constant sample of German firms 
and the matched sample of US and German firms. Apart from that, we also include additional 
control variables in our multivariate analysis, namely market-to-book value (proxy for 
conservatism), volatility of earnings, and ratio of interest expenses to the total assets, that could 
potentially influence our dependent variables. The results of all robustness tests are consistent 
with the our main tests.  
We focus on firms working under German setting to gather evidence as to whether MAD is 
achieving its objective because the successful working of regulations not only depends upon the 
thoroughness and comprehensiveness of regulations, but also upon the strength of rule of law in 
regimes in which regulations operate. In other words, a well carved regulation may fail to attain 
its objectives in weak rule of law regimes. Since the objective of this study is to examine the 
quality of MAD, it is important that we carry out our analysis on country that has a strong rule of 
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law so as to minimize the possibility that a weakness in rule of law is wrongly interpreted as 
failure of MAD. Therefore, we base our analysis on a sample of firm listed on Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, Germany. Germany ranks among the countries with the strongest and stable rule of 
law regimes. 
Our study is valuable for at least two reasons: First, even after more than 6 years after the 
implementation of MAD, there is only a limited amount of evidence available regarding the 
outcomes of MAD. Therefore, the results of our study are relevant for market authorities and 
regulators who have been discussing the effectiveness of MAD and are pondering whether or not 
to amend MAD. Second, this study is an addition to the existing literature that examines the 
effectiveness of securities regulations. Up to now, a significant portion of evidence about the 
effectiveness of such regulations was based on U.S security regulations. However, evidence from 
the U.S setting may not hold for other countries. This is because the research on the outcomes of 
such regulations suggests that the effectiveness of security regulations varies across countries 
and depends upon the quality of a country’s institutions, bureaucracy, and commitment toward 
the implementation of these regulations (e.g. Djankov et al., 2003). Therefore, our study 
contributes to security market regulation literature by focusing on the German market. The 
German market is not only one of the biggest markets in the world but also has some special 
features that distinguish it from most of other major financial markets (such as U.S and U.K) 
around the world. These features include presence of a bi-tiered board structure, a higher 
dependence on firms relating to financial institutions for financing, and other features of a 
network-oriented system.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: The next section consists of a review of 
literature, and describes our motivation of this study. Section 3 provides an overview of the data, 
and Section 4 describes the methodology used. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
presents the summary and conclusion of our findings. 
 
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
To date, there is little empirical evidence available regarding the effects of MAD. However, 
another security market regulation, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD)3, which is in many 
respects similar to MAD, has been the subject of several studies. The evidence available on the 
effects of Reg. FD indicates that the quantity of information available to the market after 
instituting Reg. FD has improved. For example, Helfin et al. (2003) documents an increase in the 
earnings related to voluntary disclosures in the post Reg. FD period. The results in Bailey et al. 
(2003) suggest that firms commit themselves to a higher level of voluntary disclosures; however, 
                                                 
3 Regulation FD, which became effective in the U.S. October 23rd, 2000, brought with it voluntary disclosure 
practices of public listed firms subject to the requirements of the SEC. The core requirement of this regulation is 
that a firm with a publicly listed security cannot provide inside information to a third party unless such information 
is simultaneously released to the public. 
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the increase in the voluntary disclosures is limited to those related to current quarter earnings. 
Consistent with the results of these studies, Straser (2002) reports an increase in quantity, 
although not in quality, of disclosures after Reg. FD; while Gomes et al. (2007) document an 
increase in the complexity of information as a result of implementing Reg. FD. While the 
existing evidence is quite conclusive regarding the effects of Reg. FD on the quantity of 
information, the evidence regarding the quality of information is mixed. Heflin et al. (2003) 
report an increase in the quality of information, measured in terms of stock return volatility and 
cumulative abnormal returns but do not find any significant change in the accuracy and 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Although, Bailey et al. (2003) find a decrease in stock return 
volatility, however they associate it with the decimalization of stock trading rather than with 
Reg. FD. Shane et al. (2001) also do not find any significant changes in the accuracy and 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the post Reg. FD period. A few studies, for example Bailey et 
al. (2003), Agrawal et al. (2006) and Mohanram and Sunder (2006), however report negative 
effects from Reg. FD on the analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. 
The limited empirical evidence available on MAD is based on Monteiro et al. (2007) and 
Prevoo and Weel (2010). Monteiro et al. (2007) analyzes the trading announcements made by 
FTSE 350 and take-over announcements made by UK firms from 2000 to 2005. The trading 
announcement analysis provides evidence of less informed trading before such announcements, 
which indicates a cleaner market. However, the decline in informed trading is not significant in 
the analysis based on the announcements of future takeovers. Prevoo and Weel (2010) is based 
on the firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and examines the effects MAD has on the 
information value of press releases issued by the firms, the level of insider-trading, leakage of 
information, and trading volume. The paper documents a) a decline in insider activities (only for 
a small, capitalized firm), and b) no conclusive evidence with respect to changes in the 
information value of firm press releases. In comparison to Prevoo and Weel (2010), we focus on 
the absolute cumulative abnormal return and stock return volatility around the annual earnings 
announcement and analysts’ reports. The annual earnings announcements are considered to be 
the single most important event that helps investors evaluate a firm’s performance (Heflin et al., 
2003), while the analysts are considered to be one of the most sophisticated users of the acquired 
information. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
We use five measures (dependent variables), namely, stock return volatility, absolute 
cumulative abnormal return, accuracy of analyst forecast, dispersion of analyst forecast and 
analyst following to examine the effectiveness of MAD. We classify the these dependent 
variables into two groups, evidence from stock prices (stock return volatility, absolute 
cumulative abnormal return), and evidence from analysts’ reports (accuracy of analyst forecast, 
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dispersion of analyst forecast and analyst following). These variables have been widely used in 
literature similar to our study.  
MAD became operational for all German firms at one point of time. From a methodological 
stand point, this means that our sample lacked a controlled group. To counter this issue we 
follow Landsman et al. (2012) and Daske et al. (2008) and include NYSE listed firms as the 
control sample. The inclusion of these firms tests whether any potential change for five measure 
used in this study is greater than that for the control sample firms.  
 
 
4.3.1 Evidence from stock prices  
 
Stock return volatility (SRV). We use stock return volatility as the proxy of the level of market 
manipulation activities. The choice of this proxy is based on Ausubel (1990), Allen and Gale 
(1992) and Benabou and Laroque (1992). These authors argue that the market manipulators and 
holders of insiders prefer volatility stock markets since dealings in such markets offer them more 
profitable trading opportunities compared to dealing in less volatile markets. Accordingly, these 
maker manipulators and holders of inside information release inside information in such a way 
that would increase the volatility of stock markets. Consistent with this theoretical perspective, 
Meulbroek (1992) find evidence of higher inside trading during the times of higher market 
volatility and thus further suggest the preference of insiders for volatile stock markets. On the 
other hand, by comparing the level of stock market volatility of more than 100 countries, Du and 
Wei (2004) conclude that the countries with more prevalent insider trading indeed have more 
volatile markets. In addition to its role as a proxy for market manipulation activates, the stock 
return volatility also serves a measure of the level of information content of the earnings 
announcements. The notion behind this form of measurement, based on Beaver (1968), is that if 
announcements of earnings reveal new information, which is not already known to investors, 
then investors will react to this new information which will lead to stock price movement. The 
level of investors’ reactions and the resulting movement in stock prices would be proportional to 
the gap between the information content of earnings announcements and the level of information 
already possessed by investors. A larger information gap at the time of an earnings 
announcement would result in higher stock price movement. In the context of this study, if, in 
compliance of provisions of MAD, inside information is released to the market on a timelier 
basis, then the amount of new information contained in earnings announcements would be lower. 
This would result in lower stock price movement and volatility around earnings announcements.  
We measured stock return volatility over three different windows, (-1, 0), (-1, +1), and (-2, 
+2), where day 0 is the earnings announcement day. Existing studies suggest that adjustments in 
stock prices resulting from earnings announcements start even before an earnings announcement 
and continue up to a few hours post-announcement (Patell and Wolfson, 1984). This means that 
the (-1, 0) window might be enough for our study. However, since earnings announcements can 
occur at any hour of the day, there is a possibility that some earnings announcements will be 
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made near the closing trading hours, or even after trading hours. Therefore, to account for any 
reaction not captured by the smaller windows, we extend our analysis and include event 
windows up to (-2, +2) days.  
Following Helfin et al. (2003), stock return volatility is defined as the sum of the squared 
market model, with prediction errors over the estimation window. More specifically, the stock 
return volatility for a particular estimation window is equal to:  
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Where tiR ,  is the stock return for firm i for the day t in the estimation period, and > @tiRE ,  is 
the expected return for the same day while x1 and x2 define length of the window. We calculate 
SRVi,t for each firm for each sample year. The expected returns are based on the standard market 
model and are calculated using an estimation period of one year, ending on the first day of the 
last quarter before the year end. 
Absolute cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) is the absolute gap between stock prices on 
any particular day (before the earnings report date), and stock prices on the report day, represents 
the level of information that markets possess on that particular day. The lower absolute 
difference stands for more information held by financial markets. After MAD, the difference 
between post-announcement stock prices and stock prices at any given time before the earnings 
announcement should be lower. This is because if inside information is released to the public as 
it becomes known to the issuer, the market will get an opportunity to continuously update stock 
prices rather than be forced to make one big adjustment at the time of an earnings announcement 
in order to incorporate previously unknown information. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, if firms exploit provisions of MAD in order to withhold insider information or if, to the 
other extreme, firms start to inundate market with the irrelevant information then the ACAR in 
the post-MAD years may not be significantly different from the ACAR in the pre-MAD years. 
In this study we define this difference as the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return 
from a particular day before the earnings report day to the day following the earnings report day, 
and we measure it as: 
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ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t. x refers to a day relative to earnings 
announcement day. We calculate ACAR for each of the 60 days preceding the earnings 
announcement day. The lower ACAR for any day x before the earnings announcement day in the 
post-MAD period would provide evidence that relevant information is quickly reaching the 
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market and vice versa. We use following regression equations to examine the effect of MAD on 
the stock price based proxies: 
 
SRVit  = ȕ0 + ȕ1MADit + ȕ2Postit+ ȕ3MAD*Postit + ȕ4RetVarit 
+ȕ5Carit + ȕ6NegCarit + ȕ7Lossit+ ȕ8Proit  
+ ȕ9Sizeit+ ȕ10Industy dummies+ߝ                (1) 
 
ACARit  = ȕ0 + ȕ1MADit + ȕ2Postit+ ȕ3MAD*Postit+ ȕ4RetVarit 
+ȕ6Carit + ȕ5NegCarit + ȕ7Lossit+ ȕ8Proit  
+ ȕ9Sizeit+ ȕ10Industy dummies+ߝ               (2) 
 
SRVit and ACARit are the stock return volatility and the absolute cumulative abnormal return 
as defined above. SRV is summed over the (-1, 0), (-1, +1), and (-2, +2) estimation windows 
while ACAR is computed over (-5, +1), (-20, +1), and (-30, +1) windows. For all variables i and t 
refer to the firm and year respectively. MAD is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 for firms 
that belong to MAD adopting country, i.e., Germany, and 0 for firms that belong to the non-
MAD adopting country, i.e., the US. Post is equal to 1 for all the fiscal years that end after 
October 2004 and 0 for the fiscal years that end before October 2004. The interaction between 
MAD and Post, MAD*Post, is our variable of interest. This interaction term effectively measures 
the difference-in-differences in our chosen proxies for the treatment sample firms relative to the 
control sample firms. With respect to the control variables, RetVar is the standard deviation of 
abnormal returns of each firm during the last quarter before the year-end. Beaver (1968) finds 
that firms with higher deviation in the abnormal returns prior to earnings announcements 
experience more erratic stock price movements during earnings announcements. Car is the proxy 
of the level of information available for a firm. Car is calculated as the cumulative abnormal 
returns of a firm over the last quarter before the year end. The inclusion of Car is based on 
Heflin et al. (2003) who report that the level of information available for a firm significantly 
influences the stock return volatility and the absolute cumulative abnormal returns of a firm. 
NegCar captures the sign of cumulative abnormal returns of a firm over the last quarter before 
the year-end. NegCar is set equal to 1 for firms that have negative cumulative abnormal returns 
in the last quarter before the year-end, and 0 for firms with positive stock returns. Christie (1982) 
posits that stock return volatility is expected to be higher for firms with negative stock returns in 
the period before earnings announcements. Loss and NegSpec control for the effect of negative 
earnings and the amount of special items reported in earnings, respectively. Loss is set equal to 1 
for firms reporting negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. NegSpec is set equals to 0 for firms with 
positive special items reported in income statements. For firms with negative special items, 
NegSpec is the absolute value of special items scaled by the total assets of a firm.4 The rationale 
behind the inclusion of  indicator variable loss is based on findings in the literature that managers 
                                                 
4 This is based on Heflin et al. (2003) who finds it informational to construct a variable representing the existence of 
special items in a firm’s income statement. 
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manipulate earnings to avoid reporting a loss. The practice of earnings management make it 
difficult to forecast the earnings of a firm. NegSpec, is included because the impact of special 
items is always hard to predict because of their nature and infrequency. Therefore, firms that 
report loss or special items in financial statements are likely to experience stock return volatility. 
Pro is based on Penman (1996) and represents the growth potential of a firm. Pro is computed as 
the earnings/price ratio of a firm at the end of each year. Prior research (e.g. Collin and Kothari, 
1989) posits that market reaction on earnings announcements is much larger for firms with a 
high growth potential. Size is the market value of the equity of a firm at the end of a fiscal year 
and is includes a control for the effect of firm size on the dependent variables. The detailed 
description and definitions of dependent and control variables is presented in Panel A and Panel 
B of Table 4.1. 
 
4.3.2 Evidence from analysts’ reports 
 
From the perspective of an analyst’s forecast, we focus on the differences in analysts’ forecast 
accuracy, analysts’ forecast dispersion, and the analysts’ following before and after MAD. The 
accuracy of analyst forecasts has been a well-accepted way to measure the quantity and quality 
of information that is available to financial markets for a firm (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996; 
Barron et al., 1998; Dichev, 1999); whereas the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the 
analysts’ following provide reliable information about the extent to which firms release private 
information to analysts (e.g. Botosan et al., 2004; Hutton, 2003). 
Analysts’ forecast accuracy. Analysts are considered to be one of the most affected groups of 
market participation since the implementation of MAD. This is because, in general, analysts 
form their opinions by taking into account both public as well as private information gained 
through their corporate contacts (Moizer and Arnold, 1984; Chugh and Meador, 1984). As 
discussed above, MAD not only calls for the immediate release of all material information but 
also requires that this information be released through public channels. These requirements can 
have both  positive and negative effects on analysts’ forecast accuracy. Analyst forecast accuracy 
may improve because the prohibition on selective disclosure of information means that, 
consistent with the management relation hypotheses (Lim, 1998; Kothari, 2001), analysts would 
no longer need to issue a positive opinion about a firm in order to get insider information from 
firm managers. Therefore, analysts are more likely to produce unbiased and much more accurate 
forecasts when they are less dependent on managers to gather the information required to make 
their forecast (Bailey et al., 2003). Analyst forecast accuracy may decline as a result of MAD if 
firms decide not to share any private information even with those analysts who previously had 
access to inside information. Managers may decide to avoid the requirements of MAD which 
necessitate that the issuer must immediately publically disclose inside information if such 
information has been disclosed to any third party. Similarly, more conservative mangers may, in 
order to avoid unintentional disobedience of MAD, even decide not to provide more detailed 
versions of financial information which they are required to provide to the public in the form of 
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financial statements. This could, in general, lower the amount of information available to the 
analysts’ making forecasts. Consequently forecast accuracy could decline after MAD.  
Analysts forecast dispersion. The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is a measure of the level of 
consensus among different analysts. Several studies (e.g. Botosan et al., 2004) find an inverse 
relation between the precision of private information and analysts’ forecast consensus. Based on 
a theoretical model, Barron et al. (1998) show that analyst forecast dispersion is a function of the 
ratio of public vs. private information used to make forecasts. Their model illustrates a fall in 
forecast dispersion as the use of private information declines in analysts’ forecasting process. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) also document that the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts depends 
upon the information gap among analysts as opposed to a difference in interpretation of common 
information. Thus, to the extent that MAD restricts the provision of private information and 
requires the immediate release of material information; the level of information gap among 
different analysts is expected to become smaller which should result in an increase in consensus 
among analysts. 
Following existing studies (e.g. Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), we define analyst forecast error 
as the absolute difference between the latest (before the EPS report date) analyst consensus 
(median) EPS forecast and the actual EPS of a firm divided by year-end stock prices. Based on 
this definition, we calculated analysts forecast error as: 
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According to the above equation, a lower value of forecast error corresponds to better 
information quality. We define analysts’ forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasts divided by year-end stock prices, which we calculated as: 
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Analysts’ followings. We use the number of analysts following a firm as another proxy for the 
level of private information available to analysts. Hutton (2003) finds that analyst followings is 
positively associated with the scale of private dissemination of firm information to analysts. 
Bushee et al. (2003) also supports this finding by showing a higher level of analyst following for 
firms that provide closed-conference calls. On one hand, the introduction of MAD is expected to 
increase the quantity of publically available information, while on the other hand, the 
implementation of MAD is likely to make private information more costly or difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, analysts who used to have an information advantage (due to their access to private 
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information) would lose this advantage. Losing this information advantage may force analysts to 
move away from those firms and focus on fewer firms so as to market themselves based on their 
ability to make more accurate forecasts. We define analysts following as the number of analysts’ 
forecasts contained in the latest consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcements as 
appearing in I/B/E/S.  
We use following regression equations to examine the effect of implementation of MAD on 
our analysts’ report based proxies:  
 
Forecast_Errorit = ȕ0 + ȕ1MADit + ȕ2Postit + ȕ3MAD*Postit + ȕ4Sizeit 
+ ȕ5ESit + ȕ6Std(ROE)it + ȕ7RetEarCorit 
+ ȕ8Analysts_Followingit + ȕ9IFRSit  
+ ȕ10Ind_dummies + ߝ                 (3) 
  
Forecast_Dispersionit = ȕ0 + ȕ1MADit + ȕ2Postit + ȕ3MAD*Postit + ȕ4Sizeit 
+ ȕ5ESit + ȕ6Std(ROE)it + ȕ7RetEarCorit 
+ ȕ8Analysts_Followingit + ȕ9IFRSit 
+ ȕ10Ind_dummies + ߝ               (4) 
 
Analysts_Followingit = ȕ0 + ȕ1MADit + ȕ2Postit + ȕ3MAD*Postit + ȕ4Sizeit 
+ ȕ5ESit + ȕ6Std(ROE)it + ȕ7RetEarCorit 
+ ȕ8IFRSit + ȕ10Ind_dummies + ߝ           (5) 
 
Forecast_Errorit, Forecast_Dispersionit, and Analysts_Followingit are the absolute value of 
analysts’ forecast error, analysts’ forecast dispersion and number of analysts following a firm. 
MAD, Post, and MAD*Post have the same meaning and interpretation as described for our stock 
price based proxies. The rest of the regressors are the variables identified in the previous 
research that affect the dependent variables of the regression equation (3), (4), and (5). Size is the 
market value of a firm’s equity at the end of a fiscal year. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find firm 
size to be positively (negatively) associated with the accuracy (dispersion) of analysts’ forecasts 
and the analyst following. The next two variables, ES and Std(ROE) capture the shock in a firm’s 
earnings. ES is defined as the absolute difference between the current and previous year’s 
earnings per share scaled by share prices at the end of the previous year, while Std(ROE) is the 
standard deviation of the return on equity of a firm calculated over the preceding five years. The 
inclusion of these variables is based on the grounds that the analysts’ forecasts are likely to be 
more accurate and less dispersed for firms with stable earnings over time. RetEarCor is the 
correlation between the returns and earnings of each firm. King (1990) argues that the higher the 
return earnings correlation the better the forecasts of future earnings. Analysts_Following 
represents the number of analysts’ forecasts contained in the latest consensus forecast prior to the 
earnings announcements as reported in I/B/E/S. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find a higher (lower) 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (dispersion) for firms that have higher number of analysts following. 
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IFRS is an indicator variable which is 1 for firms that report under IFRS or US GAAP and zero 
for firms that do not. It is important to control for the type of accounting standards used by the 
sample firms since Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) show that the quality of analysts’ forecasts is 
influenced by the quality of accounting standards. 
4.4 Data 
 
The data for this study consists of all the public firms that are listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
exchange and have their financial year ending on the 31st of December. Our sample period starts 
in 2001 and ends in 2006. The sample period of 2001 to 2003 covers the pre-MAD adoption 
period while 2004 to 2006 cover the post-MAD period. We do not extend our sample beyond 
2006 mainly because of a new set of regulations (the Transparency Directive) implemented on 
the 1st of January 2007; therefore, extending our sample period beyond 2006 might confound our 
results. Another reason we restrict our sample to 2006 is to ensure that our analysis is not 
affected by the consequences of the economic crisis on the financial market. We start by 
retrieving data for our treatment sample for the entire time period of our analysis. We then 
construct a sample on a yearly basis and exclude firms for which required financial and non-
financial information is not available. In this way, for each of the six years included in our 
sample, we obtain a sample of treatment firms with all the required information available. We 
follow the same steps for our control sample firms. 
We use three different databases to retrieve the necessary data .We retrieve the analysts’ 
forecast and dispersion from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System database (I/B/E/S). We 
gather stock price data from DataStream, while the required accounting data is obtained from 
Thomson One Banker. The earnings announcement dates are also taken from Thomson One 
Banker. We randomly checked these announcements with Factiva for their accuracy. We then 
combine the data retrieved from different databases using I/B/E/S tickers and ISIN numbers. 
After deleting the years with missing information, our final sample consists of 6095 firms 
observed with 1347 different firms (including the control sample) for our tests related to stock 
price analysis. For the tests on the analysts’ forecast and standard deviation, the sample is based 
on 5,078 firm year observations from 1,223 distinct sample firms. The differences found 
between the two samples are due to the lack of available required data from I/B/E/S for some 
smaller firms. Table 4.2, Panel A presents the breakdown of our sample by industry. Our sample 
is dominated by (approximately 25% of the total sample) the finance/real estate industry (SIC 
60-69), followed by the construction industry (SIC 15-17, 32, 52). The food/tobacco industry 
(SIC 1, 20, 21, 54) has the least representation with less than 2% of the firm-year observations. 
Panel B presents the number of firm-year observations for each of the years included in our 
sample. About 43% of our sample consists of observations from 2003 and 2004. The same 
number of firms can be found in both the pre-MAD and post-MAD years (for example, 2001 had 
118 firm-year observations. while its corresponding post-MAD year 2006 had 112 firm-year 
observations).  
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4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of the treatment and control sample firms. According 
to the statistics reported in Panel A for treatment sample firms, the mean SRVs are smaller in the 
post-MAD period compared to those in the pre-MAD period. Namely, the mean SRVs for the 
three event windows used in this analysis are 0.0014, 0.0024, and 0.0068 in the post-MAD 
period and 0.0025, 0.0041, and 0.0109 during the pre-MAD period. The mean ACARs over the 
three windows during the post-MAD period (0.0486, 0.0829, 0.1080) are also lower than the 
respective ACARs during the pre-MAD period (0.0630, 0.1182, 0.1372). Similarly, in 
comparison with the pre-MAD sample, the mean error of the analysts’ forecasts Forecast_Error 
(0.075 vs. 0.045), the dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts Forecast_Dispersion (0.026 vs. 
0.016), and the average number of analysts following a firm, Analysts_Following (11.52 vs. 
9.39) also declined during the post-MAD period. In terms of the control variables, the pre and 
post-MAD samples are significantly different from each other with respect to NegCar (0.466 vs. 
0.416), Car (0.180 vs. 0.131), Loss (0.401 vs. 0.246), Pro (0.311 vs. -0.029), NegSpec (0.040 vs. 
0.027), ES (0.304 vs. 0.122), Std(ROE) (31.059vs 27.577), and IFRS (0.738 vs. 0.936). However, 
the sample firms are quite similar to each other in terms of Size (4.961 vs. 4.893), RetVar (0.040 
vs. 0.038), RetEarCor (0.275 vs. 0.303), and RegQuality (0.1563 vs. 1.474).  
Panel B compares the descriptive statistics for the control sample firms. Just as we observed 
for the treatment sample firms, relative to the pre-MAD period, the control sample firms also 
experience a decline in the SRV (0.0007, 0.0009, 0.0026 vs. 0.0009, 0.0013, 0.0038), ACAR 
(0.0348, 0.0622, 0.0767 vs. 0.0409, 0.0721, 0.0908), Forecast_Error (0.004, 0.010), and 
Forecast_Dispersion (0.002, 0.003) in the post-MAD period, while there was a slight increase in 
Analysts_Following (9.20, 8.75). In terms of the control variables, the pre and post-MAD 
samples are similar with respect to Size (7.431 vs. 7.827), RetVar (0.023 vs. 0.024), RetEarCor 
(0.117 vs. 0.093), IFRS (1.0 vs. 1.0), and RegQuality (1.543 vs. 1.594).These samples differ 
significantly from each other with respect to NegCar (0.359 vs. 0.485), Car (0.119 vs. 0.078), 
Loss (0.174 vs. 0.101 ), Pro (0.007 vs. 0.041), NegSpec (0.246 vs. 0.127), ES (0.082 vs. 0.039), 
and Std(ROE) (26.773 vs. 40.763).  
Next, we compare the characteristics of the treatment and the control group of a firm in the 
post-MAD period. According to these statistics, the control group firms are significantly larger 
than the treatment group in terms of Size (4.893, 7.827). The firms from the control set have a 
significantly lower level of deviation in abnormal returns (Retvar 0.038, 0.024), absolute value 
of cumulative abnormal returns (Car 0.131, 0.078), and earnings surprises (ES 0.122, 0.039). 
Similarly, the control group contains fewer firms that reported negative earnings (Loss 0.246, 
0.101). The control group also appears to operate under a slightly better regulatory environment 
(RegQual 1.474, 1.594), contain a higher proportion of firms that report under a high quality 
accounting standard (IAS/US GAAP IFRS 0.936, 1.000) and have better growth potential (Pro -
0.029, 0.041). However, the treatment group contains a smaller proportion of firms for which 
cumulative abnormal returns were negative over the last quarter before the end of a particular 
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year (NegCar 0.416, 0.485). Treatment group also has a significantly lower standard deviation of 
earnings (Std(ROE) 27.577,  40.763) and a higher return earnings correlation (RetEarCor 0.303, 
0.093). Finally, the control group contained a higher amount of special items in their financial 
statements (NegSpec 0.027, 0.127).  
Taken together, the descriptive statistics reveal two important facts. First they show that the 
treatment and control sample firms differ significantly in terms of firm characteristics which 
suggests the need to control for the differences in these firm characteristics. Second these 
statistics show that both sample firms experienced a change in chosen proxies during the pre and 
post-MAD period and therefore justify our choice of the use of difference in the differences 
analysis. 
 
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Univariate evidence from stock prices and analysts’ reports  
 
In this sub section, we present the results of our univariate analysis for the five measures used 
in this study. We apply a difference in differences approach in an effort to account for the 
possible changes in the levels of proxies used in our analysis that might not be related to MAD 
but that might relate to the general improvement in the financial information environment during 
the time period covered by our analysis. For this purpose, firstly we compute the average 
difference between each measure’s pre and post-MAD value for our treatment sample. Secondly, 
we compute the average difference for the each measure’s over the same time period for our 
control sample. Finally, we compare the differences between the results of our treatment and 
control sample firms. In order to be included in this analysis, we require each firm to have the 
necessary data available in both the pre-MAD and respective post-MAD time period. This means 
that if the data for 2004 (the post-MAD period) is available for a firm, then this firm can only be 
included in the analysis if the data for 2003 (corresponding pre-MAD period) is also available 
for the same firm.  
Table 4.4 (from Panel A to Panel H) presents the result of this univariate analysis. The results 
of the analysis, based on both the stock return based measures and analysts’ forecasts,  in 
general, provide evidence of successful functioning MAD. For example, over the three windows 
used in this analysis, i.e., (-1,0), (-1,+1), and (-2,+2), SRVs for the treatment sample firms 
declined from 0.0025, 0.0041, and 0.0109 in the pre-MAD period to 0.0014, 0.0024, and 0.0068 
in the post-MAD period. During the same time period, our control firms also experienced a 
decline in SRV of 0.0002, 0.0004, and 0.0012, respectively, for the same three event windows. 
However, the difference in differences analysis, based on the independent sample t-test, shows 
that the decline in the SRV for the treatment sample firms is significantly higher compared to the 
decline in the control sample firms. With respect to the absolute cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR), the results for (-5, +1), (-20, +1), and (-30, +1) windows show that, compared to the 
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pre-MAD years, the ACAR declined by 0.0144, 0.0353, and 0.0292 for treatment sample firms 
and by 0.0061, 0.0099, and by 0.0141 for the control sample firms in the post-MAD years. The 
difference in differences analysis once again reveals a significantly higher decline in ACAR for 
the treatment sample firms compared to the control sample firms.5 Figure 4.1, Panel A 
graphically presents the ACAR for our treatment sample firms over a period of 60 trading days 
before the earnings report day to 1 trading day after the reporting day. In Panel B of Figure 4.1 
we plot the scaled ACAR. The scaled ACAR presents the level of ACAR on any particular trading 
day x before the reporting date, relative to the ACAR on day 60 before the reporting date. In both 
Panel A and Panel B, the lines representing the ACAR and the scaled ACAR in the post-MAD 
period are plotted below the lines representing the ACAR and the scaled ACAR in the pre-MAD 
period. This means that, relative to the pre-MAD period, stock prices in the post-MAD period 
remain closer to their post-announcement prices in the time period leading up to the 
announcement date.  
In terms of the evidence from the analysts’ reports and analyst following, the accuracy of 
analyst forecast improves by 0.030 in the post-MAD period for our treatment sample firms; this 
improvement is higher than that experienced by our control sample (0.006) firms in the same 
time period. The difference (0.024) in the respective improvement in the accuracy of forecast 
accuracy between treatment and control sample firms is also statistically significant. Both 
treatment and control sample firms experienced a decline in analyst forecast dispersion. 
Importantly, this decline is significantly higher (by 0.009) for treatment sample firms compared 
to the control sample firms. The average number of analysts following a firm also declined 
significantly for treatment sample firms from 11.52 in the pre-MAD years to 9.39 in the post-
MAD years. Over the same years, the average number of analysts following increased slightly 
from 8.75 per firm in pre-MAD years to 9.20 per firm in the post-MAD years for our control 
sample firms. The difference in differences analysis shows that the average number of analysts 
following for our treatment sample firms declined by 2.58 compared to the control sample firms. 
The above results, in general, provide evidence that the implementation of MAD achieves its 
stated goals. However, these results should be interpreted with caution since this difference in 
differences analysis does not control for correlated factors that potentially influence the outcome 
of our chosen proxies.  
 
4.5.2 Multivariate evidence from stock price information 
 
Stock return volatility. Table 4.5 in Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) over 
(-1, 0), (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows. The coefficients on the variable of interest, MAD*Post, 
are -0.001, -0.001 and -0.003 respectively for (-1, 0), (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows. The 
coefficients on the variable of interest, MAD*Post, are -0.001, -0.001, and -0.003 respectively 
for (-1, 0), (-1, +1), and (-2, +2) windows. These coefficients differ from zero at p<0.01 level and 
                                                 
5 For brevity we only present the results of (-5, +1), (-20, +1), and (-30, +1) windows. However, the unreported 
results of the other windows largely lead to analogous conclusions. 
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indicate a statistically significant decrease in SRV for the treatment sample firms after 
implementation of MAD. As previously stated, according to the construction, a negative 
coefficient on MAD*Post indicates that this decline is net off any potential decline in SRV that 
occurred for the control sample firms during the same time period. The coefficients on the 
control variables are generally consistent over the three windows and are in line with those 
predicted in the literature. For instance, the coefficients on RetVar, Car, and Loss are positive 
and indicate that the firms that have greater variation in abnormal returns, have higher level of 
absolute cumulative abnormal returns before earnings announcements, or report losses 
experience higher stock return volatility around the earnings announcements dates. Size and Pro 
are negative and show that the bigger firms and the firms that have higher price to earnings ratios 
experience lower stock return volatility around the earnings announcement date. In panel B, we 
add the variable RegQuality to control for the change in the level of regulation quality over the 
sample period.6 The coefficient on RegQuality is negative and significant and reveals that the 
level of stock return volatility decreases as the quality of regulations improves. The inclusion of 
RegQuality leads to a decline in the coefficients on MAD*Post for all three event windows, but 
the coefficients are negative and statistically different from zero. Therefore, controlling for 
RegQuality does not change the finding that introduction of MAD leads to a decline in SRV.  
Absolute cumulative abnormal returns. Next, we estimate the regression equation (2) which 
examines whether firms release inside information on a more timely basis after implementation 
of MAD. The regression results for three ACAR windows (-5, +1), (-20, +1), and (-30, +1) are 
presented in panel C of the Table 4.5. For all three windows the coefficient on MAD*Post are 
negative (-0.008, -0.011, and -0.020) and significantly different from zero at p<0.01. These 
results are close to the results reported in the difference in differences analysis and indicate that 
the absolute difference between the pre-announcement and post-announcement prices became 
smaller after implementation of MAD. Importantly, the decrease in the level of difference 
between the pre and post-announcement prices for the treatment sample firms is higher relative 
to the control sample firms. The majority of the control variables have the expected coefficient 
signs. Panel D shows that the inclusion of variable RegQuality to control for the change in the 
level of regulation quality makes our results stronger. 
 Overall, the stock prices based proxies show a significant decline in the SRV and ACAR for 
the treatment sample firms after the implementation of MAD. Based on prior literature, we 
interpret in these proxies as evidence that implementation of MAD lowers the market 
manipulation activities (lower SRV) and makes inside information available to the market on a 
more timely basis (lower ACAR). 
4.5.3 Multivariate evidence from analysts’ reports 
 
                                                 
6 The variable RegQuality is based on Kaufman et al. (2009). This variable does not specifically relate to the 
strength of the securities regulations in a country. Rather, it reveals the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations (Christensen et al., 2011). 
. 
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Analysts’ forecast error. Table 4.6., Panel A presents the results of the regression equation (3) 
with the absolute value of the forecast error as the dependent variable. Our variable of interest, 
MAD*Post, is negative (-0.177) and significant (p<0.01) and thus indicates that the  analysts’ 
forecast accuracy improves after the implementation of MAD. With respect to the control 
variables, the negative coefficient on Size suggests that financial analysts are able to make more 
accurate earnings forecasts for larger firms. The coefficients on RetEarCor and 
Analysts_Following are expectedly negative but not significant. The positive coefficients on ES 
and Std(ROE), are consistent with the notion that the accuracy of analysts’ forecast declines 
when firms experience higher earnings surprises or when the volatility of return on equity 
increases. The IFRS dummy has an unexpected positive sign but it is not significantly different 
from zero. The inclusion of variable RegQuality slightly changes the coefficients on MAD*Post 
but, qualitatively, our results remain the same.  
Analyst forecast dispersion. The results of regression equation (4), with the analyst forecast 
dispersion as a dependent variable, are presented in the panel B of Table 4.6. The coefficient on 
MAD*Post is negative (-0.029) and significant at p<0.01 and thus indicates a decline in the 
analysts’ forecast dispersion after MAD. The decline in the level of analysts’ forecast dispersion 
for treatment sample firms is higher than any decline in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
happening for the control sample firms during the same time period. As discussed in the earlier 
section, the decline in the forecast dispersion not only indicates a richer information environment 
but, as Barron et al. (2005) argue, also indicates a decline in private information. The control 
variables, in general, have the expected coefficient signs and, for instance, show a lower 
analysts’ forecast dispersion for bigger firms (Size) and for the firms that have higher analysts’ 
following (Analysts_Following). Furthermore, the coefficients on control variables show that 
firms that have higher earnings surprises (ES) experience a higher analysts’ forecast dispersion. 
Coefficient on RetEarCor and IFRS have unexpected signs whereas the coefficient on Std(ROE) 
is not significantly different from zero. Consistent with the finding for the analysts’ forecast error 
based analysis, the inclusion of RegQuality does not materially change our analysts’ forecast 
dispersion results.  
Analyst following. Panel C presents the results of the analysis with the number of analysts 
following a firm as the dependent variable. For this analysis, the coefficient of MAD*Post is 
negative (-2.494) and significant (p<0.01), which indicates a decline in the number of analysts 
following a firm in the time period subsequent to the implementation of MAD. Regarding the 
control variables, the positive coefficient on Size and IFRS show that larger firms and firms that 
report under high quality standards have greater analysts’ following. The negative coefficient on 
Std(ROE) is consistent with the notion that firms with less stable earnings are followed by fewer 
analysts. The negative coefficient on RetEar(Cor) is contrary to the view that analysts’ prefer to 
follow those firms that have a higher return-earnings correlation.  
Taken together, the results based on stock prices evidence and on analysts’ reports show that 
the implementation of MAD is associated with a decline in market manipulation activities ( 
lower SRV), the immediate of disclosure of inside information (lower ACAR), an improved 
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quality and quantity of information (lower Forecast_Accuracy and  Forecast_Dispersion), and a 
decline in provision of selective disclosures (lower Forecast_Dispersion and 
Analysts_Following). 
 
 
4.6 Robustness tests 
 
First of all, we perform an analysis to test whether our previous results are, indeed, 
attributable to the implementation of MAD. For this purpose, we superficially move the 
implementation date of MAD for each year included in our sample and re-run our analysis. If our 
previously reported findings are a consequence of the implementation of MAD then our results 
should be strongest for the analysis done based on the true implementation date of MAD and 
should become weaker when we use superficial implementation dates. The outcomes of this 
analysis are reported in Table 4.7. For evidence based on the analysis of stock prices, the 
significance of the coefficient on MAD*Post, as expected, weakens as we move the superficial 
implementation date of MAD to earlier years (2002 and 2003) than the actual implementation 
year of MAD (2004). For example, for window (0, +1) of the stock return volatility analysis, the 
significance of coefficient on MAD*Post changes from t = -2.949 for the analysis that is based 
on the actual implementation year (2004) to t=-0.261 for the analysis that is based on superficial 
implementation year (2003). The significance of MAD*Post continues to rise (from t= -2.949 to 
t= -5.906) as we move the superficial date of implementation to later years (2005 and 2006). The 
rise in the significance of the coefficient on MAD after year 2004 shows that MAD became more 
effective with the passage of time. This is consistent with Ernsberger et al. (2010), who report 
that the implementation of a regulation in German settings requires about two years to show its 
full effects. With regard to the analysis based on analysts’ forecast accuracy and analysts’ 
following, the significance of MAD*Post peaks at the true implementation date of MAD. The 
significance of  MAD*Post falls as we move away from the true implementation date. This trend 
is not as visible in the analysts’ forecast dispersion regression, the coefficient on MAD*Post falls 
after the actual date of implementation. Overall, this analysis indicates that the findings reported 
in our main analysis can reasonably to attributed to the implementation of MAD. 
We also vary the composition of our sample firms to test the robustness of our results. The 
results of these robustness tests are available in Table 4.8-4.10. First, we run the full set of 
regression analysis based on the sample of German firms only. Second, to alleviate potential 
concerns that any changes in our chosen proxies might be driven by changes in sample 
composition, we restrict this sample to only those German firms that were present in both pre 
and post-MAD years. Third, we also used a sample of US and German firms matched based on 
size (market value), industry (based on the Campbell, 1996), and year. The construction 
procedure of this sample is as follows: for each year (for example, 2001) we pick up, one by one, 
each firm i from our treatment sample and try to find a control sample firm (from 2001) from the 
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same industry that has the closest market value to that of treatment sample firm i. We repeat this 
process for the entire set of firms included in our treatment sample. If a match is found we 
include both the treatment and control sample firms in our final sample. After a control sample 
firm has been matched with a treatment sample firm, that (control sample) firm is removed from 
the list of candidate (control sample) firms that could potentially be matched with a treatment 
sample firm. Finally, we also include in our analysis several other variables that could potentially 
influence our dependent variables. Specifically, we include market-to-book value (a proxy for 
conservatism), volatility of earnings, and ratio of interest expenses to the total assets in our 
regression analysis for SRV and ACAR . The results of these robustness tests are virtually 
identical to those of our main analysis.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the enactment of MAD directive is to augment the integrity of security 
markets and enhance public trust in regard to these markets. For this purpose, MAD contains 
provisions that are aimed to reduce market manipulation activities, require prompt disclosure of 
inside information and restrict selective disclosures. Though regulators are optimistic about the 
success of MAD, and anecdotal evidence also suggests so, there is very limited empirical 
evidence available to support this optimism. Based on extant literature, we use stock prices based 
proxies (stock return volatility and absolute cumulative abnormal returns) to examine the market 
manipulation activities and prompt disclosure of information to the security market. Also based 
on the literature we draw on analysts’ forecast based proxies (analysts’ forecast error, analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and analysts’ following) to observe the disclosure of inside information. The 
analysts’ forecast based proxies also provide evidence about the quality of information disclosed 
by firms.  
Based on our analysis of the firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we find evidence 
of a successful functioning MAD. In particular our results indicate a decrease in the level of 
stock price volatility around earnings announcements days, and a decrease in the level of 
absolute cumulative abnormal return measured over (-60, +1) days window in post-MAD years. 
The decrease in stock return volatility indicates that level of market manipulation lowers after 
implementation of MAD. A decrease in the absolute cumulative abnormal returns indicates that 
firms feed market with new information earlier in post-MAD years compared to the pre-MAD 
years. The results also reveal a decrease in the analysts’ forecast error, analysts’ forecast 
dispersion and analysts’ following after implementation of MAD. The decline in analysts’ 
forecast reveals a richer level of information available to the market after implementation of 
MAD. The decline in analysts’ forecast and analysts’ following indicate a decline in the level of 
private information provided by firms to the analysts. Altogether, our results provide positive 
news for regulators in Europe that their policy has been effective. These results remain robust 
when the analysis is based on German firms only sample, the constant sample of German firms 
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and the matched sample of German and U.S firms. The robust tests where we move the 
enforcement date of MAD to several superficial dates provide us reasonable assurance that the 
results reported in this study are attributable to the implementation of MAD.  
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Table 4.2: Breakdown of sample in industries and years 
 Treatment Sample Control Sample 
 
No. of firm-
year 
observations No. of firms 
No. of firm-
year 
observations No. of firms 
Panel A. Industry breakdown     
Finance/real estate industry (SIC 60-
69) 
250 84 1,241 233 
Consumer durables industry (SIC 25, 
30, 36-37, 50, 55, 57) 
213 60 440 86 
Basic industry (SIC 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 
28, 33) 
149 37 487 93 
Food/tobacco industry (SIC 1, 20, 21, 
54) 
26 8 179 41 
Construction industry (SIC 15-17, 32, 
52) 
93 35 159 35 
Capital goods industry (SIC 34-35, 38) 203 57 420 80 
Transportation industry (SIC 40-42, 
44, 45, 47) 
19 5 108 20 
Utilities industry (SIC 46, 48, 49) 76 19 567 100 
Textile/trade industry (SIC 22-23, 31, 
51, 53, 56, 59) 
113 42 116 40 
Service industry (SIC 72-73, 75, 80, 
82, 89) 
267 77 359 66 
Leisure industry 71 24 150 35 
Total 1480 448 4,615 899 
Panel B. Yearly breakdown 
 
No. of firm-
year 
observations Percentage 
No. of firm-
year 
observations Percentage 
Year 2001 224 15.13 702 15.21 
Year 2002 172 11.62 760 16.47 
Year 2003 305 20.61 807 17.49 
Year 2004 345 23.31 812 17.59 
Year 2005 210 14.19 794 17.20 
Year 2006 224 15.13 740 16.03 
Total 1480 100 4,615 100 
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Table 4.4: Univariate analysis, based on difference in differences analysis, to examine the effect of 
implementation of MAD on stock price and analysts’ forecast based proxies 
Panel A. SRV (-1, 0) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.0025 0.0014 0.0011*** 0.007 
Control Sample 4456 0.0009 0.0007 0.0002** 0.047 
Difference in differences  0.0009*** 0.002 
Panel B. SRV (-1, -1) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.0041 0.0024 0.0017*** 0.000 
Control Sample 4456 0.0013 0.0009 0.0004*** 0.002 
Difference in differences  0.0013*** 0.000 
Panel C. SRV (-2, +2) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.0109 0.0068 0.0041*** 0.000 
Control Sample 4456 0.0038 0.0026 0.0012*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  0.0029*** 0.000 
Panel D. ACAR (-5, +1) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.0630 0.0486 0.0144*** 0.000 
Control Sample 4456 0.0409 0.0348 0.0061*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  0.0083** 0.012 
Panel E. ACAR (-20, +1) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.1182 0.0829 0.0353*** 0.000 
Control Sample 4456 0.0721 0.0622 0.0099*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  0.0254*** 0.000 
Panel F. ACAR (-30, +1) 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 1398 0.1372 0.1080 0.0292*** 0.000 
Control Sample 4456 0.0908 0.0767 0.0141*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  0.0151*** 0.000 
Panel G. Forecast_Error 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 720 0.075 0.045 0.030** 0.038 
Control Sample 3144 0.010 0.004 0.006** 0.012 
Difference in differences  0.024*** 0.007 
Panel H. Forecast_Dispersion 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 510 0.026 0.016      0.010* 0.086 
Control Sample 2716 0.003 0.002 0.001*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  0.009*** 0.000 
Panel I. Analysts_following 
 N Pre-MAD period Post-MAD period Difference p-value 
Treatment Sample 720 11.52 9.39 2.13*** 0.000 
Control Sample 3144 8.75 9.20 -0.45*** 0.000 
Difference in differences  2.58*** 0.000 
 
 
 
C
ha
pt
er
 4
 
 
 
 
T
ab
le
 4
.5
: R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
m
od
el
 e
xp
la
in
in
g 
th
e 
E
ffe
ct
 o
f M
A
D
 o
n 
st
oc
k 
pr
ic
es
 b
as
ed
 p
ro
xi
es
 
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 re
gr
es
si
on
 a
na
ly
si
s 
us
ed
 to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 M
A
D
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ov
em
en
t o
f s
to
ck
 p
ric
es
 a
ro
un
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
ts
. 
Pa
ne
l r
ef
le
ct
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 M
A
D
 o
n 
th
e 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
 (S
RV
) o
ve
r t
he
 th
re
e 
di
ff
er
en
t t
im
e 
w
in
do
w
s 
i.e
., 
(0
,+
1)
, (
-1
,+
1)
 a
nd
 (-
2,
+2
). 
 In
 p
an
el
 B
, w
e 
in
cl
ud
e 
Re
gQ
ua
lit
y 
to
 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t o
f 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
ov
er
 o
f 
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d.
 P
an
el
 C
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
 a
na
ly
si
s 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
M
A
D
 o
n 
th
e 
ab
so
lu
te
 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ab
no
rm
al
 r
et
ur
ns
 (
AC
AR
) 
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
 o
ve
r 
3 
di
ff
er
en
t t
im
e 
ho
riz
on
s 
i.e
., 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
y 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
t t
o 
th
e 
5,
 2
0 
an
d 
30
 d
ay
s 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
ts
. I
n 
M
od
el
 7
-9
. P
an
el
 D
 p
re
se
nt
s 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 a
na
ly
si
s 
w
he
re
 w
e 
in
cl
ud
e 
Re
gQ
ua
lit
y 
to
 c
on
tro
l f
or
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t o
f r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
ov
er
 o
f 
sa
m
pl
e 
pe
rio
d.
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
ar
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 in
 T
ab
le
 4
.1
. T
he
 p
-v
al
ue
s 
ap
pe
ar
 in
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s 
an
d 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 r
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
dj
us
te
d 
fo
r 
fir
m
 c
lu
st
er
in
g.
 
*s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
 le
ve
l, 
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
 le
ve
l, 
**
*s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
 le
ve
l. 
 
 
Pa
ne
l A
 
SR
V 
Pa
ne
l B
 
SR
V 
Pa
ne
l C
 
AC
AR
 
Pa
ne
l D
 
AC
AR
 
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(0
, +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
1,
 +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
2,
 +
2)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(0
, +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
1,
 +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
2,
 +
2)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
5,
 +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
20
, +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
30
, +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
5,
 +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
20
, +
1)
 
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
(p
-v
al
ue
s)
 
(-
30
, +
1)
 
M
AD
 
-0
.0
01
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
02
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
04
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
01
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
02
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
04
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
10
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
15
**
* 
(0
.0
16
) 
-0
.0
18
**
* 
(0
.0
01
) 
-0
.0
16
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
(0
.0
63
) 
Po
st 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.7
94
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.3
21
) 
-0
.0
00
* 
(0
.0
80
) 
0.
00
0*
 
(0
.0
97
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.1
45
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.4
76
) 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
-0
.0
07
**
* 
(0
.0
05
) 
-0
.0
03
* 
(0
.0
80
) 
-0
.0
08
**
* 
(0
.0
01
) 
-0
.0
02
 
(0
.2
22
) 
-0
.0
16
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
M
AD
*P
os
t 
-0
.0
01
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
-0
.0
01
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
-0
.0
03
**
 
(0
.0
15
) 
-0
.0
02
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
02
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
08
**
 
(0
.0
26
) 
-0
.0
11
 
(0
.1
53
) 
-0
.0
20
**
* 
(0
.0
01
) 
-0
.0
05
 
(0
.5
01
) 
-0
.0
13
**
* 
(0
.0
03
) 
0.
01
9*
* 
(0
.0
47
) 
Re
tV
ar
 
0.
00
1 
(0
.1
15
) 
0.
00
3*
* 
(0
.0
16
) 
0.
00
6*
 
(0
.0
84
) 
0.
00
2*
 
(0
.0
73
) 
0.
00
3*
* 
(0
.0
10
) 
0.
00
6*
 
(0
.0
64
) 
0.
02
1 
(0
.3
14
) 
0.
05
6 
(0
.3
14
) 
0.
04
0 
(0
.2
14
) 
0.
03
6 
(0
.2
66
) 
0.
02
2 
(0
.2
82
) 
0.
04
7 
(0
.3
95
) 
Ne
gC
ar
 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.1
37
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.1
83
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.3
07
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.1
66
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.2
21
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.3
54
) 
-0
.0
02
* 
(0
.0
65
) 
0.
00
1 
(0
.6
80
) 
0.
00
1 
(0
.7
52
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.8
45
) 
-0
.0
02
* 
(0
.0
77
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.8
30
) 
Ca
r 
0.
00
2*
**
 
(0
.0
03
) 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
03
) 
0.
00
7*
**
 
(0
.0
01
) 
0.
00
2*
**
 
(0
.0
03
) 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
01
) 
0.
00
7*
**
 
(0
.0
02
) 
0.
02
8*
**
 
(0
.0
01
) 
0.
08
1*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
07
0*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
07
1*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
02
82
**
* 
(0
.0
01
) 
0.
08
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
Lo
ss
 
0.
00
0*
* 
(0
.0
18
) 
0.
00
1*
**
 
(0
.0
01
) 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
00
0*
* 
(0
.0
16
) 
0.
00
1*
**
 
(0
.0
03
) 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
01
1*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
02
4*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
02
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
02
2*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
01
1*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
02
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
Pr
o 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.4
25
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.1
62
) 
-0
.0
02
**
 
(0
.0
11
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.4
24
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.1
63
) 
-0
.0
02
**
 
(0
.0
11
) 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
14
**
 
(0
.0
31
) 
-0
.0
06
* 
(0
.0
68
) 
-0
.0
06
* 
(0
.0
69
) 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
14
**
 
(0
.0
31
) 
N
eg
Sp
ec
 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.5
00
) 
0.
00
1 
(0
.6
65
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.6
59
) 
-0
.0
00
 
(0
.4
23
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.7
15
) 
0.
00
0 
(0
.6
95
) 
-0
.0
01
 
(0
.4
98
) 
0.
00
1 
(0
.8
51
) 
-0
.0
01
 
(0
.7
55
) 
-0
.0
01
 
(0
.8
18
) 
-0
.0
01
 
(0
.4
69
) 
0.
00
1 
(0
.7
47
) 
Si
ze
 
-0
.0
00
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
00
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
01
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
00
**
* 
(0
.0
01
) 
-0
.0
00
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
00
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
Re
gQ
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
-0
.0
06
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
08
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
15
**
* 
(0
.0
02
) 
 
 
 
0.
11
4*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
37
**
 
(0
.0
40
) 
0.
22
5*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
C
on
sta
nt
 
0.
00
3*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
00
5*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
01
33
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
01
2*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
01
7*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
03
7*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
08
0*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
16
1*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
0.
13
7*
**
 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.0
40
 
(0
.4
37
) 
0.
13
78
**
* 
(0
.0
00
) 
-0
.1
89
**
* 
(0
.0
02
) 
In
d 
du
m
m
y 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
C
ha
pt
er
 4
 
 
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
5 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
Ad
j. 
R2
 
3.
89
%
 
6.
40
%
 
8.
08
%
 
4.
05
%
 
5.
85
%
 
8.
18
%
 
9.
76
%
 
11
.7
2%
 
11
.7
8%
 
11
.9
6%
 
9.
82
%
 
12
.2
0%
 
N 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
60
95
 
 Chapter 4  
112 
 
Table 4.6: Regression model explaining Effect of MAD on analysts’ reports based proxies 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis used to determine effect of implementation of MAD the 
quality of analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ following. Panel A reflects the effect of MAD on the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. Panel B presents the result of the regression analysis examining the effect of MAD on the dispersion of 
analysts forecast dispersion. Panel C examines the effect of MAD on the average number of analysts following a firm. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.1. The p-values appear in the parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for firm clustering. *significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% 
level. 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Forecast_Error Forecast_Dispersion Analysts_Following 
 Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Coefficients 
(p-values) 
MAD -0.187*** 
(0.000) 
-0.184*** 
(0.000) 
-0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-8.941*** 
(0.000) 
-8.993*** 
(0.000) 
Post 0.009 
(0.205) 
0.003 
(0.698) 
0.000 
(0.850) 
-0.000 
(0.936) 
-0.581*** 
(0.000) 
-0.442*** 
(0.001) 
MAD*Post -0.177*** 
(0.001) 
-0.159*** 
(0.002) 
-0.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.028*** 
(0.000) 
-2.494*** 
(0.000) 
-2.873*** 
(0.000) 
Size -0.014** 
(0.039) 
-0.014** 
(0.038) 
-0.001* 
(0.067) 
-0.001* 
(0.066) 
3.083*** 
(0.000) 
3.084*** 
(0.000) 
ES 0.326* 
(0.059) 
0.327* 
(0.059) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
1.049*** 
(0.000) 
1.039*** 
(0.000) 
Std(ROE) -0.000 
(0.463) 
-0.000 
(0.463) 
-0.000 
(0.530) 
-0.000 
(0.530) 
-0.000 
(0.937) 
-0.000 
(0.939) 
RetEarCor -0.006 
(0.708) 
-0.005 
(0.720) 
0.004* 
(0.051) 
0.004* 
(0.051) 
-0.515 
(0.046) 
-0.520** 
(0.044) 
Analysts_Following --0.000 
(0.998) 
0.000 
(0.988) 
-0.000 
(0.126) 
-0.000 
(0.127) 
  
IFRS 0.072 
(0.181) 
0.073 
(0.178) 
0.014* 
(0.064) 
0.014* 
(0.064) 
3.617*** 
(0.000) 
3.608*** 
(0.000) 
RegQuality  0.130 
(0.140) 
 0.002 
(0.746) 
 -2.721* 
(0.055) 
Constant 0.201*** 
(0.002) 
-.0010 
(0.995) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-4.877*** 
(0.000) 
-0.606 
(0.807) 
Ind dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 10.31% 10.31% 14.14% 14.14% 59.32% 59.32% 
N 5078 5078 4392 4392 5078 5078 
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Table 4.7: Robustness test 
This table presents the results of our analysis where we superficially move the implementation date of MAD, one 
by one, over year from 2002 to 2006 and re-run the analysis. For example, first we assume that MAD is 
implemented in year 2002. Accordingly, we set MAD equal to 1 for each financial year 2002 to 2006 and 0 for 
year 2001. Similarly we repeat this procedure for year 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. We do not start from year 2001 
because in that case MAD would be equal to 1 over entire sample period of our analysis. For brevity, we do not 
report results of the control variables. 
Panel A SRV 
(0, +1) 
SRV 
(-1, +1) 
SRV 
(-2, +2) 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
2002 0.001 3.794 0.001 1.971 0.003 2.363 
2003 -0.000 -0.261 -0.000 -0.533 -0.002 -0.967 
MAD -0.001 -2.949 -0.001 -2.966 -0.003 -2.447 
2005 -0.001 -4.865 -0.002 -4.478 -0.004 -4.545 
2006 -0.001 -5.906 -0.002 -5.031 -0.004 -4.405 
Panel B ACAR 
(-5, +1) 
ACAR 
(-20, +1) 
ACAR 
(-30, +1) 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
2002 0.005 1.266 0.001 0.136 0.029 2.996 
2003 -0.006 -1.407 -0.013 -1.879 0.003 0.428 
MAD -0.008 -2.226 -0.020 -3.182 -0.011 -1.429 
2005 -0.017 -5.159 -0.024 -4.015 -0.025 -3.397 
2006 -0.015 -4.774 -0.020 -3.166 -0.034 -4.708 
Panel C Forecast_ 
Accuracy 
Forecast_ 
Dispersion 
Analysts’_ 
Following 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
2002 0.078 2.889 0.004 0.784 -2.242 -3.781 
2003 -0.257 -2.692 -0.040 -4.014 -2.891 -6.512 
MAD -0.177 -3.237 -0.029 -3.832 -2.494 -6.578 
2005 -0.120 -3.133 -0.027 -4.632 -1.929 -5.314 
2006 -0.057 -2.734 -0.019 -4.630 -1.827 -4.759 
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Figure 4.1: Panel A. description of the figure 

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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
 
This thesis studies the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in capital markets and the effects 
of two important regulatory decisions that are meant to improve the quality of information 
available to the capital markets and hence their integrity. In particular, this thesis examines a) the 
importance of CRAs to debt markets and the level of trust investors place on the credit ratings 
assigned by CRAs, b) whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) has improves the quality of accounting information in the European Union (EU), and c) 
whether the implementation of Market Abuse Directive (MAD) has been successful in deterring 
market manipulation activities, reducing selective disclosure of private information, and 
improving the flow and quality of information to capital markets. 
Credit ratings are the opinions of CRAs about the credit quality of various debt securities and 
are known to influence investors’ choices as well as policymakers’ regulatory decisions. Over 
the years, however, the CRAs have been subject to strong criticism related to their integrity, 
independence, and accuracy of information. CRAs became even more controversial because of 
their alleged negligence that led to the recent financial crisis. Chapter 2 shows that, amid these 
controversies, investors do not appear to rely on credit ratings as the sole evidence of a debt 
security’s credit risk. Rather, they appear to carry an analysis of their own to form an opinion 
about the accuracy of those ratings. That is, the investors seem to distinguish whether or not 
credit ratings assigned by CRAs correspond to the ratings that are expected based on publically 
available information (expected ratings) and adjust the required yield accordingly. In particular, 
the results show that after controlling for all relevant factors, the investors require a higher yield 
for bonds that receive higher than expected ratings compared to similar bonds for which the 
credit ratings assigned by CRAs are equal to their expected ratings. The results also show that 
the difference between the ratings assigned by CRAs and expected ratings lowers the 
information content of credit ratings. This chapter also sheds light on the premium required by 
investors on split rated bonds. The results confirm the findings of previous studies that show that 
investors demand a premium, referred to as an opacity premium, on split rated bonds. However, 
as opposed to the previous studies, this chapter shows that part of the opacity premium fades 
away when the odds that actual ratings assigned to the split rated bonds might be higher than the 
expected ratings are accounted for. Finally, this chapter also shows that Moody’s updates the 
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ratings of bonds that receive higher than expected ratings much earlier when they bonds sell at 
higher than expected yield. No such evidence is found for S&P.  
Chapter 3 examines whether the introduction of IFRS improves the quality of accounting 
information in EU. The move towards IFRS is a global trend and a large number of countries 
requires, or at least allows, firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS. 
The scale of adoption of IFRS raises a natural question of whether or not the switch from local 
GAAP to IFRS is actually achieving the desired objectives. Many recent studies try to answer 
this question by focusing on equity markets while the evidence from the debt market largely 
remains ignored. Chapter 3 fills this gap in the literature by examining and comparing the quality 
of accounting information prepared under IFRS and other local GAAP used in the EU from the 
perspective of CRAs, an important information intermediary of the debt markets. The particular 
proxies for the quality of accounting information used in this chapter are the level of credit 
ratings assigned by the CRAs and the frequency and magnitude of rating disagreements between 
the CRAs. The review of existing literature reveal that both of these proxies reflect the level of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty that exists in the rating process which, in turn, depend on 
the quality of accounting information.  
Based on the analysis of bonds issued by European financial firms during 1996-2008, the 
results in Chapter 3 reveal that bonds issued by firms reporting under IFRS receive better ratings 
and are less likely to be split rated compared to the bonds issued by a firm reporting under other 
accounting standards. The results in Chapter 3 also reveal a decline in the pattern of lopsided 
ratings after firms start to report under IFRS. These results remain robust to various sample 
compositions. All together the results in Chapter 3 show that reporting under IFRS improves the 
quality of accounting information as IFRS based financial reports seem to make it easier for the 
CRAs to value the assets of the issuer’s firm and its financial risk.  
Chapter 4 focuses on one of the important directives, MAD, promulgated in Europe with the 
purpose to enhance the integrity of the security markets. Although regulators are optimistic about 
the success of MAD (and anecdotal evidence also suggests so), there is very limited empirical 
evidence available to support this optimism. Chapter 4 concentrates on the three most important 
provisions of this directive that aim to a) deter the market manipulation activities, b) require 
prompt release of all inside information through public sources, and c) disallow private 
disclosure of material information to selected individuals such as security analysts. The results 
provide strong evidence of the success of these MAD provisions. In particular, the results in 
Chapter 4 show that the stock return volatility around the earnings announcement decreases after 
the implementation of MAD. The existing literature shows that a reduction in market 
manipulation activities and the prompt disclosure of private information lowers the volatility of 
stock prices. Further, results show that the stock prices in the post-MAD period remain closer to 
their real prices (prices subsequent to the earnings announcements) during the time period prior 
to earnings announcements. This finding indicates that firms feed market with new information 
earlier after enactment of MAD. With respect to the restriction on selective disclosures, Chapter 
4 concentrates on the accuracy and dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts as well as the analysts’ 
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following. Chapter 4 provides evidence that the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts improves and the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts declines in the post-MAD years. Chapter 4 further reports a 
decline in the average number of analysts following a firm. A review of analysts’ reports 
literature shows that a restriction on the selective disclosure of information reduces analysts’ 
dependence on firm management and thus reduces bias in their forecasts which in turn improves 
the accuracy of their forecasts. The same literature also reveals that a restriction of the provision 
of selective disclosures narrows the heterogeneity of information possessed by different analysts 
which leads to a reduction in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Finally, the literature on 
analysts’ reports shows that analysts prefer to follow those firms that give them access to private 
information. A restriction of the provision of private information forces analysts to allocate their 
resources to a smaller number of firms in order to market themselves based on the accuracy of 
their forecasts. Based on these findings, the results in Chapter 4 provide evidence of a decline in 
the level of selective disclosures. 
 
5.2 Suggestions for future research 
 
This thesis consists of three studies that examine the importance of credit rating information 
for the debt market, whether the introduction of IFRS improves the quality of information, and 
whether the implementation of MAD achieves its objectives. The topics covered in this thesis 
pertain to the efforts made to improve the functionality of the security markets. The development 
of security markets is an ongoing process and needs continuous monitoring and introduction of 
new rules.  
Chapter 2 examines the worth of credit rating information for the debt market. As discussed in 
this thesis, the CRAs came under strong criticism for their negligence that led to the recent 
financial crisis. This criticism led regulators around the world to ponder a framework that would 
allow for better monitoring of CRAs so as to make their rating methodology more transparent 
and hold them more accountable for any deliberate negligence. The Rating Accountability and 
Transparency Enhancement (RATE) and Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament are two major examples of such frameworks. In addition to the effects of these 
regulatory steps, CRAs themselves are also expected to be cautious of losing the value of their 
services. Together, these factors are likely to force CRAs to undertake actions to make rating 
criteria more transparent and understandable. Future research may investigate whether or not 
these actions enhance investors trust in the credit rating information. 
Chapter 3 provides evidence that the implementation of IFRS improves the quality of 
accounting information in Europe. One of the important objectives of the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) is to enhance the comparability of accounting information. 
However, the critics think that a simple adoption of IFRS might not make the accounting 
information comparable over different countries because of difference in level of enforcement of 
regulations in different countries. Further, although the current currently available evidence 
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generally suggests that application of IFRS improves the quality of accounting information, the 
adoption of IFRS might lead countries to abolish their own accounting standard boards and, 
consequently, lower the competition among the accounting standard boards (Ball, 2006). This is 
ultimately expected to lower the quality of accounting standards in the long run. Future studies 
may examine whether the adoption of IFRS enhances the comparability of accounting 
information across different countries and their long term impact on the quality of accounting 
information. 
Chapter 4 examines and provides evidence about the effects of MAD on market manipulation 
activities, flow of information to the security markets and provision of selective disclosures. 
Among other objectives, the implementation of MAD is aimed at creating a single market in 
financial services and to facilitate cross border cooperation within EU. Future research might 
investigate whether these objectives have been achieved. 
   
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de rol van kredietbeoordelaars in kapitaalmarkten en de effecten 
van twee nieuw van kracht zijnde belangrijke regelgeving die bedoeld zijn om de kwaliteit te 
verbeteren van de beschikbare informatie voor kapitaalmarkten en als gevolg daarvan hun 
integriteit. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt in het bijzonder a) het belang van kredietbeoordelaars 
voor de schuldmarkten en de mate waarin investeerders de kredietbeoordelingen vertrouwen van 
kredietbeoordelaars, b) of de adoptie van de International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
de kwaliteit van de financiële informatie heeft verbeterd in de Europese Unie (EU), en c) of de 
implementatie van de Market Abuse Directive (MAD) succesvol is geweest in het afschrikken 
van mogelijke overtreders van marktmanipulatie, in het reduceren van ongelijke 
informatieverstrekking aan verschillende stakeholders, en het verbeteren van de 
informatiestroom en de kwaliteit van de informatie aan de kapitaalmarkten.  
Kredietbeoordelingen zijn de meningen van kredietbeoordelaars over de kredietwaardigheid 
van verscheidene soorten schuldbewijzen en staan erom bekend dat ze de keuzes van 
investeerders beïnvloeden, alsook de nieuwe regelgeving die beleidsmakers ontwikkelen. Door 
de jaren heen hebben kredietbeoordelaars echter met stevige kritiek te maken over hun 
integriteit, onafhankelijkheid, en over de nauwkeurigheid van hun informatie. De rol en info van 
kredietbeoordelaars werd alleen maar controversiëler door hun vermeende nalatigheid welke 
leidde tot de huidige financiële crisis. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat te midden van deze 
controversies, investeerders niet alleen lijken te steunen op kredietbeoordelingen als bewijs voor  
het kredietrisico van een schuldbewijs. In plaats daarvan lijken ze zelf een analyse uit te voeren 
om een oordeel te vormen over de nauwkeurigheid van de kredietbeoordelingen. Dat wil zeggen, 
beleggers lijken te kijken of kredietbeoordelingen van kredietbeoordelaars overeenkomen met de 
verwachte kredietbeoordelingen op basis van openbaar beschikbare informatie en passen hun 
vereiste rendement daarop aan. De resultaten van het onderzoek laten zien dat nadat alle 
relevante factoren beheerst zijn, investeerders een hoger vereist rendement verlangen voor 
obligaties die een hoger dan verwachte kredietbeoordeling krijgen in vergelijking met obligaties 
die een kredietbeoordeling krijgen die overeenkomt met hun eigen verwachtingen. De resultaten 
van het onderzoek laten ook zien dat het verschil tussen de kredietbeoordelingen van 
kredietbeoordelaars en de eigen verwachte beoordeling, de informatiewaarde vermindert van de 
kredietbeoordelingen. Dit hoofdstuk schept ook licht op de premie die investeerders verlangen 
bij het splitsen van obligaties. De resultaten bevestigen de bevindingen uit eerdere onderzoeken 
die laten zien dat beleggers een premie verlangen, een zogenaamde opaciteit premie, bij het 
splitsen van obligaties. Echter, in tegenstelling tot eerdere onderzoeken laat dit hoofdstuk zien 
dat een deel van de opaciteit premie verdwijnt wanneer de kans dat de kredietbeoordelingen van 
de kredietbeoordelaars voor de gesplitste obligaties hoger is dan de verwachte  eigen beoordeling 
op basis van openbaar beschikbare informatie. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt of de introductie van 
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IFRS de kwaliteit van de financiële informatie in de EU heeft verbeterd. De overgang naar IFRS 
is een wereldwijde trend en een groot aantal landen vereist, of staat toe, dat ondernemingen hun 
jaarrekeningen opstellen in overeenstemming met IFRS. De omvang van de overgang naar IFRS 
roept de vraag op of er niet overgegaan moet worden van nationale accountingstandaarden naar 
IFRS om de nagestreefde doelen te bereiken. Veel recente onderzoeken proberen deze vraag te 
beantwoorden door te focusen op de aandelenmarkten, terwijl de ontwikkelingen op de 
schuldmarkten grotendeels worden genegeerd. Hoofdstuk 3 vult deze kloof in de literatuur door 
de kwaliteit van financiële informatie te onderzoeken en vergelijken bij toepassing van IFRS en 
andere nationale accountingstandaarden in de EU vanuit het perspectief van de 
kredietbeoordelaars, een belangrijke groep informatieverstrekkers voor de schuldmarkten. De 
gebruikte proxies voor de kwaliteit van de financiële informatie in dit hoofdstuk, zijn de hoogte 
van de verstrekte kredietbeoordelingen door kredietbeoordelaars en de mate en omvang van de 
verschillen tussen kredietbeoordelingen van verschillende kredietbeoordelaars. Het 
literatuuronderzoek in de bestaande literatuur laat zien dat beide proxies de mate van informatie 
assymetrie en onzekerheid weerspiegelen die bestaat in het kredietbeoordelingsproces. Deze zijn 
op hun beurt weer afhankelijk van de kwaliteit van de financiële informatie. 
Op basis van de analyse van obligaties die uitgegeven zijn door Europese financiële 
instellingen tussen 1996 en 2008, onthullen de resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 dat obligaties die zijn 
uitgegeven door instellingen die IFRS toepassen, betere kredietbeoordelingen krijgen dan die 
zijn uitgegeven door andere instellingen. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 onthullen ook een afname 
van het aantal scheve kredietbeoordelingen nadat ondernemingen IFRS toepassen. Deze 
resultaten blijven robuust bij verschillende sample composities. Samenvattend laten de resultaten 
in hoofdstuk 3 zien dat het toepassen van IFRS de kwaliteit van de financiële informatie 
verbeterd doordat het voor kredietbeoordelaars makkelijker wordt de waarde van de activa en de 
financiële risico’s te beoordelen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op een van de belangrijkste richtlijnen, MAD, die is afgekondigd in 
Europa met als doel de integriteit van de effectenmarkten te vergroten. Alhoewel beleidsmakers 
positief zijn over het succes van MAD (en anekdotisch bewijs hetzelfde suggereert), is er weinig 
emperisch bewijs beschikbaar om dit optimisme te ondersteunen. Hoofdstuk 4 concentreert zich 
op de 3 meest belangrijke bepalingen van deze richtlijn die ernaar streven a) marktmanipulatie 
activiteiten af te schrikken, b) gelijk binnen het bedrijf beschikbare informatie naar buiten toe te 
communiceren via openbaar toegangkelijke informatiekanalen, en c) niet toe te staan dat 
materiële informatie wordt verstrekt aan specifieke individuen zoals analisten. De resultaten 
geven sterke aanwijzingen dat de MAD bepalingen succesvol zijn. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 4 
laten onder meer zien dat de volatiliteit van aandelenrendementen rond winstaankondigingen 
afneemt na toepassing van MAD. De bestaande literatuur laat zien dat een vermindering van 
marktmanipulatie activiteiten en het gelijk naar buiten toe communiceren van intern beschikbare 
informatie, de volatiliteit vermindert van aandelenkoersen. De resultaten laten verder zien dat 
aandelenkoersen nadat MAD van kracht is, dichter in de buurt blijven van de werkelijke waarden 
(de waarden volgend op winstaankondigingen) gedurende de periode voorafgaand aan de 
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winstaankondigingen. Deze resultaten wijzen erop dat ondernemingen sneller nieuwe informatie 
verstrekken aan markten nadat de MAD richtlijn van kracht is geworden. Ten aanzien van dat 
MAD niet toestaat dat materiële informatie wordt verstrekt aan  specifieke individuen zoals 
analisten, richt hoofdstuk 4 zich op de nauwkeurigheid en de spreiding van de prognoses van 
analysten. Hoofdstuk 4 levert aanwijzingen dat de nauwkeurigheid van de prognoses van 
analysten verbeterd en de spreiding van de prognoses vermindert sinds MAD van kracht is. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat verder een afname zien van het gemiddelde aantal analysten dat een 
onderneming volgt. Een literatuuronderzoek over rapporten van analysten laat zien dat een 
beperking in het verstrekken van informatie aan specifieke individuen, ertoe leidt dat analysten 
minder afhankelijk worden van managers. Dit leidt vervolgens tot minder subjectiviteit in 
prognoses hetgeen leidt tot nauwkeurigere prognoses. Tot slot laat het literatuuronderzoek over 
rapporten van analysten zien dat analysten er de voorkeur aan geven om ondernemingen te 
volgen waarvan ze meer informatie krijgen dan anderen. De beperking hiervan als gevolg van 
MAD, leidt ertoe dat analysten zich richten op een kleiner aantal ondernemingen om zich te 
onderscheiden op basis van de nauwkeurigheid van hun prognoses. Op basis van deze 
bevindingen geven de resultaten in hoofdstuk 4 aanwijzingen dat er een afname is in het 
verstrekken van informatie aan specifieke individuen zoals analysten. 
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This thesis studies the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in capital markets, and the
effects of two important regulatory decisions that are taken to improve the quality of
information available to the capital markets. In particular, this thesis examines a) the
importance of credit ratings to the debt markets and the level of trust investors place on
CRAs b) whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
improves the quality of accounting information in European Union, and c) whether
implementation of Market Abuse Directive (MAD) has been successful in deterring the
market manipulation activities, improving the quality and flow of information to the
capital markets, and reducing selective disclosure of private information. Chapter 2 of this
thesis shows that the extent of investors’ reliance on the credit ratings depends on
whether or not these ratings correspond to the ratings that are expected based on
publically available information. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the reporting under IFRS is
associated with higher credit ratings and a lower probability and level of rating
disagreements between CRAs. The results in Chapter 4 reveal a decrease in the level of
market manipulation activities and the provision of selective disclosures subsequent to the
implementation of MAD. Chapter 4 also provides evidence of more timely and accurate
information flowing to the security markets after implementation of MAD. Overall the
findings in this thesis show that the participants in the capital markets prefer credit
ratings that have strong association with the publically available information and that
financial regulations introduced during the last decade enhanced the quantity and quality
of information available to the capital markets. 
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